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Abstract
Purpose: Although it is a country with abundant natural resources, Nigeria suffers poor
economic, social and development conditions as one of the resource curse countries in subSaharan Africa. In order to work towards a solution, Nigeria embarked on the journey by
adopting the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) to fight corruption and provide
transparency and accountability in its extractive industry. However, after more than a decade,
the domestic attempt through the Nigerian Extractive Transparency Industry Initiative (NEITI)
has failed to deliver on its stated objectives to promote open and accountable management.
NEITI is a disclosure regime mandated through Nigerian legislation with weak compliance
protocols, thus rendering it a hybrid accountability device. The social responsibility literature
in accounting is replete with examples of reporting frameworks as legitimating devices or mere
exercises in impression management for a range of known and unknown spectators. This thesis
critically examines the process of embedding transparency within NEITI as part of a broader
framework of accountability as a spectacular production.

Theoretical and Methodological approach: This thesis adopts a discourse approach to
understand how the spectacle of transparency and accountability is delivered in NEITI
published reports. The thesis adopts Debord’s (1967) Theory of Spectacle to explain how
NEITI maintains the ideals of global capital through a false impression of originality. Debord
initially developed the idea of spectacle, from the French term for theatre, to explain the rise
of neoliberalism and capital in the 1960s. Spectacles serve to reinforce a dominant ideology,
while concealing others, through the production of spectacles totalising “images” of society for
an audience of spectators. Since then, scholars have identified the spectacle in a wide variety
of events and circumstance, using a range of techniques, including accounting disclosures and
the reporting process. Since language and discourse are at the centre of understanding social
phenomenon, Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) is
used to analyse the rhetorical features found in NEITI reports within their broader legislative
and political context.
Findings: The transparency provided by NEITI is limited, the quality of information in the
reports is questionable, and conceals several important aspects in the extractive industry.
Therefore, the delivery of promised accountability is undermined. Given the unequal power
relations in the NEITI governance framework, the inability to initiate criminal prosecution, and
I

many other legal loopholes; this finding is not unexpected. Therefore, this thesis provides an
insight into the process that creates the spectacle of transparency as a pseudo-reality to mediate
accountability (the spectacle of transparency-as-accountability) and maintain the status quo.
Research Contributions: This thesis contributes to the accounting literature in several ways.
First, by studying the use of a hybrid global disclosure regime to foster transparency and
accountability it extends the application of the Theory of Spectacle. Prior studies using
spectacle as a means of understanding disclosures and reporting have focussed on managerial
tools, such as budgets, or corporate social responsibility reports. Second, the thesis offers
empirical support to theoretically informed application of the spectacle in society (see Boje
(2001; 2001a). Third, describing a form of spectacular accountability borne out the spectacle
of transparency, the spectacle of transparency-as-accountability, and its implications for
poverty alleviation and mitigation of the resource curse. Finally, the thesis methodologically
contributed by applying Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) unique approach to critical discourse
analysis (CDA) in the field of accounting for the first time. Through its three levels of analysis
including visualisation, valuation and mobilisation Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach
helped to untangle the complexities of transparency and accountability discourse.
Research Limitations: While NEITI publishes financial, process and physical audits, the
analysis was limited to the financial audit. Including the process and physical audits provide
further understandings of the process of NEITI to ameliorate corruption. In addition, the data
is limited to publicly available documents, interviews with NEITI officials, managers of CSOs
involved in NEITI work and directors of MNCs affected by NEITI will provide a spectator
perspective on NEITI.
Future research: several research opportunities exist including: the work of CSOs in Nigeria
in the process of a ‘watchdog’; and. a comparison between NEITI and the EITI implementation
in a developed country EITI, such as Norway where different spectators exist. The analysis
also highlighted the use of images of calculative practices, such as graphs and charts, as a form
of rhetoric. Further analysis of the process of calculative presentations would add additional
insight into the process of the spectacle.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The extractive industry, including oil, natural gas, minerals and similar non-regenerative
resource operations, accounts for a quarter of the world's gross domestic production (GDP),
with almost 81 countries, or half of the world's population, depending on it (World Bank 2017).
It plays a vital role in the economic, social and political global context (EITI 2017a; IFRS 2017;
World Bank 2017). Its importance is amplified in developing countries, where it represents a
“key source of jobs, energy, government revenues, and a wide array of other benefits for local
economies” (International Finance Corporation 2017, np). Therefore, the extractive industry
supports the growth and stability of the global economy, especially for many of the developing
countries.
Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing field of research led by Richard Auty, a British
economist, suggesting that
[c]ountries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas,
often perform worse in terms of economic development and good
governance than do countries with fewer resources (Humphreys, Sachs &
Stiglitz 2007, p.408).
These economic, social and development conditions are known as a resource curse (Auty,
1993). While corruption and lack of transparency and accountability are considered among the
contributors to this resource curse, two factors have been identified as the main causes. First,
the overdependence of resource-rich developing countries on a sole commodity for government
revenues results in the neglect of other economic sectors (Karl 1997). Second, the scarcity of
natural resources makes these countries vulnerable to many other countries’ contentious
attempts to control them (Auty 2001).
Nigeria is considered the largest economy in Africa, and has an abundance of natural resources;
however, the country suffers from poor economic, social and political conditions; in other
1

words, it is a classic example of the resource curse (Auty, 1993). The lack of transparency, an
inadequate accountability system and widespread corruption in all sectors, especially the
extractive industry, have been identified as the key factors of Nigeria’s economic, social and
political troubles (Adams, Osho & Coleman 2008). Given the power and importance of the
extractive industry in Nigeria, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the Nigerian Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI)2, the objectives of which are to provide transparency,
accountability and better governance outcomes for the Nigerian extractive industry. Since it
has been widely adopted by resource-rich countries, the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) framework has been selected from several other attempts to overcome the
negative consequences of the resource curse. The other attempts include, but are not limited
to, Publish What You Pay, Revenue Watch and Global Witness (Corrigan 2014; Schuler 2012).
The following background to the extractive industry, the resource curse, the oil and gas sector
and its economic significance in Nigeria sets the context for the thesis, together with the
economic, historical and social context of the country. This is followed by a discussion of the
theory, methodology and structure of the thesis.

1.2 The context of the thesis
Nigeria is a resource-abundant country, and its economy depends heavily on the extractive
industry, which is dominated by oil and gas (Shaxson 2009). For example, the extraction of oil
and gas contributes up to 77% to the government budgetary revenues, and almost 90% of
Nigerian exports (Akinrele 2014; EITI 2017b; International Monetary Fund 2020; Okeiyi
2017; Shaxson 2009). Nigeria is considered Africa's largest oil exporter and natural-gas
reserve, and is the world’s sixth-largest oil producer (Akinrele 2014; NEITI 2018a; World
Bank 2017b). Nigeria has Africa’s largest economy, with a total GDP of US$397.27 billion in

2

NEITI is the Nigerian version of the international Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).
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2018 (CIA World Factbook 2018; World Bank 2019, UNICEF 2017). However, despite its
natural resources, Nigeria is an example of a country that suffers from the resource curse. In
particular, the high levels of corruption and lack of transparency in the extractive industry
contribute to problems in ensuring political and corporate accountability (Ihugba 2014).
Nigeria was subject to military dictatorships and successive military coups between 1966 and
1999 (Afigbo 2005). However, the election of the civilian president Olusegun Obasanjo in
1999 ended the military rule that had been characterised by corruption and a lack of economic
and political transparency and accountability (Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz 2005).
In addition, the overreliance on extractive-industry revenues disadvantages the other Nigerian
economic sectors, such as agriculture and industry (Adams, Osho & Coleman 2008). Further,
the average life conditions for Nigerian citizens has shown insignificant improvement, and at
times even a negative trend (Agbonifo 2011, World Bank 2019). For example, Nigeria records
high maternal, child and infant mortality rates, a lack of clean water, 10.5 million children outof-school, a high unemployment rate and over half of its population living below the poverty
line (CIA World Factbook 2018; UNICEF 2017). These economic, social and political
indicators confirm Nigeria’s suffering under the resource curse (Akinrele 2014).
Therefore, this thesis examines the transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s extractive
industry delivered through NEITI. NEITI was introduced as part of the socio-economic reform
programme of the former Nigerian president Obasanjo to improve the transparency and
accountability of the political and economic systems and performance of the economy (Caspary
2012; NEITI 2018b). Therefore, it is important to explore the current literature on EITI and its
Nigerian version, NEITI, in addition to their key mechanisms to ensure transparency and
accountability.

3

1.3 EITI Framework
EITI was established in 2002 as “a global standard to promote the open and accountable
management of oil, gas and mineral resources” (EITI 2017, np; EITI 2017c). While the EITI
principles (Appendix 1) indicate its voluntary nature, the initiative is supported by many
international economic groups such as the World Bank and the G7 and G20 groups (EITI
2017c; La Viña, Hoff & DeRose 2003). By mid-2019 there were 52 countries implementing
the EITI Standard, of which all were developing countries except for Norway, the United
Kingdom and Germany (EITI 2019). However, many developed countries, including Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Japan, while not implementing EITI Standard, are part of
EITI through a wide network of supporters (EITI 2017g). This network includes multi-national
companies (MNCs) such as Chevron, Shell, ExxonMobil and Total; partner organisations
including the G83 and G204 groups, the European Commission, the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (Caspary 2012; EITI 2017g); and large international CSOs such
as Global Witness and the Publish What You Pay Coalition.
From its founding in 2002 until 2012, EITI’s main objective was to achieve transparency in
the extractive industry (Corrigan 2014). However, since 2013 the EITI Standard5 has explicitly
made transparency and accountability the main objectives. Therefore, through transparency
and accountability EITI aims to oversee and report on the entire extractive-activity value chain

3

The G8 group “was the name of a political forum that ran from 1997 until 2014” (World Population Review
2020, np). It originally included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States and
Russia. Upon Russia’s withdrawal in 2017, it became known as the G7 group
The G20 group, a forum that discusses the international financial system, includes 20 of the world’s largest
economies: the European Union, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom and the
United States (G20 2020).
4

5

EITI provides the governance framework for implementation. The EITI Standard provides guidance on the
disclosure requirements for reporting. Within the EITI Standard are the 12 principles outlining the qualitative
characteristics (Appendix 1).
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from the discovery of reserves to the distribution of revenues. To achieve transparency, EITI
uses a reporting mechanism to produce and publish annual reports about the extractive industry.
And to achieve accountability, EITI engages a multi-stakeholder mechanism to increase public
debate (Corrigan 2014; Egbon 2015; Short 2014; Smith, Shepherd & Dorward 2012).

The multi-stakeholder group includes representatives from the government, MNCs and local
companies operating in the industry and civil society organisations (CSOs). The multistakeholder group appoints independent auditors to conduct the reconciliation of revenue
streams between companies and the government and publishes reports as a platform to facilitate
public debate (EITI 2017d; Öge 2016a). However, the multi-stakeholder group has been
criticised for an uneven power distribution between companies, especially MNCs that have
financial and technical dominance compared to weak host governments and incompetent
CSOs. This is more evident in the non-democratic regimes that dominate in developing
countries (Detomasi 2007; Florini 2003; Furstenberg 2015; Levy & Prakash 2003). For
example, studies have confirmed that the value of CSOs in developing countries is undermined
by unequal power distributions across governments and companies in jurisdictions such as
Madagascar (Smith, Shepherd & Dorward 2012) and Ghana (Andrews 2016).

Several studies suggest that joining EITI has many benefits for host governments and MNCs.
For example, EITI membership can improve the investment environment and attract foreign
capital and international aid (David-Barrett & Okamura 2016; Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016;
Short 2014; Sturesson & Zobel 2015), as EITI members are perceived as accountable (Al
Faruque 2006; Malden 2017). Therefore, Schuler (2012, p.1) suggests that EITI benefits:
MNCs from countries with long arm disclosure laws, to MNCs lacking
relationships with NGOs seeking inexpensive CSR, to MNCs relying upon
financing from institutional and social investors, to MNCs attempting to
differentiate themselves from competitors on social criteria, and to MNCs
with broad stakeholder-focused top managers.

5

Several studies cite other benefits such as reducing poverty and building sustainable economic
growth (Pitlik, Frank & Firchow 2010); enhancing the credibility of local institutions such as
government public companies operating in the extractive industry (Corrigan 2014); ensuring
wise governance of natural resources (Al Faruque 2006); reducing corruption (Papyrakis,
Rieger & Gilberthorpe 2017; Villar & Papyrakis 2016); and promoting transparency and
accountability (Aas Rustad, Le Billon & Lujala 2017; Al Faruque 2006; Hess 2012; Sovacool
& Andrews 2015).

In spite of all these benefits, EITI is still regarded as a soft law that cannot address issues such
as transparency, accountability and corruption in a meaningful way (Andrews 2016; Fasterling
2012; Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016). In addition, the transparency provided by EITI is
regarded as narrow in scope (Le Billon 2011; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016; Sovacool &
Andrews 2015). Further, it is argued that the level of corruption has not changed in the
countries that have implemented EITI (Haufler 2010; Öge 2016b). This is further supported by
Sovacool et al.’s (2016 p.179) study, which confirms that “in most metrics EITI countries do
not perform better during EITI compliance than previously, and that they do not outperform
other countries”.
1.3.1 NEITI
NEITI is the Nigerian national version of the global EITI. Nigeria joined EITI in 2003 and
established the National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) (Löwenheim 2008). Nigeria’s
decision to join EITI was driven by an international call for transparency in the country’s
economic, political and social activities and internally by the “comprehensive socio-economic
reform programme embarked upon by the Federal Government of Nigeria” (Caspary 2012;
NEITI 2018b, np). In addition, Nigeria codified the EITI principles into the NEITI Act 2007
(the Act) (Aigbovo & Atsegbua 2013; Luqman & Lawal 2011). This made Nigeria EITI’s
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flagship country, as the Act goes far beyond EITI requirements (Kemp & Martens 2007;
Muhammad 2016; Okeiyi 2017). While it is argued that the Act establishes a legal framework
to implement the EITI Standard and achieve the required transparency and accountability
(Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019; NEITI 2018b), several studies have criticised the Act for
its many flaws. First, the Act has not reduced the level of corruption (Haufler 2010; Okeke &
Aniche 2013). Second, the Act does not give NEITI the power to initiate criminal action against
noncompliant parties (Ihugba 2014). Third, there is no definition of best practice for the
extractive industry in terms of transparency and accountability (Okeke & Aniche 2013).

Opinion is divided about whether NEITI has been successful in achieving transparency and
accountability in the Nigerian extractive industry. For example, Okeiyi (2017) suggests that
NEITI did, in fact, make the extractive industry transparent and reveal how the main players
in the industry work and interact with each other. Further, the publication of NEITI reports is
considered as an example of NEITI’s ability to be transparent, given that most of the reports
reveal discrepancies in the financial flows between the government and extractive companies
(Löwenheim 2008; Luqman & Lawal 2011).

In contrast, several studies have found that NEITI has failed to achieve accountability in the
Nigerian extractive industry. For example, Aigbovo and Atsegbua (2013) assert that no
corrective measures were taken to fix discrepancies in the revenue streams that appeared in
NEITI reports, and no-one has been held accountable for the misconduct. In addition, NEITI
was unable to overcome the unequal power distribution that stripped from CSOs the ability to
oversee the audit process between the government and companies and interrogate
noncompliant parties (Ekhator 2014). In addition, several MNCs dominate the discourse of
transparency and accountability in the industry, which allows them to legitimise their nontransparent practices by claiming cooperation with NEITI and creating an impression of
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transparency (Egbon 2015). Finally, the irregular publishing schedule of the NEITI reports
reduces the importance of their information and NEITI’s ability to hold noncompliant parties
accountable (Kolstad & Wiig 2009).
This thesis will build on these prior studies by providing a more nuanced understanding of
transparency and accountability, the fundamental constructs of EITI and NEITI, from an
accounting and discourse perspective.

1.4 Aims- exploring transparency and accountability
While accountability and transparency are the promised outcomes of both the EITI framework
and NEITI, these terms may have differing definitions, depending on the field or discipline of
knowledge. For example, while Collin (2003) uses “transparent” to refer to things that can be
seen through, Fox (2007) distinguishes between two types of transparency: opaque and clear.
In opaque transparency, the quality of data is problematic since it contains information that
might be inappropriate (Fox 2007). On the other hand, the data in clear transparency is limited
to the subject matter to make a timely and clear picture of that which is disclosed. This shows
that to achieve true transparency, the quality, timing and amount of the information are crucial.
Tsoukas (1997, p.827), for example, argues that “[m]ore information may lead to less
understanding; more information may undermine trust; and more information may make
society less rationally governable”. Since uncovering information or making information
publicly available may not always achieve transparency, Neyland (2007) suggests that it is
crucial to have a level of trust in the intentions of the actors and the information presented to
ensure a form of genuine transparency; not merely transparency in appearance, which presents
a desirable image of an organisation while hiding other aspects to mislead stakeholders
(Teurlings & Stauff 2014).
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Kolstad and Wiig (2009, p.522) define the transparency provided by EITI as “timely and
reliable economic, social and political information…accessible to all relevant stakeholders”.
However, this definition does not define essential characteristics for transparency, such as the
scope and quality of the information disclosed, or the ability of stakeholders to comprehend
the disclosed information. Therefore, in this thesis, these characteristics are taken into
consideration when examining the transparency of NEITI. These are essential factors, as
incomprehensible information, whether because the source presents it so or the recipient cannot
understand it, does not promote transparency; rather, the disclosure of inappropriate, inaccurate
or incomprehensible information creates confusion (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016). Thus,
the recipient’s capacity to comprehend, process and work upon the financial and legal aspects
of this information is essential to transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016). Therefore,
transparency in the literature is generally defined as the timely, public and comprehensive
disclosure of relevant, accurate and comprehensible information.
Moreover, transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, the second key objective of both
EITI and NEITI. Accountability takes various forms; however, three basic components are
common to all of them: an actor, a forum and an account are in a relationship in which the actor
provides an account to the forum (Roberts 2009). In different contexts and relations,
accountability is defined differently. For example, if the relationship is limited to providing an
account and making things visible, then transparency-as-accountability is achieved (Roberts
2009). In this form of relationship, “transparency” and “accountability” are used
interchangeably (Hood 2010). In contrast, if the relationship enables the forum to ask questions
and investigate information, this form of accountability is called intelligent accountability
(Roberts 2009). If this accountability relationship is related to public matters, requires public
disclosure of the account and generates public debate, this is called public accountability
(Bovens 2005a). Bovens (2007) defines public accountability as:
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a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences
(Bovens 2007, p.450).
Through its principles and through the Act, NEITI promises a form of accountability that is
closer to Bovens’s (2007) public accountability; thus, NEITI’s accountability mechanism will
be tested against this definition. In intelligent accountability and public accountability, the
relationship between accountability and transparency is evident when the two concepts enable
each other as a “matching pair” (Hood 2010, p.989). However, Hood (2010, p.989) argues that
there is a third form of relationship between transparency and accountability, referred to as the
“awkward couple”, where disclosing inappropriate information misleads the forum and
miscarries the intention of holding actors to account. Therefore, this thesis considers the EITI
principles in the NEITI reports as accounts that serve as a transparency mechanism to discharge
accountability.
Thus, transparency and accountability are inextricably linked, and this interrelationship is
explored in Chapter 4. In accounting, these notions are often explored in the context of publicly
available financial reports and social and environmental reports. In this thesis, transparency
and accountability are separated for analytical purposes prior to a discussion of the spectacle
that is produced and its impacts when the two concepts are amalgamated in a dedicated
disclosure regime. Therefore, the Theory of Spectacle is used as an interpretative framework
to analyse how these principles are discursively used by NEITI to persuade powerful spectators
such as the government, MNCs and, increasingly, NGO and CSO groups.
The aims and purpose of this thesis are to:
1. Explore how the meaning of transparency is constructed, conveyed and legitimised in
NEITI reports.
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2. Examine how NEITI discourse maintains the objective of promoting open and
accountable management of the extractive industry.
3. Critically evaluate the network of power and ideology that maintains EITI in Nigeria.

1.5 The Theory of Spectacle
The spectacle is an ancient concept that has manifested in different forms according to the
available technologies in each historical era. However, there is a common element in all forms
of spectacle: “an event or scene regarded in terms of its visual impact” (Oxford Online
Dictionary 2017, np). In modern society, the spectacle is manifested in many forms, such as
advertisements, celebrity lifestyles, corporate policies and accounting and organisational
reports (Kellner 2008).
The Theory of Spectacle was developed by Guy Debord, a leading French theorist in the
Situationist International movement, an intellectual Marxist revolutionary avant-garde group
of scholars and artists active between 1957 and 1973 (Gotham & Krier 2008). The group was
mainly influenced by a radical Marxist criticism of the commodification inherent in the
capitalist system. The latest stage of this commodification led to the development of
neoliberalism as the stage in capitalism associated with globalisation, the removal of trade
barriers and customs duties, maximum economic liberalisation, minimum government
intervention in the market and the deregulation and privatisation of public sectors (Boas &
Gans-Morse 2009; Goldstein 2007).
The Theory of Spectacle is established around two concepts. First, the spectacle is “the very
heart of this real society’s unreality” (Debord 1967, p.3), which refers to the ability of spectacle
to represent certain realities through images and signs that have the power to conceal or reveal
specific aspects to the spectators (Patrascu 2013). Therefore, when the spectacle is embraced
by spectators, it plays the role of a perception-management technology to “redirect citizens’
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attention from structural inequalities to spectacular events designed to subdue social criticism”
(Kersten & Abbott 2012, p.324). These spectacular events are the unreal realities that redirect
attention from “real” or authentic concerns and needs to maintain the dominance of specific
social orders (Debord 1967). Thus, in a society dominated by spectacles, new and radical ideas
are filtered to the point where some are marginalised, and the remainder are domesticated and
integrated within the dominant models in society. This conveys the impression that the old
social, economic and political modes are innovative and original (Debord 1967).
Second, the spectacle is a “social relationship between people that is mediated by images”6
(Debord 1967, p.4). This concept confirms that in a society dominated by spectacle, “images
teach us what and how to see and think and, in doing so, they mediate the way in which we
interact with one another as social beings” (Garoian & Gaudelius 2004, p.298). In this sense,
images mediate the actual products, experience or social needs to become needs in themselves.
For example, shopping becomes a need that replaces the actual need for the product.
Consequently, in modern consumer societies an authentic social life has been replaced by a
proxy representation (Thwaites 2015). Thus, spectacle uses images to manipulate, conceal,
deceive and shift attention from more important events to less important ones according to the
interest of the spectacle’s producers (Crary 1989; Flyverbom & Reinecke 2017; Krier & Swart
2016). Therefore, since this thesis explores the call for transparency and accountability in the
extractive industry, the Theory of Spectacle, as a theory that combines symbolic representation
with the ability to characterise “the ideological position of those who have architected society
for their own interest”, including how to mediate and interact, is appropriate (Gilman-Opalsky
2011, p.73).

6

For Debord, an image is any visual representation of abstract ideas, social relationship or social setting such as
a mere picture, a person, media materials, economic phenomenon and capital accumulation (Debord 1967).
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The spectacle has many means available to perpetuate dominant social, political and economic
systems (Debord 1967). These include social organisations such as publishers, schools, sport,
political and regulatory institutions and municipal environments, along with the media and its
power to create a unified image to convince spectators (Boje, 2001a). Therefore, the language
used in NEITI reports and the regulatory power represented in the Act provide an example of
the institutional and organisational power and persuasive language that mediates an ideological
position.
The study of NEITI reports and the Act, in light of the Theory of Spectacle, supports and
extends the empirical application of the idea of the spectacle in the field of accounting. This is
of specific importance because Debord’s discussion of the spectacle is often criticised as being
contemplative and tending to give abstract generalisations (Gotham & Krier 2008). In addition,
there have been calls to extend the use of the Theory of Spectacle in the accounting and
organisation literature (see, for example, Flyverbom & Reinecke 2017; Uddin, Gumb &
Kasumba 2011; Chatterjee et al. 2020). This thesis will demonstrate the application of the
spectacle through contemporary topics such as transparency and accountability; and how the
spectacle has expanded to all aspects of modern organisations, such as NEITI.

1.6 Methodological assumption
There is a growing trend of using language-based analyses to study the discourse of
organisations, as language is the apparatus through which organisations are constructed and
exist (Mumby & Clair 1997; Phillips & Oswick 2012). While positivists consider social
phenomena as objective and as having an independent existence, critical constructionist
scholars consider societies, organisations and identities as socially and discursively constructed
(Hardy 2001). This approach emphasises the importance of the contextual aspects of a social
phenomenon, such as accounting, in creating meaning and justifying specific practices (Chua,
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1986). This also highlights the role of language and text as a means to create realities.
Consequently, organisational phenomena, such as NEITI, are regarded as “the result of
processes of social construction carried out through the production and dissemination of texts
of various kinds” (Phillips & Oswick 2012, p.4). Fairclough (2005, p.2) defines discourse as
“a particular way of representing the (physical, social, psychological) world”. This power of
discourse affects and shapes meanings and how audiences perceive and experience an
organisational reality (Marshak & Grant 2008). In this sense, discourse creates the social
identity of organisations and institutional phenomena, and thus their natural existence (Chia
2000). Therefore, the dominant discourse determines strategic direction, view and approaches
toward subject matter (Boje, 1995). Thus, the network of power surrounding the production,
dissemination and consumption of NEITI discourse is of particular importance for this thesis
and the context in which a network of power is enacted and practiced (Hardy, Palmer & Phillips
2000). This thesis considers NEITI as a social phenomenon that reflects networks of power to
create a particular reality in relation to transparency and accountability in the extractive
industry in Nigeria.

1.7 Methodology
In line with this thesis’s methodological assumption about the importance of studying text in
relation to its context and the way this informs our understanding of how meaning is created
and communicated and how it prevails, this thesis uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to
analyse NEITI reports and the Act. The importance of CDA in the field of discourse analysis
stems from its ability to critique social phenomena and recognise the ideological dimension of
verbal or written texts (Janks 1997; Sheyholislami 2001). As a method of analysis, CDA was
formally introduced by Norman Fairclough in 1992. Fairclough defined CDA as the study of:
opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive
practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures,
relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts
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arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles
over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between
discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony
(Fairclough 1993, p.135).
In contrast, van Dijk (2015, p.466) defines CDA as:
discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power
abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by
text and talk in the social and political context.
The existence of multiple definitions in the literature indicates that there is no standardised
approach or uniform analytical model for CDA (Meyer 2001; Wodak & Meyer 2009). Van
Dijk (2015, p.466), for example, suggests that “in CDA all methods of the cross-discipline of
discourse studies, as well as other relevant methods in the humanities and social sciences, may
be used”. Therefore, the theoretical background of each study, its objectives, the context of the
case study and the nature of the available data should be taken into consideration in selecting
CDA (Chouliaraki 2008).
In the accounting literature CDA has been used as a multidisciplinary approach that takes
advantage of the advantages of multilayer analysis, including a micro-linguistic analysis of the
text in relation to its broader social, economic and political contexts7 (Wodak 2007; Wooffitt
2005). This thesis builds on this literature and extends the application of CDA in accounting.
Fairclough’s (1989; 1992; 1995; 2001) and van Dijk’s (1993; 1998) approach are the dominant
approaches in the field of CDA. Fairclough (1995) argues that the main concerns of CDA are
the social, political and economic relations of power, dominance and ideology evident in the
use of discourse. In contrast, van Dijk’s (1993; 1998) main concerns are the problem of power
abuse, social inequality and discrimination and how to create and maintain the dominance of

7

The studies discussed in this thesis include Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis (2010); Craig and Amernic (2004);
Gallhofer, Haslam and Roper (2001); Kyriacou (2016); Malmmose (2015); Nwagbara and Belal (2019); and
Pupovac (2014).
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specific social orders. Both approaches are used to discover the power relations and ideology
of the main players who create and dominate the discourse. However, in this thesis, the
discourse is used to understand how spectacle is created to “redirect citizens’ attention from
structural inequalities to spectacular events designed to subdue social criticism” (Kersten &
Abbott 2012, p.324). Discourse is thus seen as a mechanism to make certain aspects of a
phenomenon visible, conceal undesirable aspects and, in the process, harness discourse as
social control mechanism. Since there is a process aspect, this thesis adopts Clegg and
Kornberger’s (2015) approach to conduct a multilayer critical discourse analysis focusing on
making things visual, valuable and subsequently mobilised.
Visualisation: According to Clegg and Kornberger (2015), visualisation refers to the means,
processes and devices through which power and meaning take strategic dimension. In this
thesis, the process of visualisation will be conducted through the text and rhetorical analysis of
NEITI reports (Chapter 7).
Valuation: The word “valuable” indicates the means and strategies by which the objects and
principles that have been made visible in the first stage are legitimised and made credible to
become a strategic force (Clegg & Kornberger 2015). In this thesis the valuation process is
examined through analysing the structure of NEITI reports and their role in legitimising NEITI
as transparency and accountability mechanisms (Chapter 8).
Mobilisation: This level of analysis examines how elements that have been made visible and
valuable become strategic powers through powers networks, and how social actors shape,
control, dominate and mobilise spectators toward a specific topic or event. At this level of
analysis, the Act will be examined to assess its ability to enforce transparency and
accountability and to reveal the network of power in the multi-stakeholder group (Chapter 9).
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In summary, in this thesis this approach is used to explore how NEITI’s discourse makes
notions of transparency and accountability visible through the NEITI reports and valuable
through the structure of the reports, and how they mobilise accountability and transparency as
strategic power in the extractive industry.

1.8 The structure of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2: Nigeria and the extractive industry. This chapter discusses the context and
background of NEITI as the case study. It introduces the extractive industry in Nigeria, the
resource curse and Nigeria’s history and its economic and political conditions as the
background to this exploration. Nigeria as a case study is selected based on its great wealth of
natural resources, its social, political, economic and demographic conditions and its status as
the first country to adopt EITI. Further, Nigeria has been labelled by academics such as
Akinrele (2014) as an example of a country that suffers the negative consequences of the
resource curse.
Chapter 3: EITI. This chapter discusses the EITI framework as an initiative proposed to address
aspects of the resource curse related to a lack of transparency, accountability and corruption
within the extractive industry. The chapter describes EITI’s historical development; principles;
mechanisms,

including

reporting

and

the

multi-stakeholder

group;

membership;

implementation; and supporters. This is followed by a review of the literature on EITI benefits
and limitations, and its effectiveness in achieving its stated objectives of transparency and
accountability. The current literature on EITI in Nigeria is also discussed.
Chapter 4: Transparency and Accountability. Providing transparency and achieving
accountability in the extractive industry in Nigeria are the key objectives of NEITI. Therefore,
this chapter introduces and discusses the two concepts in order to conceptualise them as
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analytical constructs that will be used in this research. The first section of the chapter discusses
the types, promises and limitations of transparency. This is followed by an overview and
discussion of accountability and its different forms and types. In particular, transparency-asaccountability, intelligent accountability and public accountability will be applied to assessing
NEITI’s ability to achieve its objective in the Nigerian extractive sector.

Chapter 5: The Theory of Spectacle. The chapter starts with a general introduction of the
Theory of Spectacle. The next section discusses the term “spectacle” and its use, followed by
an exploration of the emergence of the modern society of the spectacle. Further, Debord's
(1967; 1991) Theory of Spectacle and its linkages to the notions of transparency and
accountability within accounting studies are discussed.
Chapter 6: Methodology. This chapter begins by stating this thesis’s methodological
assumptions and outlines the features of its discourse. This is followed by a discussion of CDA,
its application in accounting studies and its relevance to this thesis. The chapter then introduces
Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) method of analysis as the selected approach to CDA used to
analyse NEITI reports and the Act. Finally, the NEITI reports are introduced as the empirical
material of the thesis.
Chapter 7: Visualisation. This chapter represents the first analytical level of Clegg and
Kornberger’s (2015) approach. At this level, the NEITI reports are analysed in terms of their
textual and rhetorical features and the qualitative characteristics of the data provided in the
reports. This assists in assessing the intended messages in the text (NEITI reports) and how
meaning is created and made visible. The use of the pronoun “we”, strong and soft voice in
making recommendations, passive and active voice, professional language and intertextuality
are examples of rhetorical strategies identified.
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Chapter 8: Valuation. This chapter discusses the structural features of the NEITI reports to
determine their genre and ability to legitimise and make valuable what was made visible, as
discussed in the previous chapter. These structural features are communicated through the
report’s cover page, preface, table of contents, list of appendices, executive summary and audit
methodology as well as the body of the report.

Chapter 9: Mobilisation. This chapter analyses the Act and the language that mobilises the
scope of transparency and accountability in the NEITI reports. It starts with a discussion of
the sections in the Act that reveal the network of power between the main stakeholders of
NEITI. These include the sections that establish NEITI and set its objectives and functions,
with special attention to NEITI’s working mechanisms, such as producing and publishing its
reports. This will be followed by an analysis of the NEITI multi-stakeholder group (NSWG),
its composition and the network of power between its stakeholders. Finally, the chapter
discusses the ability of the Act to sanction and enforce its outlined penalties.

Chapter 10: Discussion. This chapter discusses the findings of the analysis in light of the
research aims. First, it presents examples of uncovered, misstated and concealed issues
regarding the Nigerian extractive industry and several issues regarding Nigeria in general.
Second, it presents the findings regarding transparency and accountability including an
exploration of how the meaning of transparency is constructed, conveyed and legitimised in
NEITI reports. Third, it discusses how NEITI discourse maintains the objective of promoting
open and accountable management of the extractive industry. Finally, the Theory of Spectacle
provides the framework to explain the findings of the thesis and critically evaluate the network
of power and ideology that maintains EITI in Nigeria.
Chapter 11: Conclusion. The chapter summarises the thesis and presents its practical,
theoretical and methodological contributions to the literature. The chapter also discusses the
19

limitations of the thesis and concludes by suggesting future research opportunities arising from
it.
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1.9 Summary
This chapter introduced the thesis, giving a background to the case study and presenting the
research purpose and research questions, the theoretical and methodological framework, an
overview of three levels of analysis and a short summary of each chapter in the thesis. The next
chapter discusses a background of the Nigerian extractive industry, and the country’s economic
and social conditions as the context of this thesis.
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Chapter 2: Nigeria and the extractive industry
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the aims and theoretical and methodological assumptions of
this thesis and highlighted its overall structure. This chapter provides a background to Nigeria’s
extractive industry and its significance to Nigeria’s economy. It also explains the relationship
between the Nigerian economy, the extractive industry and the resource curse, which was a
catalyst for Nigeria to implement EITI as a mechanism to promote governance through
transparency and accountability in the extractive industry.

The first section introduces the extractive industry and its dominant international economic
importance, which is one of the significant features of this study. This will be followed by a
description of the resource curse, followed by an overview of Nigeria’s modern history and its
political, social and economic conditions.

2.2 The extractive industry
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) defines the extractive industry as oil,
natural gas, minerals and similar non-regenerative resources operations (IFRS 2017). This
definition is also adopted by EITI, which describes the extractive industry as including oil, gas
and mineral resources (EITI 2017a). The extractive industry plays an important role in the
global context. For example, according to the World Bank (2017), around 3.5 billion people –
half of the world's population – are residents of countries rich in oil, gas or minerals. Further,
the extractive industry plays an important economic role in almost 81 countries, which together
generate a quarter of the world's GDP (World Bank 2017). In particular, developing countries
rich in extractive resources fundamentally depend on the industry as a “key source of jobs,
energy, government revenues, and a wide array of other benefits for local economies”
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(International Finance Corporation 2017, np). Therefore, the extractive industry is a vital
source of economic growth and stability, especially for many of the world's poorest countries.

The far-reaching economic effects of the extractive industry are reflected in the strong
economic position held by many MNCs, such as ExxonMobil, the Royal Dutch Shell group
and BHP Billiton (PWC 2017). Prior to 2014 five extractive companies were among the
world’s top 12 companies in terms of their economic wealth. In 2016, however, only one of
the world’s top 12 companies is from the extractive industry, four are in the top 50 and 11 are
in the top 100 (PWC 2017). This decline in ranking could be due to the severe decrease in the
oil and gas prices from an average price of US$90 in 2014 to an average price of US$45 in
2016 (US Energy Information Administration 2017). Nevertheless, despite this decline, the 11
companies in the top 100 have maintained a prominent economic position, which is reflected
in their collective market capitalisation of US$1688 billion in March 2017 (PWC 2017). This
market capitalisation is bigger than the individual GDPs of 10 of the world's top 20 economies,
including countries such as Canada, Russia and Australia (Trading Economics 2017).
However, despite the promise of the extractive industry to improve the economic and social
conditions of resource-rich countries, research suggests a different outcome: worsened
economic conditions, greater corruption and civil war, in what has been called the resource
curse.

2.3 The resource curse
The academic literature prior to the 1980s suggested a positive relationship between the
endowment of natural resources and economic growth; however, a new trend emerged in the
late 1980s, suggesting that such relationships had negative economic consequences (Rosser
2006). For example, countries that have used their natural resources and achieve positive
economic development include “Britain, the United States...Australia, Botswana, Canada,
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Chile, Malaysia, Peru, the Netherlands, and Norway” (Davis & Tilton 2005, p.237). In
contrast, a reliance on natural resources caused “the Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, and Sierra Leone” to instead experience a rising
level of poverty (Davis & Tilton 2005, p.237). These negative consequences have been labelled
as the resource curse.
The term “resource curse” or, as it is sometimes known, the “paradox of plenty”, was coined
by Richard Auty, a British economics professor at Lancaster University (Auty, 1993). Auty
refers to the economic, political and social phenomenon in which “[c]ountries with large
endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often perform worse in terms of
economic development and good governance than do countries with fewer resources”
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, p.408). To support this notion, Auty (2001) conducted
widespread research on resource-poor countries versus resource-rich countries. The study,
which covered the period between 1960 and 1990, concluded that “since the 1960s, the
resource-poor countries have outperformed the resource-rich countries compared by a
considerable margin” (Auty 2001, p.840). Further, according to Karl (1997), the resource curse
is the result of the developing countries' overreliance on a specific commodity as the sole
source of national income and economic growth. Another cause of the resource curse is the
fact that resources are scarce, vital for economic development and unevenly distributed
between countries and nations. This leads to conflicts over who controls and secures them and
ensures their continued flow (Corrigan 2014). Although the early research into the resource
curse research focused on the economic consequences of this phenomenon, it has been
demonstrated that the resource curse has multifaceted consequences, including social and
political impacts (Ross 2001).
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Several attempts have been made to overcome the negative consequences of the resource curse
and to promote transparency and accountability. Examples include Publish What You Pay
(PWYP), Revenue Watch, Global Witness, Transparency International, Southern Africa
Resource Watch, EITI and the Global Reporting Initiative (Schuler 2012). Corrigan (2014,
p.17) considers EITI as:
an international policy intervention that aims to mitigate the negative effects
of resource abundance by promoting the transparency of resource revenues
and accountability of the governments of resource rich states.
EITI is therefore of interest to this thesis, as it is widely adopted by resource-rich countries and
introduces a practical governance standard for the extractive industry. Nigeria, a country that
suffers from the resource curse, will be analysed to explore the dimensions of EITI
operationalised through NEITI.

2.4 Nigeria
2.4.1 Overview
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a West African developing country, see Figure 2.1, with a
total of 92 4000 square kilometres divided into 36 states and one territory (Afigbo 2005).

Figure 2.1: Nigeria’s location withing Africa (Lodson, Ogbeba & Elinwa 2018, p.85).
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Nigeria has been inhabited since 9000 BCE and has witnessed several civilisations (Falola &
Heaton 2008). The modern-day Nigeria goes back to 1914 when the British, with their
colonising power and authority, set the Nigerian borders. Currently, it has borders with the
Republic of Benin, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, and a marine coast on the Gulf of Guinea
(Falola & Heaton 2008). The country gained its independence from Britain in 1960, and in
1963 became a republic with a civilian presidential regime (CIA World Factbook 2018; Falola
& Heaton 2008). Between 1966 and 1999 the country suffered under the rule of military
dictatorships and successive military coups in addition to a civil war between 1967 and 1970
(Afigbo 2005). This long period of tyranny and military rule ended with the election of a new
civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 (Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz 2005).
Currently, Nigeria is Africa’s and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)’s most populated country (NEITI 2018a). The latest figures show that the country's
population is estimated to be 195.8 million, representing 47% of West Africa’s population
(CIA World Factbook 2018; World Bank 2019). The population is expected to grow to around
392 million by 2050, which will make Nigeria the world’s fourth most populous country (CIA
World Factbook, 2018).
2.4.2 The economy in Nigeria
The CIA World Factbook (2018) considers Nigeria one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest
economies, with a total GDP of US$394.8 billion and a GDP per capita of US$5900; according
to UNICEF (2017), Nigeria is also Africa’s largest economy overall. Nigeria is a resource-rich
country, and its economy relies heavily on an extractive industry that is dominated by oil and
gas (Shaxson 2009). In 1960 the Nigerian economy relied on agriculture, as “Nigeria was a
major producer of palm oil, cocoa, and rubber”, with “agricultural exports generat[ing] about
75% of its foreign-exchange earnings” (World Bank 2017a). Currently, Nigeria’s main
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economic sectors are oil, gas, mining, agriculture, services and communication. The country
has:
over forty (40) different species of natural resources that are commercially
viable and globally competitive” including “coal, columbite, salt, lime stone,
gold, diamond, allied solid minerals, sundry stones, sand, clay, cognate solid
minerals, crude oil, natural gas, timber, wildlife (game), eco-tourism resorts,
fuel-wood, charcoal, fish, fresh water, aqua-life, rangeland, farmland and flora
(Al Chukwuma & Clement Ahar 2015, p.42).
In addition, it has a considerable amount of “iron ore, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc and arable
land” (CIA World Factbook, 2018). However, the country currently depends on the revenues
from the oil and gas sector to finance more than half of its budget, which disadvantages the
other Nigerian economic sectors such as agriculture and the other industrial sectors. This
overdependence on oil production is one example of how the resource curse manifests in
Nigeria. Other examples include “high corruption, lack of socio-economic development and
recurrent resource control-related conflicts” (Ihugba 2014, p.234).

Notwithstanding its abundance of natural resource, the Nigerian Gross National Income (GNI)
per capita in 2018 was a mere US$1960 according to the World Bank (World Bank 2019). This
is lower than the GNIs of sub-Saharan countries with less natural resources, which affects the
Nigerian citizens’ level of trust in the extractive industry (Adams, Osho & Coleman 2008). In
addition, various quality-of-life indicators have either grown insignificantly or declined
following extensive development of Nigeria’s extractive industry (Agbonifo 2011). For
example, the country's “maternal, child and infant mortality rates remain among the world’s
highest... and tens of millions of people still lack access to clean water and proper sanitation”
(UNICEF 2017, np). In 2017 the infant mortality rate was 69.8 deaths/1,000 live births and the
life expectancy was only 53.8 years at birth (CIA World Factbook 2018). Further, out of its 40
million children, Nigeria has 10.5 million out-of-school children, the worst results for this
indicator in the world (UNICEF 2017). In addition, only 59.6% of the total population in 2017
were able to read and write. A 7.7% unemployment rate for youth between 15 to 24 years old
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and a total of 13.4% for all age groups was recorded in 2017 (CIA World Factbook 2018, np).
Many factors contribute to Nigeria’s poor economic and social performance, including:
inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of
legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive
trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and
ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms,
insecurity, and pervasive corruption (CIA World Factbook 2018, np).
One factor that has been quoted as a major reason for this insignificant improvement in social
and economic life conditions is corruption. Nigeria also suffers serious problems with political
and corporate accountability. For example, Amnesty International (2017) argues that the
Nigerian government fails to hold oil MNCs such as Shell to account in relation to oil spills
that are destroying the Ogoniland region in the Niger Delta8. However, the Nigerian former
president Obasanjo launched a socio-economic reform programme during his second
administration to improve the transparency and accountability of the political and economic
systems and to improve the performance of the economy (Caspary 2012; NEITI 2018b).
Furthermore, the technocrat government of the current president, Buhari, who was elected in
2015, reinforced the commitment towards more transparency, accountability and
diversification of the economy and away from overreliance on the oil sector (CIA World
Factbook 2018). Buhari’s administration also “identifies fighting corruption, increasing
security, tackling unemployment, diversifying the economy, enhancing climate resilience, and
boosting the living standards of Nigerians as main policy priorities” (World Bank 2017b).
Finally, despite the fact that in 2017 over half of Nigeria's population lived below the poverty
line9 (CIA World Factbook 2018), Nigeria is still considered to be Africa’s largest economy
(UNICEF 2017).

8
9

The region of Nigeria that has the largest quantity of oil and gas reserves and production.
In 2010, 70% of the population was below the poverty line (CIA World Factbook 2018).
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2.5 The oil in Nigeria
2.5.1 The history of oil in Nigeria
In 1937, a consortium of Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum and D’Arcy Exploration, under the
name of the Shell D’Arcy Company, was given the exclusive right to explore and produce oil
in Nigeria (Akinrele 2014). The company started its activities in the same year and, in 1946,
formed a partnership with British Petroleum (BP), creating the entity Shell-BP. In 1956 ShellBP discovered the first commercial quantities of oil and started to produce 5100 barrels per
day (Ogri 2001). However, by 1956 the end of Shell-BP’s exclusive right meant the expansion
of oil and gas exploration and production rights to non-British companies. Accordingly, in
1962 other companies such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, Total and Texaco began
exploration activities in the country (Akinrele 2014). Since then, oil production has been
concentrated in the Niger Delta around the Niger River and the coastal area of the Atlantic
Ocean, which is close to European and American markets. This makes Nigeria a very attractive
investment market for many multinational oil companies (MNCs) (Afigbo 2005).

To help the government in managing this important sector, and with the increase in the
exploration and production activities in the 1960s, Nigeria joined OPEC as an observer in 1964
and a full member in 1971 (Afigbo 2005; Falola & Heaton 2008). This increase in oil and gas
exploration and production activities required the Nigerian government to issue the Petroleum
Act 1967 to govern the licensing, exploration and production activities in the sector; it remains
the source of all regulations in the sector (Akinrele 2014). In the 1970s the revenues from the
oil and gas sector multiplied following the oil crises resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict in
1973 (Ogri 2001), and OPEC encouraged its members increase oil and gas operations. In
response, Nigeria replaced its Nigerian National Oil Corporation (founded in 1971) with the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977, which continues to operate (Ogri
2001).
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2.5.2 The Nigerian economy and oil
The oil sector in Nigeria is dominated by a joint venture between the Nigerian government,
represented by the NNPC, and six of the world’s largest oil MNCs: Mobile, Shell, Texaco,
Chevron, Elf and Agip (Idemudia 2013; Okeiyi 2017; Pupovac 2014). Although within the
joint venture the oil and gas MNCs tend to dominate the government-owned companies, the
authority to issue licences and the rights for exploration and production of oil, gas and minerals
is under the aegis of the Nigerian government and is regulated by the Petroleum Act 1967,
Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007 and NIGERIA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE. (NEITI) ACT, 2007 (Callaghy 2010), referred to as the NEITI
Act 2007 (the Act) in this thesis.

The Nigerian oil and gas sector contributes 65-77% of the government budgetary revenues and
almost 95% of Nigerian exports (Akinrele 2014; EITI 2017b; Okeiyi 2017; Shaxson 2009).
The revenues from the extractive industries, especially oil, are distributed between the federal
(50%), state (25%) and local (20%) governments, with the remaining 5% going to special
accounts in accordance with the federal law in Nigeria (Idemudia 2009). In addition, in 2014
the sector contributed 14% to the Nigerian GDP (Akinrele 2014). In 2016 Nigeria produced
1.871 million bbl10/day of oil, and its natural gas production in 2015 was 45.15 billion cu m.
Further, the 2018 estimation for the reserves in Nigeria is 3697 billion bbl of proven crude oil
reserves and 5.6754 trillion cu m of proven natural gas reserves (OPEC, 2020).
However, the Nigerian oil and gas sector suffers from “political instability, corruption,
inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management” (Akinrele 2014, p.222).
Corruption is widespread among government officials and there is an absence of an effective
accountability system; this hinders the country’s sustainable development (Falola & Heaton

10

Barrel, which is the unit of volume for crude oil.
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2008). Furthermore, this sector faces serious challenges in relation to oil theft, transparency
and accountability, which affect performance as well as overall government revenue flows. For
example, the daily estimates for oil theft from pipelines in 2013 was 300,000 barrels (Nnaa,
Kia & Nwibor 2015). In addition, an average of 53.281 million barrels valued at US$3.837
billion was attributed to oil theft in 2018 (2018 NEITI Report). There are also accusations of
corruption associated with the activities of the NNPC, the national representative in all
Nigerian oil and gas joint ventures. For example, the former Governor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) “indicated that there was a difference between the value of crude lifted by the
NNPC (US $65 billion) between January 2012 and July 2013, and the amount repatriated to
the Federation Account (US $50 billion)” (Nnaa, Kia & Nwibor 2015, p.597). In addition,
PWC (2016, p.3) argues that corruption cost around US$1,000 per person in 2014 and “could
cost up to 37% of GDP by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately”. This level of corruption is
harming not just the business sector, but all economic sectors in Nigeria, including the
extractive industry. To increase the efficiency of the industry and improve government revenue
through greater transparency and accountability, Nigeria joined EITI when it was launched in
2003.
Finally, the overreliance on the oil and gas industries renders Nigeria’s economy subject to
fluctuations in the international price of oil and gas. This contributed to a drop in Nigeria’s
economic growth from 6.3% in 2014 to 2.7% in 2015; it subsequently recorded negative growth
and entered recession in 2016 (World Bank 2017b). In addition, the Nigerian regulatory
constraints and “security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's
oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017”,
which also contributed to the 2016-2017 recession (CIA World Factbook 2018, np).
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2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the extractive industry and the resource curse and presented the
background against which Nigeria’s extractive industry operates. Nigeria is an example of a
country suffering from the resource curse. It has been chosen as a case study based on its great
wealth of natural resources and its social, political, economic and demographic conditions.
Given this and its status as an initial adopter of EITI, Nigeria is an appropriate case to study
the disclosure of information through NEITI reports that reflect the objectives of transparency
and accountability.
The following chapter introduces the EITI framework as one of the proposed solutions to the
resource curse by promoting transparency as an international norm and aiming to create
accountability within the extractive industry.
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Chapter 3: EITI
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 provided the contextual background for the thesis and justified the choice of
Nigeria’s extractive industry for the study. This chapter will discuss EITI as an initiative to
address aspects of the resource curse. EITI’s history, principles, mechanism, membership,
implementation, supporters, benefits and limitations and its effectiveness in achieving its stated
objectives are also discussed. In addition, the current literature on EITI in Nigeria (NEITI) is
discussed.

Given the important role of the extractive industry in creating the basis for sustainable
economic growth, EITI was established as “a global standard to promote the open and
accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources” (EITI 2017, np). To achieve these
stated aims, EITI “seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate
and promote understanding” (EITI 2017, np). EITI is considered an international governance
standard to oversee the entire extractive-activity value chain from research and licensing
through to revenue collection and distribution. Therefore, the importance of this chapter is in
locating NEITI within its international framework of EITI and identifying gaps in the literature.

3.2 EITI
3.2.1 The history and development of EITI
During the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, September 2002, the
former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, announced the commencement of EITI (EITI 2017c).
The EITI principles were subsequently set and agreed on during the first EITI conference in
London in 2003, and endorsed by the G8 leaders in 2004 (EITI 2017c; La Viña, Hoff & DeRose
2003). Corrigan (2014) argues that in the first stage, EITI’s main objective was to promote
transparency by making visible only the payments between governments and the extractive
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companies. During EITI's third conference in Oslo in 2006, the first international EITI board
was selected; in December of the same year, Oslo was selected as the location for EITI's
international secretariat (EITI 2017c). The first EITI Standard was launched in 2013 and was
amended in 2016 and 2019 to reflect wider governance principles and to reinforce the notion
of accountability (EITI 2019d).
3.2.2 EITI principles and multi-stakeholder mechanism
EITI has 12 principles that represent the shared vision, objectives and beliefs of its members
(Appendix 1). The principles are centred around two focal doctrines: transparency and
accountability in the extractive industry, based on the following argument. The extractive
natural resources, which belong to the citizens of a country, are key drivers of economic growth
and sustainable national development (EITI 2019c). Thus, transparency and accountability
within this industry are crucial to ensure integrated governance and public understanding of
the government revenues and revenue distribution from this sector (EITI 2017d). Therefore,
EITI is considered by many researchers as a transparency and accountability mechanism for
governments, extractive companies and the public (Corrigan 2014; Egbon 2015; Smith,
Shepherd & Dorward 2012). Short (2014) states that EITI uses its reporting and auditing
mechanism to achieve transparency within the industry, and its multi-stakeholder mechanism
to achieve accountability.
Because the responsibility to govern the extractive industry on behalf of citizens lies with
governments, it is important that the public are informed about the revenue streams from the
industry to generate public debate and improve returns to society. Therefore, EITI is designed
to ensure sustainable development of the extractive industry and the continuity of financial
flows to the public through industry and governments. A founding assumption is that the
transparency and accountability of both governments and companies reflect a healthier
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environment for investment (Ionescu-Somers & Steger 2008). Finally, the principles
emphasise the importance of all stakeholder contributions to meet the objectives and
expectations set out in EITI.
EITI discharges accountability and transparency through audit reports of revenue streams11 in
the extractive industry. To ensure the credibility of EITI reports, the information about revenue
streams from MNCs and local companies to governments, regardless of whether they are
supporters of EITI, are submitted to an independent auditor (EITI 2017d). The auditor has the
responsibility to reconcile this information with the government submissions of revenues
received while CSOs monitor the process. This creates a multi-stakeholder group including
governments, companies, CSOs and other stakeholders to ensure the interests of various parties
(Öge 2016a). If the multi-stakeholder group members in each country maintain meaningful
progress as shown by the publication of timely EITI reports, compliance with EITI’s principles
and active engagement in all EITI activities, then they maintain implementing status. However,
if the members fail to maintain satisfactory, meaningful progress, the country may be
suspended until it demonstrates progress in the next validation process. If the members show
no progress at all, the country might face a delisting (Idemudia & Ite 2006).
Globalisation and its major attributes, such as technology and free capital flows, allow
businesses to play a significant role in creating economic value within the open global market.
The dominant economic power that resides in possessing capital, technology and managerial
expertise increases business influence and bargaining power compared to host governments
and local communities, especially in developing countries (Detomasi 2007; Florini 2003; Levy
& Prakash 2003). Moreover, because MNCs are usually driven by profit maximisation,
transnational social activist groups have emerged to scrutinise them and represent the public

11

Revenues collected by the government from the companies in the extractive industry, including royalty profit
tax, education tax etc.

35

voice (Furstenberg 2015). Further, as Furstenberg (2015) argues, the effectiveness of NGOs is
limited within non-democratic regimes, which are particularly common in developing
countries rich in natural resources. Accordingly, Smith, Shepherd and Dorward (2012) argue
that the value of CSOs’ and NGOs’ engagement in voluntary initiatives in developing countries
such as EITI is undermined by uneven distribution of power across governments, MNCs and
local companies. For example, Smith, Shepherd and Dorward (2012) propose that the role of
CSOs in EITI Madagascar has been dominated by the government's power and agenda. This is
further exemplified in the Ghanaian context, where the government and companies have a
louder voice than CSOs (Andrews 2016). Thus, EITI’s ability to fulfil its objectives in
promoting transparency and accountability is limited in this context. This raises questions
about the appropriateness of EITI's one-size-fits-all approach.
Furthermore, EITI principles emphasise that countries, as sovereign states, are responsible for
the enforcement of EITI requirements through their national laws, especially in relation to the
publication of EITI reports (EITI 2019c). In principle, this should empower countries to
enforce the objectives of and compliance with the EITI Standard. However, the enforcement
of EITI has been criticised in many countries, such as Liberia and Nigeria, as being fragile and
lacking deterrent measures (Sovacool & Andrews 2015).
3.2.3 EITI membership and implementation
To maintain EITI compliance, a country with full membership needs to establish a multistakeholder group the participants in which reflect the commitment of the government,
extractive companies and CSOs. The government is required to prepare and endorse an EITI
work plan12 (EITI 2017e). First, the government states publicly its intention to implement EITI
and appoints an official to plan for and execute an implementation process (Aaronson 2011).
12

The EITI work plan “sets out why the EITI is being implemented and what issues the EITI process will seek
to address” (EITI 2020a, np).
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The appointed official is responsible for the coordination of the process between different
stakeholders, and allocates the relevant resources for the implementation to ensure active
participation of all stakeholders including the government, companies and CSOs. The complete
and active participation of all stakeholders is crucial for EITI to function properly and achieve
its intended objectives (Desai & Jarvis 2012). However, the onus is on the government to
create, ensure and facilitate an active participation and engagement environment for the
companies and CSOs by enacting relevant national laws and regulations. These must respect
the membership requirements of the multi-stakeholder group. This responsibility extends to
ensuring freedom of speech for all stakeholders that engage in public debate about the process,
effectiveness and evaluation of EITI (Schouten & Remmé 2006).
The work plan should be prepared according to EITI rules and objectives. In addition, the multistakeholder group should keep this plan and is responsible for implementing it according to the
validation and reporting process deadlines set by the EITI Board (Ruggie 2007). The plan
should take into account the specific economic, regulatory and institutional conditions that
might represent a capacity constraint for stakeholders. Thus, it should correspond to the
specific needs of each country (Ospanova, Ahmadov & Wilson 2013). The plan should also be
reviewed and updated annually in response to any development in the EITI implementation
process and any economic, social and political changes (Kolstad & Wiig 2009).

The next step in the process is to submit an EITI candidature application to the EITI board. If
the EITI board admits the country, the status of “EITI candidate” is granted. The country is
then expected to publish its first EITI report within 18 months and commence its validation
process within two and a half years (EITI 2017e). If the country accomplishes both these tasks,
it is granted the status of “EITI compliant” and is subject to examination with respect to the
validation framework every five years, or as required by the EITI board (EITI 2017e). In
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addition, EITI (2017f) requires its member countries to disclose information about their legal
framework, fiscal regime, license allocations, register of licenses, contracts, beneficial
ownership and state participation in the extractive industry. This allows all stakeholders to fully
understand the application process and how to

achieve the rights for exploration and

production in the sector, and to understand the legal framework that manages the sector and
determines the rights and duties of the governments, companies, CSOs and other stakeholders
(Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006). This information should thus be included in EITI’s periodic
reports, and it is the responsibility of the multi-stakeholder group to ensure that the reports and
any additional information relevant to them are publicly available.
In addition, EITI reports should include information regarding beneficial ownership and all
government revenue collections and distributions (Eigen 2007). This is in line with ensuring
transparency of information regarding the companies that are involved in bidding, running,
operating and financing the extractive sector. The information should include the company’s
country of registration, its share of ownership and the level of involvement in managing the
industry (Eigen 2007). Furthermore, EITI requires governments to disclose revenue
distribution and companies’ and governments’ social and economic spending13 (EITI 2017f).
The government revenues and benefits from the industry include, but are not limited to, taxes,
royalties, transportation revenues and infrastructure.

3.2.4 EITI supporters
While a member country implements and applies the EITI Standard and other requirements, a
supporter country can only support EITI financially, professionally and technically. Caspary

13

These are contributions by regional and local governments and extractive companies to “regional or local
governments, communities, non-governmental organizations or other third parties” in the areas where they
operate (EITI 2020b, np). The contributions “may involve cash payments such as donations, grants or other
types of cash transfers, the transfer of assets such as the construction of roads or schools, or the provision of
services like training and health care” (EITI 2020b, np).
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(2012) confirms that EITI is successful because of the support from its wide network of
governments, the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, many international and
domestic CSOs and the major international financial and investment institutions. Examples of
countries that support EITI include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Japan (EITI
2017g). In addition, over 80 of the world's largest extractive companies, including the major
players such as BP, Chevron, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Eni, Glencore, BHP Billiton and Rio
Tinto, support EITI. Partner organisations include the G7 and G20 groups, the European
Commission, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (EITI 2017g).

In addition, EITI is

supported by nine of the world's largest CSOs, including Oxfam, Global Witness and the
Publish What You Pay Coalition. This wide range of implementing countries and supporters is
also reflected in the EITI Board, which consists of 21 members including representatives of
CSOs, companies, industry and institutional investors (EITI 2017g). Appendix 6 contains an
example of the EITI Board Members 2019-2022 (EITI 2020c).
As at 30 April 2019, 52 countries implement the EITI Standard. The vast majority are
developing countries in Africa and Asia. Apart from Norway, which joined EITI in 2007, most
of the developed member countries have joined relatively recently, including the United
Kingdom in 2014 and Germany in 2016. Furthermore, Australia, France and Guyana
announced their intention to implement the EITI Standard in 2017 (EITI 2017g). While
Australia and France are still not implementing countries, Guyana became an EITI candidate
country in October 2017.
3.2.5 Prior studies of EITI implementation
Since EITI is a voluntary initiative, its long-term continuity and success are related to the
amount and nature of benefits it offers to its implementing members (Malden 2017). Malden
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(2017, p.1) argues that the implementation of EITI results in an economic benefit for the
implementing countries represented by a positive impact on “a country’s ability to attract
mining company investment”. Malden (2017) based his conclusion on a study that used panel
data from countries implementing EITI between 2003 and 2014. This conclusion is based on
the notion that the government's transparent management of the industry enhances
governments’ accountability and makes the investment environment in the host countries more
attractive and trustworthy for foreign investors (Al Faruque 2006). However, this also
encourages corrupt governments to join EITI to attract foreign investment (David-Barrett &
Okamura 2016).
Most EITI countries are classified as highly corruption-prone on Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index. Malden (2017, p.3) asserts that by being an EITI implementing
member “a developing resource-rich country can reassure a potential investor that governance
of the extractive industries will be conducted in a consistent and stable manner”. David-Barrett
and Okamura (2016) suggest that EITI membership thus serves governments’ reputational
purposes. Consequently, corrupt officials can use EITI to signal good intentions to international
actors in the extractive industry in order to improve their government reputation and attract
investment and international aid (David-Barrett & Okamura 2016; Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr
2016). This international aid includes funding from institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Short 2014). Sturesson and Zobel (2015) similarly
suggest that EITI has been used by corrupt governments as a mechanism to differentiate
themselves from other governments that are also perceived as being corrupt.
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In terms of benefits to MNCs, Schuler (2012) considers EITI as an example of a voluntary
social program. Schuler (2012) adopts club theory14 to explain the motivations of MNCs in the
extractive industry to join and support EITI. Schuler (2012) deems EITI to be a club that
provides members with two benefits. The first is a public benefit, represented by revenue
transparency; the second is a private benefit in the form of social branding for the MNCs.
However, after conducting a group of unstructured interviews with experts related to EITI,
Schuler (2012, p.1) proposed that this type of voluntary social program is:
most attractive to MNCs from countries with long arm disclosure laws, to
MNCs lacking relationships with NGOs seeking inexpensive CSR, to
MNCs relying upon financing from institutional and social investors, to
MNCs attempting to differentiate themselves from competitors on social
criteria, and to MNCs with broad stakeholder-focused top managers.
As well as the perceived benefits for some groups, research has demonstrated positive results
regarding EITI’s ability to achieve its stated objectives. In general, Pitlik, Frank and Firchow
(2010) believe initiatives that promote transparency and accountability, such as EITI, have
contributed significantly to poverty reduction and building sustainable economic growth. This
positive impact enhances the credibility of local government institutions, especially in
countries characterised by weak institutions. This is also supported by Corrigan (2014), who
conducted a study of 200 countries between 1995 and 2009 to compare the economic
development and quality of governance between EITI and non-EITI countries. Corrigan (2014)
demonstrates that the negative effects of the resource curse on economic development and
quality of governance was mitigated in EITI countries compared to non-EITI countries
(Corrigan 2014). In the same context, Al Faruque (2006) argues that EITI contributes to
ensuring the wise governance of natural resources for the benefit of national development.

14

According to this theory, voluntary clubs generate three types of goods or benefits for their members: public

goods that benefit both club members and non-members, club goods that benefit only the club members and
private goods.
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Villar and Papyrakis (2016) note that EITI reduced corruption significantly in Zambia,
especially in the early stages of implementation. However, this effect weakened in the later
stages. Papyrakis, Rieger and Gilberthorpe (2017, p.295) consider EITI as a “shielding
mechanism against the general tendency of mineral-rich countries to experience increases in
corruption over time”. This shielding mechanism is most effective in the candidate phase of
membership because, at this stage, countries must demonstrate a serious commitment to EITI
principles via the application of a compliance working plan. This working plan usually involves
full public disclosure of revenue flows within the industry and the timely publication of EITI
reports to gain implementation status. In this manner, EITI is an established “brand” that
promotes transparency internationally (Aas Rustad, Le Billon & Lujala 2017).
Additionally, EITI has created a standardised mechanism for reporting, auditing and civilsociety engagement that ensures that information and data about revenue streams from the
extractive industry are publicly available in a timely manner (Sovacool & Andrews 2015). This
also affects companies, as they can be held accountable by the stakeholders that monitor their
engagement in EITI (Hess 2012). Governments are also held publicly accountable through
EITI and use EITI as an internationally recognised standard that reflects their credibility in
managing extractive industries (Al Faruque 2006). This strategy can be classified as
accountability via transparency, or governance by disclosure.
Other research, however, provides mixed or negative results in assessing EITI’s efficacy in
achieving its stated objectives. For example, Sovacool and Andrews (2015) examined the
impacts of EITI on the governance matrices of Liberia and Azerbaijan, the first two countries
to achieve candidate status. They concluded that EITI created a new international norm
characterised by the power of information disclosure. However, the causal link between
implementing EITI and improved governance outcomes in the extractive industry is
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indeterminate, as many other factors also affect governance (Sovacool & Andrews 2015).
Therefore, Sovacool and Andrews (2015) concluded that EITI has only limited impact.
A further study based on data from the first 16 countries to achieve EITI compliance status for
the period between 1996 and 2014 supports the notion that EITI has failed to achieve its
intended objectives (Sovacool et al. 2016). The study confirms that “in most metrics EITI
countries do not perform better during EITI compliance than previously, and that they do not
outperform other countries” (Sovacool et al. 2016, p.179). EITI has also been criticised for
condoning any social or environmental consequences of extractive operations, which has
limited its ability to fight the effects of the resource curse (Caspary 2012). In addition, Andrews
(2016) challenges the ability of EITI to address governance, transparency, accountability,
corruption and ethical issues rooted in the extractive industry due to its “soft law” nature. This
is further supported by Fasterling (2012), who argues that this type of initiative lacks the tools
of enforceability over its members in the case of non-compliance. For example, in Nigeria “indepth financial, physical and process audits for the period 1999-2004 revealed serious
irregularities but no one was held to account for these” (Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016,
p.118). While transparency covers a wide range of processes within the extractive industry,
EITI deals only with transparency of revenue flows from companies to governments, which
limits its ability to achieve its stated objective and narrows the scope of transparency (Sovacool
& Andrews 2015). For example, EITI cannot monitor or uncover illegal payments to
government officials, nor does it monitor revenue distributions, which are a fertile area for
corruption and misconduct (Le Billon 2011). Additionally, patronage, one of the fundamental
forms of corruption in resource-rich countries, is characterised by a lack of transparency of
expenditures and revenue distribution rather than revenue generation (Kolstad & Soreide
2009). Thus, EITI’s sole focus on revenue flows and payments to governments reduces its
effectiveness in fighting corruption (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016).
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Although EITI does improve the quantity and quality of disclosed information, the level of
corruption in implementing countries has not changed, which suggests that many of
implementing countries use EITI as a public-relations strategy (Öge 2016b). This argument is
supported by Haufler (2010), who contends that transparency is not always the appropriate tool
to address complicated issues such as corruption. Hence, the only positive impact of EITI,
according to Andrews (2016), is in making the extractive industry less opaque, given that prior
to 2016, when EITI’s accountability approach, approved in 2013, was activated by amendment
to EITI principles, EITI was merely a tick-box disclosure mechanism for transparency, without
accountability implications. Furthermore, Andrews (2016) suggests that it is too early to assess
the effectiveness of the accountability approach. Several underlying causes contribute to
limitations that hinder EITI from achieving its objectives of transparency and accountability.
To begin with, some of the major extractive producer countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran,
are not members of EITI, and combined with only a limited number of implementing developed
countries weakens global compliance and commitment (Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016).
Furthermore, despite improvements to the EITI Standard, Haufler (2010) challenges the
transparency of implementing countries and companies and suggests that they disclose
incomplete information to serve their own interests. In addition, there is no mechanism to
discern collusion (Haufler 2010). Moreover, citizens, especially in developing countries, may
not have the skills or knowledge to fully comprehend the disclosure, or may not have the ability
to hold government officials or companies accountable. Therefore, as Meijer (2014) notes,
public accountability through transparency in developing countries is a façade, and EITI
requires robust civil-society institutions to achieve its objectives (Pitlik, Frank & Firchow
2010; Sovacool et al. 2016). Therefore, developing countries characterised by weak domestic
CSOs can participate in only a limited way in EITI's multi-stakeholder mechanism (Haufler
2010).
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Aaronson (2011) further proposes three factors that hinder EITI from reaching its potential
abilities. First, there are different interests and agendas for the three components of EITI’s
multi-stakeholder mechanism: government, companies and CSOs. Second, CSOs have not
been given enough information and opportunities to actively participate in EITI, including
information about agenda-setting and operations. Third, the public and legislators in most
implementing countries have not been informed of EITI's activities or existence, which reduces
the public’s ability to monitor the extractive industry (Aaronson 2011). Furstenberg (2015,
p.462) also affirms Aaronson's (2011) view in the context of implementing EITI in nondemocratic countries, such as Kyrgyzstan in his study, concluding that “a lack of a
consolidated, strategic approach among stakeholders and at times, competing objectives, often
compromises the smooth functioning of such global governance initiatives”.
To summarise, EITI was initiated as a transparency and accountability mechanism to address
the inefficiency and unethical practices in the extractive industry; to partially address some
manifestations of the resource curse, including corruption and the ineffective use of natural
resources; and to achieve sustainable development in the extractive industry. EITI aims to
achieve accountability in the extractive industry through the promotion of transparency, or
what is called “governance by disclosure”. However, the collaboration and participation of
governments, CSOs and the extractive companies is needed to ensure that EITI can achieve its
intended objectives. Some researchers do believe that EITI has many benefits, especially in
making the extractive industry more transparent and empowering CSOs and the public to hold
the governments and the extractive companies accountable. Nevertheless, other researchers
argue that the life conditions of the citizens, especially in developing countries, have not
changed after the implementation of EITI, the corruption levels have not decreased and the
CSOs have not been empowered by EITI, mainly because it is a voluntary initiative.
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The next section introduces NEITI and the Act. This is followed by Chapter 4, which discusses
the concepts of transparency and accountability, their various forms and their relation to EITI
in this thesis.
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3.3 NEITI
3.3.1 Overview and historical development
The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) is the Nigerian national
version of EITI. Nigeria has been committed to EITI since 2003, and from December 2004 the
Nigerian National Assembly began work on the NEITI Act 2007 (the Act) (Aigbovo &
Atsegbua 2013). Despite NEITI starting work in 2004 and publishing its first report in 2006, it
took the legislators until 2007 to pass the Act toward the end of President Obasanjo’s
administration (NEITI 2018b). NEITI was then legally established through the Act as an
independent, self-managing entity that has a direct reporting relationship to the Nigerian
President and the National Assembly (Okeiyi 2017). The Act in Nigeria represents the first
attempt at domestic regulation for EITI implementing countries. The Act provides NEITI with
the required legitimacy to be a key player in the government’s anti-corruption efforts, making
it a catalyst for transparency in the extractive industry through its financial, physical and
process reconciliations (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019). The Act contains 22 sections that
codify the EITI principles into legislation; it also addresses the establishment of NEITI, its
objectives and functions and the appointment of an independent auditor. In addition, the Act
describes the establishment and composition of the NSWG, and other matters such as offences
and penalties in case of non-compliance with the Act (NEITI Act 2007).

Basing their initiatives on the EITI structure, the Nigerian government established a multistakeholder group known as the National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG). The NSWG
includes representatives of the government, extractive companies operating in Nigeria, national
and international CSOs, media and local communities (Appendices 3, 4 and 5 provide more
details) (Löwenheim 2008). In this manner, NEITI was believed to represent an engagement
shared ground for all stakeholders in the extractive industry in Nigeria (Luqman & Lawal
2011). According to EITI principles, this in turn, was assumed to help achieve accountability
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across the entire value chain of the extractive industry, and to achieve a further goal of fighting
corruption within the operational chain of the extractive industry from the allocation of
contracts to exploration, extraction, revenue flows and revenue distribution (NEITI Act 2007).
Nigeria’s decision to join EITI was driven by an international call for transparency in the
economic, political and social activities of the country, and to address the resource curse.
Therefore, NEITI was established “in the context of the comprehensive socio-economic reform
programme embarked upon by the Federal Government of Nigeria during the second term of
President Obasanjo’s administration” (NEITI 2018b, np). This is echoed in the extended
definition of NEITI in the 2009 NEITI Report (p.25), which proposes to ensure:
the domestication of the global initiative through the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) of the continuing anti- corruption reforms in
the extractive sector aimed at ensuring that revenues from the sector
contribute towards sustainable development.
Since EITI is an internationally recognised initiative to promote governance in the extractive
sector, linking NEITI to EITI provides NEITI with international support and enhances its
credibility in the domestic context. In addition, EITI’s role in fighting corruption and ensuring
sustainable development serves the government’s quest to promote economic and political
reforms that focus on transparency and accountability. Therefore, joining this initiative was
one of the Obasanjo administration’s strategies to fight corruption and gain local and
international legitimacy after decades of military rule (Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz 2005) that
had been characterised by an excessive level of institutional corruption that hindered Nigerian
economic, social and political growth for decades (Caspary 2012).

Nigeria is one of the first countries to adopt EITI, comply with its requirements, and thus be
granted compliance status. In addition, Nigeria was also the first country to publish an audit
report for the years 1999 (prior to the existence of EITI) through to 2004. Although Nigeria
achieved these milestones, the subsequent publication of NEITI audit reports has been
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irregular, which has limited their importance and significance (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). At the
time of writing this thesis, Nigeria still holds compliance status. As a result, the country has
increased its annual reported revenues from the oil sector by US$1 billion (Akinrele 2014).
Therefore, NEITI has earned the title “flagship of EITI”, and it is regarded by many researchers
as Nigeria’s local jewel in EITI’s global crown (Kemp & Martens 2007; Muhammad 2016).
Figure 3.1 illustrates Nigeria’s timeline in adopting and applying EITI.
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Figure 3.1: Nigeria’s EITI timeline (EITI 2018)
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3.3.2 The NEITI Act 2007 (the Act)
To achieve the intended goals of NEITI, the Act guarantees the exploitation of Nigeria’s natural
resources for public benefit and the country’s sustainable economic growth (Ihugba 2014).
However, opinion about the capacity of the Act to achieve these goals is divided. On one hand,
it is argued that the Act represents an opportunity for sustainable development to improve the
quality of life for Nigerian citizens as well as setting out the appropriate legal framework to
attract foreign investments and build trust in the sector. It also represents a legal precedent and
a pioneer regulation that can be applied or emulated in other resource-rich countries that intend
to codify EITI principles domestically (Ihugba 2014).

On the other hand, the criticism is that the Act does not result in a better quality of life for
Nigerian citizens; nor has the level of corruption decreased since its enactment (Haufler 2010;
Okeke & Aniche 2013). According to Ihugba (2014), the Act has many flaws, including an
unclear definition of the type of audits, such as physical, process and financial, and does not
set a clear timeline and milestones for the publication of the audit reports. Moreover, although
the Act explains how NEITI works to achieve its objectives, it does not specify any power to
enact criminal action against institutions and individuals who do not comply with the NEITI
principles. This, then, challenges NEITI’s ability to promote transparency and accountability.
For example, many breaches of the Act have been recorded, including payment discrepancies
between companies and government agencies. This also includes oil theft, underpayment of
tax, royalties and other payments, non-collaboration and corruption by government agencies
and government officials (Okeke & Aniche 2013). However, no sanctions or penalties have
been applied to any of the noncompliant parties. Finally, an essential issue with the Act is that
it does not define best practice for the extractive industry in terms of transparency and
accountability in order for stakeholders to plan their conduct accordingly. This represents a
loophole that allows companies to use their own interpretation and to justify incomplete
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compliance with the principles to avoid penalties (Okeke & Aniche 2013). Therefore, Okeke
and Aniche (2013, p.107) conclude, “the NEITI Act of 2007 inadequately empowers NEITI to
compel oil and gas multinationals to carry out remediation of their account” and “has only been
able to transform NEITI into a barking dog or a toothless bulldog that cannot bite” (Okeke &
Aniche 2013, p.99).

3.3.3 Prior studies of NEITI
Okeiyi (2017, p.55) suggests that the main success of NEITI is in “providing a picture showing
for the first time how important parts of the industry worked and how they interacted with each
other and with the various parts of government”. Another example of NEITI’s success is
issuing the physical, financial and process audit reports on the extractive industry’s activities
since 1999, especially the oil and gas sector (Löwenheim 2008). The audit reports have
increased transparency in the industry and improved government revenue flows. According to
Luqman and Lawal (2011), these reports exceeded EITI requirements, as they introduced wellorganised information about the revenue flows between the companies and the government in
addition to valuable information on oil production and oil theft. One example of NEITI’s
capacity to provide transparency in the Nigerian extractive industry is the discovery of a
discrepancy of more than US$800 million in revenue flows between what the extractive
companies claimed to have paid and what the government disclosed as revenue flows from the
sector (Aigbovo & Atsegbua 2013).

The 2004 NEITI audit report revealed many flaws in the extractive industry, including:
the actual amount of oil produced in Nigeria is not known: some aspects of
tax legislation in Nigeria are unclear thereby making the tax regime one
characterised by “unregulated self-assessment”; the office of the AttorneyGeneral of the Federation does not keep complete records, forcing the
reconciler to rely on Central Bank of Nigeria’s records which are not strictly
maintained for the purpose of EITI reconciliation; tax assessments
submitted by some companies do not match their own internal audited
financial statements, an indication that the companies are overstating several
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costs in tax assessments and abusing capital allowances in attempt to reduce
tax liabilities, incapacity of government IT systems to cope with financial
flows from the sector; conflict of interest and loss of revenue arising from
the NNPC being both buyer and seller of oil; general lack of skills and
capacity by government agencies compared with international oil
companies; and lack of transparency in accounting for signature bonuses
receipts; lack of power by the accountant general of the federation to
proactively address problems in the revenue collection system (Aigbovo &
Atsegbua 2013, p.74).
Regardless of the many flaws that have been identified, no corrective measures have been
taken, no investigations conducted and no officials from the government or the companies held
accountable for these violations of the Act (Aigbovo & Atsegbua 2013). NEITI also exhibits
fundamental shortcomings in its application in the Nigerian economic, social and political
environment that hinder its ability to achieve its goals, and especially to act as a mechanism to
achieve accountability (Luqman & Lawal 2011). One of NEITI’s additional shortcomings is
its inability to overcome the unequal power distribution between the government, companies
and CSOs. For example, although NEITI creates greater transparency by providing NEITI
reports to CSOs, it does not empower CSOs with the ability to question either the government
or company conduct; nor does NEITI provide any way to hold the government and companies
accountable (Ekhator 2014).

After analysing the CSR reports of ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell and Total as the key oil MNCs
operating in Nigeria, Egbon (2015) concluded that NEITI is used as a legitimacy mechanism
to harmonise corporate values with social values, especially by creating the impression of a
fair distribution of oil revenues between these companies and the Nigerian government. In
Nigeria, powerful players, especially MNCs, dominate the discourse of transparency and
accountability in both the public and private sectors. Whose accountability is promoted by
NEITI is still debatable (Egbon 2015). Finally, Ejiogu, Ejiogu and Ambituuni (2019)
conducted research using NEITI reports (2004-2016) and other NEITI publications in light of
the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) Conceptual Framework for financial
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reporting and transparency. Their premise was based on the belief that “for information
disclosed through NEITI audit reports to be used effectively by its target audience, the
information disclosed needs to be timely, understandable and faithfully represent the
phenomena which it claims to represent” (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019, p.2). They
concluded that the transparency offered by NEITI justified and legitimised the corruption of
government agencies in the Nigerian extractive industry. In addition, Ejiogu, Ejiogu and
Ambituuni (2019) suggest that NEITI is controlled and captured by the interests of the Nigerian
government, and that Nigerian citizens largely ignore the information provided by NEITI
reports because they do not understand it. While the IASB Conceptual Framework forms a part
of the methodological framework for this thesis, the method of analysis adopted focuses on the
process of NEITI reporting and an evaluation against the criteria of transparency and
accountability. Further, the analysis in this thesis extends the period of reporting from 2004 to
2018. In addition to analysing the structure of the reports and the Act, the analysis also explores
the network of power within the NSWG and frames NEITI within a neoliberalist economic
system, according to the Theory of Spectacle.

As discussed earlier in this section, several studies have addressed EITI and NEITI; they have
done so, however, from a legal perspective (Andrews 2016; Ihugba 2014; Okeke & Aniche
2013; Sturesson & Zobel 2015). This thesis provides an accounting insight into NEITI. Other
studies apply quantitative analysis using panel data and regression analysis to test EITI’s ability
to fight corruption, improve foreign investments, provide transparency and achieve economic
growth (Corrigan 2014; David-Barrett & Okamura 2016; Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016;
Malden 2017; Öge 2016; Papyrakis, Rieger & Gilberthorpe 2017; Sovacool et al. 2016; Villar
& Papyraki 2016; Williams 2011). This thesis qualitatively analyses the NEITI reports and the
Act in light of the Theory of Spectacle, which provides a critical framework for NEITI within
the wider neoliberalist system. Finally, while several studies lack empirical insight and are
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limited to a theoretical discussion of issues related to EITI and NEITI (Ekhator 2014; Egbon
2015; Furstenberg 2015; Haufler 2010; Short 2014; Sovacool & Andrews 2015), this thesis
contributes to the empirics of the current literature on NEITI and EITI.
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3.4 Summary
The first part of this chapter provided an overview of EITI; its historical development,
principles, mechanism, membership and implementation and supporters; and previous studies
about EITI’s benefits and limitations. EITI was established to serve as an accountability
mechanism and promote governance in the extractive industry. Further, the chapter examined
and reviewed NEITI (the Nigerian version of EITI), its historical development, its mechanisms,
the role of CSOs and the establishment of the Act.

Like EITI, NEITI was introduced to promote transparency and accountability and promote
governance outcomes in Nigeria’s largest economic sector, the extractive industry. Nigeria
committed itself to NEITI in 2003 and established a multi-stakeholder group, the National
Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG). However, the NSWG has been criticised for unequal
power distribution between the government and the extractive companies on one side, and the
weak CSOs on the other. In addition, the Act is also criticised for its inability to enforce
penalties, which transforms it into a mere “toothless dog” (Okeke & Aniche 2013). The
following chapter discusses different forms and types of transparency and accountability in the
context of EITI and NEITI.
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Chapter 4: Transparency and Accountability
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the international EITI framework along with NEITI, its
Nigerian version, and discussed the current literature on EITI and NEITI and their history,
implementation, achievements and limitations. Given that transparency and accountability are
the mechanisms used in EITI and NETI to achieve better governance outcomes in the extractive
industry (Chapter 3), this chapter discusses the two concepts in detail.
Transparency and accountability are often used interchangeably (Mabillard & Zumofen 2015),
although in this study they are treated as distinct concepts. In the context of EITI, government
transparency and accountability are considered the fundamental factors that shape – either
positively or negatively – the economic, political and social outcomes of natural-resource
endowment in any country (Corrigan 2014). Williams (2011) considers transparency and
accountability as the primary factors that can turn the resource curse into a resource blessing.
This is because a fairer wealth distribution reduces the level of poverty and improves life
conditions in resource-abundant countries (Mejía Acosta 2013). This is evident in resourcerich countries, such as Norway, that have developed good democratic institutions, as opposed
to countries with weak institutions that cannot ensure transparency and accountability in their
extractive industry. Consequently, initiatives such as EITI and the Publish What You Pay
(PWYP) campaign are regarded as attempts to institutionalise transparency as an
internationally accepted norm of accountability in the governance of natural resources (Alstine
2014).
Since transparency and accountability play a significant role in fighting aspects of the resource
curse, particularly corruption, they are at the heart of EITI’s strategy. Therefore, it is important
to introduce and discuss both concepts in the context of this thesis. The first section in this
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chapter discusses transparency, its different types, what it promises to achieve and its
limitations. This is followed by an overview and discussion of accountability and its various
forms and types. These concepts are used to assess how NEITI discourse maintains the
objective of promoting open and accountable management of the extractive industry (Chapter
10).

4.2 Transparency
4.2.1 Definition and forms
Calls for transparency can be traced back to attempts during the Enlightenment era to clarify
the vague and opaque concepts that dominated the Dark Ages (Teurlings & Stauff 2014).
Transparency, as an incomplete and confused concept, was expressed in terms of using
scientific methods, as opposed to myth, to develop and transmit knowledge. The subsequent
emergence of capitalism and the rise of the market system increased levels of transparency
because of their reliance on the notion of market efficiency, which in turn needs transparency
as a way to enable and monitor its driving force, market competition (Teurlings & Stauff 2014).
Consequently, Meyer et al. (1997) currently consider transparency as a necessity for the
neoliberal system that dominates the world, as it is needed as soft regulation for the private
sector, in preference to the “inefficient” public sector.

To be perceived as transparent, relevant and accurate, information of an entity or institution
should be presented to all stakeholders openly in a comprehensible and timely manner
(Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016; Tsoukas 1997). This suggests that transparency is
constructed around stakeholders’ ability to understand publicly available information.
Consequently, information that does not fit this criterion does not promote transparency.
However, nor does the disclosure of inappropriate, incomprehensible or inaccurate information
that creates confusion promote transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016). This gives
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transparency the ability to govern by disclosure where the target audience is identified, relevant
information is determined, and information is documented and communicated to both internal
and external stakeholders (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016).
Based on the above, transparency or “[g]overnance by disclosure has become a defining feature
of global governance, and one that extends well beyond state-led efforts at international regime
building” (Sovacool et al. 2016, p.179). This reflects the increasing role of CSOs, companies
in general and MNCs in particular in creating international rubrics to govern international
markets instead of government legislation. In the same context, Rees (2014) argues that
national legislation generates a harmful competitive environment for companies and increases
corruption, especially as companies compete to access extractive rights. Therefore, initiatives
such as EITI offer what Rees (2014) calls revenue transparency, which can overcome the flaws
in national legislation and hold governments accountable. This trend of replacing national
enforceable law and regulations with voluntary initiatives is supported by MNCs through their
dominant international influence. For example, the legal director of Royal Dutch Shell15,
argues that EITI:
offers the best and only effective global common alternative to a patchwork
of variable and ad hoc national rules to legislate for so-called ‘financial
transparency reporting’ in the USA and Europe (Rees 2014, p.20).
In addition to the market system, other factors play a role in converting transparency into “an
international norm including advances in information and communication technologies as well
as the trends of democratization and globalization” (Alstine 2014, p.22). For example,
technology such as computers and other electronic devices, electronic storage and the internet
assist in gathering, storing, processing and presenting useful information in a quick and timely
manner. In modern society, information is the most valuable resource (Tsoukas 1997). Further,
15

It is worth noting that Royal Dutch Shell is one of the founders and a board member of EITI.
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as discussed previously, transparency is also supported by many international NGOs, including
Global Witness, Oxfam and PWYP, but also institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (Bleischwitz 2014).
To reflect its importance, studies on transparency have proliferated in various fields and
domains, such as communication, management, development, ethics, economy, law, political
science and public administration (Mabillard & Zumofen 2015). Moreover, the shared
principle of open access to information has been used in many fields such as social and physical
sciences, poetry, business, accounting, politics, philosophy, post-modernism, psychology and
humanities; thus the idea of transparency has acquired multiple facets and nuances (Neyland
2007; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016). Transparency is also of concern to governments,
companies, NGOs, institutions, academia and society as a whole (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson
2016).
There is no commonly agreed definition for transparency. Even in financial reporting and
accounting, it lacks definitive characteristics in the conceptual frameworks of either the IASB
or the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (Barth & Schipper 2008). However, in
academic research, transparency has been defined according to different disciplines and study
domains (Table 4.1)
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Table 4.1: Definitions of transparency (Schnackenberg &Tomlinson 2016, p.1787).
Definitions of Transparency
Study

Study Domain

Akkermans, Bogerd, & van
Doremalen (2004)

Strategic alliances

Bloomfield & O’Hara (1999)

Financial markets

Bushman, Piotroski & Smith (2004)

Organisational
governance

Eijffinger & Geraats (2006)

Monetary policy

Flood, Huisman, Koedijk & Mahieu
(1999)

Financial markets

Granados, Gupta & Kauffman (2010)

Electronic markets

Jordan, Peek & Rosengren (2000)

Financial markets

Kaptein (2008)

Organisational
culture

Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson &
Sparks (1998)

Strategic alliances

Madhavan, Porter & Weaver (2005)

Financial markets

McGaughey (2002)

Strategic
management

Nicolaou & McKnight (2006)

Organisational
governance

Pagano & Roell (1996)

Financial markets

Potosky (2008)

Organisational
governance

Prat (2005)

Organisational
governance

Vorauer & Claude (1998)

Negotiations

Walumbwa, Luthans, Avey & Oke
(2011)

Leadership

Zhu (2004)

Electronic markets
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Definition of Transparency
Sharing data regarding current order and
production statuses as well as plans and
forecasts with various supply-chain
partners
The real-time, public dissemination of
trade and quote information
The availability of firm-specific
information to those outside publicly
traded firms
The extent to which central banks disclose
information that is related to the policymaking process
The ability of market participants to
clearly see outstanding price quotes
The availability and accessibility of market
information to interested parties
The disclosure of timely and accurate
information
Ensuring visibility within the organisation
to allow employees to properly modify or
correct behaviours
Openness toward partners
The ability of market participants to
observe information about the trading
process
The extent to which members of a
population (a) have identified or are aware
of an intellectual asset’s existence and (b)
understand the intellectual asset’s
underlying principles
The availability of adequate information to
verify or assess the data exchange taking
place
The degree to which the size and direction
of the current order flow are visible to the
competing market makers involved in
setting prices
The extent to which a communication
medium facilitates a clear or unobstructed
communication exchange
The ability of the principal to observe how
the agent behaves and the consequences of
the agent’s behaviour
The degree to which an individual’s
objectives are readily apparent to others
Leader behaviours that are aimed at
promoting trust through disclosures that
include openly sharing information and
expressions of the leader’s true thoughts
and feeling
The degree of visibility and accessibility of
information

While the table from Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) indicates multiple, and contextual
definitions of transparency, they all share the concept of making things visible (Neyland 2007).
In this context, Collin (2003) defines a narrow concept of transparency as things that can be
seen through. However, this is regarded as one-way communication that does not fulfil its
objectives: generating trust, participation and efficiency and fighting corruption (Mabillard &
Zumofen 2015). Further, this reduced concept of transparency is not sufficient to represent
practice, as:
[r]eality itself necessarily consists of invisibility, hidden areas, and
unequally structured access, and any kind of mediating entity will only add
to the impossibility of full transparency (Teurlings & Stauff 2014, p.5).
Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012, p.563) propose a practice-based definition of
transparency, albeit imperfect: “the availability of information about an organization or actor
allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings or performance”. Several types of
transparency have been identified in the literature: political, social, financial, institutional,
opaque and clear. In its political form, transparency contributes to the creation of government
legitimacy (Heard-Lauréote 2007). Transparency as an element of legitimacy confirms that
“the operation of the government is sufficiently open to public view and simple enough in its
essentials that citizens can readily understand how and what it is doing” (Dahl 1998, p.126).
Barth and Schipper (2008, p.173) adopt the same elements to define financial reporting
transparency as “the extent to which financial reports reveal an entity's underlying economics
in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial reports”. This approach
towards transparency, which only concerns publicly available information, has been termed
“verifiability transparency without accountability implications” (Barth & Schipper 2008).
However, there is another approach towards transparency – “performativity” – that focuses on
the ability of transparency to stimulate socio-economic reactions and lead to performative
accountability (Albu & Flyverbom 2016).
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Fox (2007) distinguishes between two types of transparency: opaque and clear. Opaque
transparency refers to the disclosure of unreliable and inappropriate information that does not
reveal aspects of institutional internal governance. In contrast, clear transparency ensures the
reliability of the disclosed information to create a “true” picture of disclosing entities, their
internal governance policies and their chain of responsibilities. However, to ensure
performative accountability through clear transparency, public-sector players, including
governments and NGOs, are needed. Transparency, in this manner, is referred to as a
governance-by-disclosure mechanism that challenges:
the traditional norms of corporate privacy and state sovereignty and is
invoked in many issue areas including security, financial policy, economics,
corruption, human rights, and the environment (Alstine 2014, p.22).
Consequently, this form of transparency is an essential element in building stakeholder trust
and improving communication through a feedback loop that reflects the positive consequences
of transparency and enhances governance (Duan et al. 2015). Therefore, the concept of
transparency is nuanced and defined according to a plethora of contextual factors including:
history, the economic system, the political regime, industry, the audience and calculative
practices.
In the extractive industry, transparency is always discussed in association with accountability.
Therefore, a different understanding of transparency will lead to a nuanced form of
accountability. Accordingly, for the extractive industry in Nigeria it is believed that the
disclosure of revenue streams allows citizens to hold their governments accountable and
ensures the wise management of revenues for the benefit of the citizens (Jayasinghe & Ezpeleta
2019; Vijgea et al. 2019). Therefore, Jayasinghe and Ezpeleta (2019) consider transparency as
a prerequisite for social accountability in which ordinary citizens and/or CSOs take the lead to
hold noncompliant parties accountable. On the other hand, transparency in the extractive
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industry is regarded as “an insufficient but necessary condition of public accountability”
(López & Fontaine 2019, p.1156). As such, transparency in the extractive industry makes
information publicly available, allows non-government actors, citizens and CSOs to scrutinise
the industry and enhances social involvement in its management (López & Fontaine 2019;
Osuoka 2019). However, Osuoka (2019) argues that to play this positive role in supporting
public accountability, transparency in this case requires an active, educated and empowered
CSOs and citizens.
In the context of EITI, Kolstad and Wiig (2009, p.522) define transparency as “public access
to information, or more precisely timely and reliable economic, social and political
information…accessible to all relevant stakeholders”. Further, Ejiogu, Ejiogu and Ambituuni
(2019) highlight the importance of the quality of information in achieving the desirable
outcomes of transparency in NEITI. For example, they write that the NEITI disclosed
information was ignored by the audience it was targeted at because it was not understandable.
Therefore, they conclude (p.2) that:
viewing transparency as increased information disclosure without regard to
how the information was produced…served as a means of legitimising the
weak and corrupt reporting systems and practices of government agencies
which provide NEITI with the information on which it bases its audit report.
In addition, Ejiogu, Ejiogu and Ambituuni (2019) suggest that the lack of political will to
enable accountability through the disclosed information downgrades the importance of
transparency. For the same reasons, Akonnor and Ohemeng (2019) conclude that EITI in
Ghana failed to promote adequate transparency and accountability to ensure sustainable
development for the country.
4.2.2 The promise of transparency
Since the Enlightenment, information and knowledge associated with greater transparency
have been equated with the power of light in revealing the darkness of secrecy and ignorance
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(Tsoukas 1997). In other words, more information and knowledge provide a greater ability to
take actions and provide more accountability and control (Tsoukas 1997). United States
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated in 1913 that “[p]ublicity is justly commended as
a remedy for social and industrial diseases, sunshine is said to be the best disinfectant, electric
light the best policeman” (cited in Fox 2007, p.664). This view suggests that transparency
provides many social, economic and political advantages. According to Haufler (2010, p.55)
transparency advocates argue that:
it makes markets work more efficiently; enhances trust and cooperation;
strengthens institutions; reduces corruption and mismanagement; enables
people to hold others accountable for their actions; and increases the
legitimacy of decisions and institutions.
Moreover, Eigen (2007) suggests that transparency minimises political instability because it
reduces the debate about corruption and the need for regime change. A lack of transparency
strengthens corruption by making it less visible, creates an agency problem between
governments and the public and reduces government accountability as a result of the
overdependence on resource revenue instead of tax (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). Moreover, Haufler
(2010) argues that transparency is considered a low-cost solution for many of the problems of
developing countries. However, it is not a favourite policy for either governments or companies
operating in developing countries, because if transparency helps the public to hold companies
and governments accountable, it might undermine the competitive position of some companies
and damage their reputation. In addition, it might pose a threat to the existing official elites in
government (Haufler 2010). For example, transparency as an accountability mechanism in
EITI promises to generate public debate about government revenues from the extractive
industry, which leads to better governance in the industry. However, transparency has
limitations, as discussed in the following section.
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4.2.3 Limitations of transparency
Despite its advantages, transparency has been criticised by different scholars. For example,
Fenster (2006, p.885) argues that all the shortcomings of transparency are caused by the
assumption “that information, once set free from the state that creates it, will produce an
informed, engaged public that will hold officials accountable”. This suggests that information
will empower citizens and CSOs to play the role of scrutineer in society. While it is argued that
transparency (in its bureaucratic and political forms) reduces corruption, there are some
conditions that must be met for transparency to work well (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016).
The conditions include the technical, financial and legal ability of the recipient of the
information to comprehend, process and work based on this information in order to hold
governments or companies accountable for their actions (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016).
However, this might be challenging to achieve, as CSOs in developing countries, for example,
suffer from inherently weak organisation and governance and a lack of resources. This limits
their capacity to assess and process the information needed. These limitations are further
intensified by low literacy levels in developing countries; but also, governments attempt to
work against CSOs, considering them a threat (Sandbrook 2016). As Fox (2007) writes,
revealing the truth does not always lead to justice.
Roberts (2009) argues that companies aim to be perceived by the public in a certain way that
serves their public image. As a result, transparency can encourage management to give more
attention to creating a desirable image rather than increasing actual operational efficiency
(Roberts 2009). Tsoukas (1997, p.838) writes that “management becomes tantamount to
keeping up appearances and, fighting shadows: managing via league tables leads to managing
the league tables themselves”. In this way, companies are always able to employ and harness
the positive implications of concepts and initiatives such as transparency, forgiveness and
openness. However, these concepts may generate unintended, counteractive and undesirable
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outcomes. For example, transparency, when it is misused, may diminish accountability rather
than strengthen or enable it. According to Roberts (2009), this is evident in transparency’s role
in intensifying the global financial crisis in 2007, when the appearance of fair value information
ignited a panic in financial markets. Therefore, as Tsoukas (1997, p.827) asserts, “[m]ore
information may lead to less understanding; more information may undermine trust; and more
information may make society less rationally governable”.
By controlling information, governments, companies and other institutions can shape public
knowledge, and thus public opinion, about matters of concern (Tsoukas 1997). Furthermore,
while transparency seeks to disseminate trust and accountability, companies and other
institutions may use organisational procedures to gain the benefits of transparency yet maintain
secrecy. These procedures include “creative accounting, the release of data incomprehensible
to the lay investor or customer, and the hounding of whistleblowers” (Birchall 2011, p.14). For
example, Neyland (2007) argues that transparency does not lead directly to open access to
organisational dynamics or structures that allow one to hold organisations accountable for their
actions. Indeed, organisations attempt to create and produce a specific version of information
that corresponds to an internal auditor’s requirement for transparency. In addition, in an open,
rich-information society all concepts, opinions and facts are equally presented and accessible,
which makes them equally adoptable, with only a shallow understanding and little discernment
among them (Tsoukas 1997). Finally, it is argued that a fully transparent society can undermine
trust between stakeholders because it reveals the hidden parts of an institutions’ operations.
This makes it a controversial mechanism, as it does not have the consent of all parties (Tsoukas
1997). Therefore, according to Neyland (2007), it is crucial to be able to trust the intention of
the actors behind transparency and the procedures and outcomes of the transparency itself,
because transparency has the potential to be either genuine or merely apparent. Apparent
transparency is consistent with current social pressures to present a desirable image or to
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mislead stakeholders while hiding other aspects. This allows transparency to create a selfcontained spectacle (Teurlings & Stauff 2014). In other words:
uncovering secrets always might unveil the fact that the truth thus revealed
is part of a greater system of secrecy, and merely a supplementary fold in
the structure of veiling itself. Enlightenment always might in fact be the
dupe of apparent transparency, and transparency might still be a kind of veil
(Bennington 2011, p.28).
Therefore, based on the above discussion, transparency in the context of NEITI is linked to the
broader context of the extractive industry in Nigeria and is explored as spectacular production
to reinforce or legitimate the timely, public and comprehensive disclosure of relevant, accurate
and comprehensible information for decision-making by a range of users. Since an
understanding of transparency determines forms of accountability, the following section
discusses the concept of accountability.
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4.3 Accountability
4.3.1 Introduction
The concept of accountability can be traced back to Hammurabi, King of Babylon, in 2000
B.C.E., The term has always been linked to the concept of accounting or providing an account
of oneself or of others (Bovens, 2007; Roberts 2009). This is evident in the accounting
literature, as accountability has this shared meaning of providing an account for one’s actions
to others. In this context the one that provides the account is referred to as “accountor” and the
one that receives the account is referred to as “accountee”; both the accountor and the accountee
can be individuals or organisations (Steccolini, 2004).
However, there is an agreement within academic circles that the concept of accountability is
ever-expanding and hard to define (Andrew 2007; Mulgan 2000). According to Willmott
(1996, pp.24, 26) “accountability is a widespread phenomenon that occurs whenever people
strive to account for their experience-in-the-world.... Accountability is at the centre of human
relations and interactions”. Further, Bovens (2007) suggests that accountability is an elusive
concept because it means different things to different actors or users. Yet, nobody is opposed
to it, as it conveys a sense of transparency and credibility. Therefore, accountability may have
different meanings and definitions according to different ideologies, context or actors. For
example, Sinclair (1995, p.221) suggests that auditors:
discuss accountability as if it is a financial or numerical matter, political
scientists view accountability as a political imperative and legal scholars as
a constitutional arrangement, while philosophers treat accountability as a
subset of ethics.
For the purposes of this thesis, given that EITI is built around the ideal of transparency to
promote better governance of the extractive industry and uses a multi-stakeholder mechanism,
the following types of accountability will be discussed: transparency as a form of
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accountability (transparency-as-accountability); intelligent accountability; and public
accountability. Each resonates with aspects relevant to NEITI.
4.3.2 Transparency-as-accountability
According to Bovens (2007, p.449) accountability is a broad umbrella for “distinct concepts,
such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility and
integrity”. Consequently, accountability can be studied as:
a mechanism (principal-agent theory), a function (institutionalist theories),
a behavior (social or cultural psychology) or a relation (moral theory)
depending on the standpoint the author would like to adopt (Mabillard &
Zumofen 2015, p.7).
Several accounting scholars consider accountability as the act of providing or receiving
account for events, such as disclosure (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995). This means that
disclosure or transparency becomes not just a means to attain accountability, but a form of
accountability referred to in this thesis as transparency-as-accountability. Arguably, through
transparency those in power, such as government officials and corporate officers, could be held
accountable for their actions. However, Bovens (2007) suggests that transparency does not
replace social or public accountability because it does not always generate scrutiny and
guaranteed consequences. Further, as a form of accountability, Roberts (2009, p.957) argues
that transparency can only afford to “cast light upon what would otherwise remain obscure or
invisible, and to do so in order to provide the basis for confidence for distant others”. In this
sense, transparency-as-accountability reduces the meaning of accountability to a “mere
making things visible”, under the assumption that one can provide a full account. For
transparency to achieve its accountability potential, Wall (1996) proposes three conditions:
public accessibility of the information; public understandability of the information; and public
acceptability or trust in the information. However, according to Roberts (2009) it is impossible
to provide a full account because social, economic and political entities are interdependent.
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Therefore, EITI and/or NEITI may operate as a transparency-as-accountability mechanism, as
it is based on the principle of promoting accountability by making the extractive industry more
transparent.
4.3.3 Intelligent accountability
From the beginning of the 21st century belief has been growing that accountability should:
allow for clarification, scrutiny and revision; and it reinforces the idea that
a broader social group may have rights to an account of an event for which
they are not directly in control (Andrew 2007, p.879).
This form of accountability, which is referred to as intelligent accountability, opens a two-way
communication channel between the provider and the receiver of information (O’Neill 2002).
Intelligent accountability “does not exclusively rely on the power to make things transparent,
but, acknowledges the impossibility of this ideal of a self that is fully transparent to itself and
others” (Roberts 2009, p.958). Intelligent accountability is supplemented by transparency to
enable “talk, listening, and asking questions then allows us to explore and investigate” (Roberts
2009, p.969). This kind of accountability reinforces the mutual responsibly between social,
economic and political actors. In addition, intelligent accountability compensates for the flaws
of transparency-as-accountability, which merely make things visible without any mechanism
to question or sanction. EITI “seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform
public debate and promote understanding” (EITI 2017, np). Therefore, NEITI manifests a form
of intelligent accountability by providing an opportunity to question the calculative practices
related to the disclosure of revenue flows.
The multi-stakeholder mechanism overseen by CSOs also resonates with a public
accountability function; this is discussed in the following section.
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4.3.4 Public accountability
Public accountability can be defined as “a social relationship in which an actor feels an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other” (Bovens 2005a,
183). The prior notions of accountability had been based on rulers or officials holding subjects
to account. However, public accountability according to Bovens’s (2005a; 2005b; 2007)
definition takes a reverse approach: subjects or citizens holding officials to account.
The term “public” in “public accountability” refers to two ideas. Since the account is given to
the public, it denotes its openness to citizens (Bovens 2005a). This indicates the shift from
internal accountability to an external form that concerns a wider range of public affairs.
Examples include, but are not limited to, corporate-citizen reporting, social and environmental
reporting and sustainability reporting. In addition, the term links the concept of accountability
to the public sector, as in the case of public managers, public money and public authority. In
these cases, “[a]gencies or individual public managers should feel obliged to account for their
performance to the public at large or, at least, to civil interest groups, charities, and associations
of clients” (Bovens 2005b, p.185).
Bovens (2007), however, proposes a more comprehensive definition for public accountability:
Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face
consequences (Bovens 2007, p.450).
According to Bovens (2007) actors can be individuals or organisations, and the accountability
forum can be a government, a parliament, CSOs or the public (Bovens 2007). In the case of
EITI and NEITI, CSOs and the independent auditor represent the forum (the actor that holds
other accountable). The actor's obligation, the account subject matter, can be formal or
informal, enforceable or not enforceable (Bovens 2007). Regarding enforceability, EITI and
NEITI are hybrid in nature because they are voluntary at the international level but enforced
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by specific laws at the domestic level. In addition, EITI and NEITI have formal processes and
well-structured mechanisms. The account-giving process between the actor and the forum has
three phases: receiving a complete account from the actor; investigating the account; and
interrogation by the forum. Finally, the forum provides a judgement that might approve the
actor's conduct or might attract more public scrutiny, negative publicity, or might impose some
form of sanction (Bovens 2007). The forum for EITI, the multi-stakeholder group, lacks the
capacity to impose sanctions, especially in countries that do not issue formal legislation to
determine specific procedures in cases of noncompliance.
There is an increasing role for NGOs or CSOs in public accountability. Because trust in
governments is decreasing within neoliberalist systems, a direct accountability relationship
between public agencies, CSO and citizens is more common. However, Bovens (2007)
questions the ability of these arrangements to provide full accountability, considering their
inability to provide full judgement and apply sanctions. As this thesis outlines, NEITI is meant
to establish an accountability relationship between CSOs, governments and the extractive
companies. Arguably the Act gives it the ability to sanction. Therefore, it is reasonable to
consider the accountability promised by NEITI against Bovens’s (2007) notion of public
accountability.
The concepts of transparency and accountability are context specific and these concepts are
under-researched in the case of organisations that have a hybrid nature such as NEITI. NEITI
represents a new form of hybrid that combines voluntary international NGOs with domestic
regulatory institutions. This thesis provides the opportunity to study the relationship between
the two concepts and if they enable each other, complement or silence each other.
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4.4 Summary
Because transparency and accountability are at the heart of NEITI, this chapter introduced and
discussed these two constructs, which will be explored in the analysis. The chapter concludes
that transparency is an elusive term and intrinsically bound to the context in which it is situated.
Since accountability is linked to transparency, several forms identified in the literature –
transparency-as-accountability, intelligent accountability and public accountability – all
resonate with NEITI’s objective of transparency. However, NEITI is situated within an
industry that promotes the dominant ideological context of global capital. Therefore,
transparency and accountability may be mere spectacular productions to secure legitimacy for
an audience of willing spectators.
The following chapter presents the Theory of Spectacle as an analytical framework.
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Chapter 5: The Theory of Spectacle
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 the relationship between EITI, transparency, accountability and the role of NEITI
reports was discussed. This chapter introduces the Theory of Spectacle as a means of
explaining modern-day reporting as spectacles produced by organisations: in particular, their
ability to create a certain reality through financial, CSR and other forms to serve particular
needs and to maintain the status quo (Boje 2001). Boje (2001, np) argues that “accounting is
co-storytelling, the conversations where deals are made, the truth invented, and the spectacle
gets rehearsed”; that is:
total manipulation of meaning-making....through theatrical events to serve
the production of power and managerial needs to control and spin a good
story for the consumers of accounting (Boje 2001, np).
This good story or image also mitigates any attempt to challenge the dominant ideology
(Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba 2011). To study meaning, especially the operationalisation of
transparency and accountability, this thesis adopts a social-construction paradigm and a
discourse-analysis approach.
The objectives of the thesis are to:
•

Explore how the meaning of transparency is constructed, conveyed and
legitimised in NEITI reports.

•

Examine how NEITI discourse maintains the objective of promoting open and
accountable management of the extractive industry.

•

Critically evaluate the network of power and ideology that maintains EITI in
Nigeria.

The next section discusses the term “spectacle” and its origin, followed by the background of
the modern society of the spectacle. Further, Debord's (1967; 1991) Theory of Spectacle is
discussed in detail with reference to different types of spectacle and their applications. This is
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followed by a discussion on how the Theory of Spectacle has been used and applied in several
areas, including accounting.

5.2 Why the Theory of Spectacle?
Several theories may be used to study voluntary initiatives and voluntary disclosure practices
such as NEITI. Examples include club theory and impression management. Club theory was
introduced in James Buchanan’s (1965) seminal paper “An economic theory of clubs”. Potoski
and Prakash (2009, p.19) argue that “the club theory approach to voluntary programs builds on
long-standing political economy traditions that address the theoretical bases of collective
actions”. Clubs are considered alternative non-government institutions that provide unique
“club goods” in addition to public goods and private goods (Buchanan 1965; Potoski & Prakash
2009). Club goods are those goods and services that are only offered to the members (Potoski
& Prakash 2009), similar to the benefits of paid membership granting an exclusive right to use
the services (Schuler 2012). Private goods are those enjoyed by specific members of a club,
such as a member of a tennis club booking a court for exclusive use (Schuler 2012).
Club theory has been applied in variety of fields, including:
military alliances, international organizations, recreation facilities,
infrastructure, national parks, and wilderness areas. Club goods encompass
hospitals, health clubs, trauma clinics, libraries, universities, movie theaters,
telephone systems, and public transport (Sandler & Tschirhart 1997, p.336).
Schuler (2012) used club theory to study MNCs’ motives for joining EITI, concluding that
EITI favoured:
MNCs from countries with long arm disclosure laws, to MNCs lacking
relationships with NGOs seeking inexpensive CSR, to MNCs relying upon
financing from institutional and social investors, to MNCs attempting to
differentiate themselves from competitors on social criteria, and to MNCs
with broad stakeholder-focused top managers (Schuler, 2012, p.1).
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In addition to club theory, impression management has also been applied in accounting
literature to study corporate voluntary reporting such as CSR (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011).
Impression management has its roots in economics-based theories, such as agency theory, and
in social psychology (Leary & Kowalski 1990; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011). According to
Hooghiemstra (2000, p.60), at the social-psychology level, impression management studies
“how individuals present themselves to others to be perceived favourably by others”. In
contrast, agency theory implies that impression management is concerned with how managers
use organisational reports to make a positive impression on the investors to justify their
remuneration (Rutherford 2003). Such impression management controls:
the perceptions of organisational audiences either by biasing the
presentation or disclosure of information before it is released (reporting
bias) or by biasing the descriptions of causality of organisational actions and
events (self-serving bias) (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2011, p.421).
The use of impression management is reflected in the selective disclosure of information for
“a manner that is intended to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements” (Godfrey,
Mather & Ramsay 2003, p.96). Cho et al. (2015, p.80) argue that corporations use sustainability
reports and other disclosure materials “for window-dressing and impression management
purposes”. This implies that corporations conceal the undesirable aspects of their operations
by selectively disclosing biased information that serves their reputation instead of the interests
of all stakeholders (Cho et al. 2015).
As discussed above, club theory may help to explain the factors that drive members to join
NEITI and what benefits they may enjoy from this membership. In addition, impression
management also has the potential to explain the disclosure practices of NEITI participants.
However, neither theory explains the ideologies that drive this organisational behaviour.
Further, they do not help in understanding how the dominant ideology is manifest in NEITI
reports, the network of power between the NEITI members or the form of transparency and
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accountability provided. These gaps are filled by the Theory of Spectacle, which offers an
interpretation of how organisations, such as NEITI, are ideological social-control mechanisms.

The Theory of Spectacle links a specific phenomenon to its ideological interpretation:
[T[he basic claim underlying Debord’s theory of spectacle is the assertion
that what we see in the world – essentially, how the world is architected – is
a reflection of triumphant ideologies (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.98).
The Theory of Spectacle shows the impact of contextual social, political and economic factors
on a particular phenomenon, as choices are “constrained within a general framework that limits
our options only to ones that benefit (or at least do not contradict) the existing society and its
political-economic structure” (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.98). Capitalism is currently the
dominant economic system globally, and neoliberalism is regarded as the latest phase of
capitalism, in which the power of capital and financial actors has increased and dominated
social, political and economic life (Chiapello 2017; Sikka 2015; Lehman, Hammond &
Agyemang 2018).

While the roots of neoliberalism can be traced back to the intellectual work of capitalist and
market scholars such as Milton Freidman, Frederich Hayek and Richard Epstein in the1970s,
it became prominent with US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher during the 1980s (Chiapello 2017; Jessop 2002; McCarthy & Prudham 2004; Peet &
Hartwick 1999). Neoliberalism lacks a unique and homogeneous definition because it:
stands for a complex assemblage of ideological commitments, discursive
representations, and institutional practices, all propagated by highly specific
class alliances and organized at multiple geographical scales (McCarthy &
Prudham 2004, p.276).
According to Breslow (2015, p.421), neoliberalism is “the term used by a cross-disciplinary
suite of social scientists and humanists to describe prevailing trends in the global political
economy that shift the roles of government to firms, communities, and individuals”.
Neoliberalism has had a profound effect on all aspects of contemporary life including political
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institutions, schools, hospitals and intellectual and occupational policies (Andrew & Baker
2020).
From an economic perspective, neoliberalism is based on the ideas of commodification and
self-regulating markets that allocate goods and services worldwide. Politically and
ideologically, neoliberalism fiercely opposes state intervention and only supports regulation
that promotes personal property rights (Jessop, 2002; Narayan & Stittle 2018). This is because
the role of the state is considered by neoliberalists as “a hindrance to wealth creation. Blame is
laid on high levels of taxation, budget deficits, and disincentives to work as a result of generous
welfare systems” (Chow & Bracci 2020, p.154). Therefore, within this system, the state
regulatory and governance functions are delegated to NGOs and international institutions, with
no clear transparency and accountability frameworks. As a result, in advanced neoliberal
systems, regulation shifts:
from binding to increasingly voluntarist, neo-corporatist regulatory
frameworks involving non-binding standards and rules, public-private cooperation, self-regulation, and greater participation from citizen coalitions,
all with varying degrees of capacity and accountability (McCarthy &
Prudham 2004, p.276).
In addition, neoliberalism promotes privatisation and government spending cuts, which reduce
government public services. This subsequent lack is substituted with a direct and unmediated
partnership between capital and citizens and signals the diminishing of political, social
economic functions of the state and its public service against the growing role of the private
sectors and NGOs (Chiapello 2017; McCarthy & Prudham 2004). Therefore, neoliberal
instruments include, but are not limited to, cutting taxes, instituting maximum economic
liberalisation, privatising the public sector, deregulating commerce, removing trade barriers
and customs duties and dismantling the social-welfare apparatus (Chiapello 2017).
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5.3 Spectacle and its use
Linguistically, the term “spectacle” is derived from the Latin spectaculum, meaning a public
show that is characterised by visual effects. The word spectaculum is formed from two Greek
words – thea (θέα) and theama (θέαμα), meaning an event seen by the public, such games and
public entertainment (Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000; Collin 2003). In this sense, this word
refers to “something very impressive to look at” (Collin 2003, p.824), often involving visual
effects. Spectacles were originally manifest in different forms:
from mundane household objects to monuments for contemplation: finger
rings, clay lamps, glassware, silver, painting, mosaic, inscription, coins,
reliefs, texts and architecture (Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000, p.10).
“Spectacle” referred to “a person or a thing seen as an object of curiosity, contempt, marvel or
admiration and it could connote the height of delusion” (Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000, p.11).
However, the ancient spectacles were not only expressed in physical form, they were also
social, political or sports events. For example, in ancient Greece spectacles were presented as
part of festivals, rituals, weddings, funerals, music, texts, races, poetry, Olympic Games and
political events such as the democratic debates in Athena. These activities increased during the
Hellenistic and the Roman periods especially in association with Hellenistic royal banquets,
mimes, pantomimes, gladiatorial combats, chariot races, sports games and the hunting and
slaughter of animals (Boje et al. 2004).
Boje et al. (2004) argues that these festivals, rituals and other form of entertainment were used
to exercise political and social control through pictures and inscriptions, rather than written
documents. Therefore, throughout ancient civilisations, the experience of spectacle was
characterised by an active participation in the act of speculation. One example was the Circus
Maximus, where thousands of people watched and cheered the hosts and their utterances
before, during and after the end of the games and events (Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000).
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Due to social, political and economic factors, the form of spectacle changed significantly in
Europe, especially during the Dark Ages and the Renaissance (Boje et al. 2004). For example,
the Dark Ages were characterised by the disappearance of sports, entertainment and musical
celebrations and the emergence and growing power of the Church in society. Combined with
the State, they used their spectacular powers “to keep the masses under control, until public
execution and torture proved unreliable means of social control” (Boje et al. 2004, p.754).
In contrast, the Renaissance opened the European mind to science, arts and ancient Greek
philosophies. According to Bergmann and Kondoleon (2000), the rebuilt city of Paris in the
19th century offered the first example of the new notion of spectacle: writers, artists, ballet and
theatre flourished as economic prosperity became more widely distributed. This was also the
origin of Guy Debord's idea of the society of the spectacle. Debord (1967) considers spectacle
as a tool used by those in power to control behaviour through staged public events and
sophisticated mass media.

5.4 Theorising the society of the spectacle
The origin of the modern concept of the society of the spectacle emerged in the 1860s with the
“massive internal extension of the capitalist market — the invasion and restructuring of whole
areas of free time, private life, leisure and personal expression” (Clark 1984, p.9). This later
encountered the initial stage of what is currently known as the globalisation of social, political
and economic Western systems. This new system was characterised by the emergence of mass
shopping centres, magazines, fashion and the dominance of “image” or visual events (Clark
1984). Crary (1989) further suggests this society was characterised by the dominance of images
over content, and superficial understandings over intellectual output. According to Gotham and
Krier (2008), the production and distribution of these new spectacles involves different players
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such as governments, political organisations, economic elites, different interest groups,
marketers and advertising agents.
While Debord (1967) sees the antecedents of the modern spectacle in the Renaissance, he
suggests that the society of the spectacle came to existence in the late 1920s. However, while
Debord does not provide any justification for his choice of this particular period, Crary (1989)
suggests that it coincided with the invention of the first television16 in 1927 and the first sound
movie, along with the:
rise of fascism and, soon after, Stalinism, and the way in which they
incarnated models of the spectacle. Important, for example, was Goebbels's
innovative and synergetic use of every available medium, especially the
development of sound/image propaganda (Crary 1989, p.104).
Debord set out his theory in his seminal book, The Society of the Spectacle, in 1967. Debord
did not introduce society as he wished it to be, or how society should be, but how society was
in the late phase of capitalism (Merrifield 2004).
Theoretically, Debord (1967, p.3) does not propose a unified definition of the concept of the
spectacle. Instead, through The Society of the Spectacle he explains the concepts that define the
spectacle. The two main concepts are that the spectacle is “the very heart of this real society’s
unreality” (Debord 1967, p.3) and that it is a “social relationship between people that is
mediated by images” (Debord 1967, p.4). These concepts or definitions reflect the ability of
the spectacle, through images and signs, to claim the status of reality (Patrascu 2013). In
addition, they refer to the ability of the spectacle to play the role of a perception-management
or perception-manipulation technology through its power to conceal or reveal specific aspects
of reality. The spectacle therefore is able to “redirect citizens’ attention from structural

16

Televisions became widespread in the US and Europe after World War II (Campbell, Martin & Fabos 2012).
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inequalities to spectacular events designed to subdue social criticism” (Kersten & Abbott 2012,
p.324).
Debord (1967, p.1) considers the spectacle as a representation of a certain social reality: “the
spectacle presents itself as society itself, as a part of society, and as a means of unification”.
As such, the spectacle with all its manifestations represents the dominant social order and a
control mechanism to maintain that dominant social order. In a society dominated by
spectacles, new and radical ideas are filtered to the point where some are marginalised. The
remainder are domesticated and integrated with the dominant models in society, which gives
the old social, economic and political models a false appearance of innovation and originality
(Debord 1967). This process of recuperation reflects “the ideological position of those who
have architected society for their own interest” and to maintain social control in order to ensure
the survival of the spectacle (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.73). In this sense, the spectacle
represents a capitalist institutional and ideological device to manipulate and distort reality by
covering the exploitative nature of capitalism (Gotham & Krier 2008; Uddin, Gumb &
Kasumba 2011). In this society, commodities control both workers and consumers by creating
pseudo-needs for the passive consumer that replace their real human needs (Debord 1967).
Thus, these new commodities “are no longer created to satisfy basic needs, images create the
spectacle and then become the illusion of a need” (Diaz 2007, p.5).
Debord’s Theory of Spectacle is considered a “sharp critique to capitalist society and to the
domination of image” (Celso 2010, p.179). Through the Theory of Spectacle, Debord (1967)
replaces Marx's concept of the accumulation of production to explain the primary force that
ensures the continuity of capitalism and the development it brings to a consumer society
(Catchpowle & Cooper 1999). Marx highlighted the spectacular nature of the capitalist system
through the idea that the wealth of the capitalist society is reflected or represented as an
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immense collection of commodities (Bottici 2015). In Debord’s society of the spectacle, “life
is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has
receded into a representation” (Debord 1967, p.1). Debord, in turn, also “extended this analysis
so as to make of the spectacle the central category through which to disentangle the constitutive
dynamics of contemporary capitalism” (Bottici 2015, p.241). To serve the fundamental purpose
of a comprehensive justification of the dominant social, political and economic systems
(Debord 1967), spectacle uses language and power to create a unified image to convince
spectators (Boje, 2001a).
Based on the notion that the production and consumption of images/spectacles dominate
capitalist society, Christopher Lasch (cited in Garoian & Gaudelius 2004, p.298) concludes
that “no part of life can remain immune from the invasion of spectacle”. This domination
disguises the essence and the consequences of capitalisim. Therefore, the spectacle is
considered as a:
tool of pacification, depoliticization, and massification that distracts and
seduces people using the mechanisms of leisure, consumption, and
entertainment as ruled by the dictates of advertising and commodified media
culture (Gotham & Krier 2008, p.157).
Krier and Swart (2016) argue that the spectacular images that create alienation for the
spectators serve political and social purposes as they detach consumers from the real
experience and conditions of their social, economic and political life. This confirms Debord’s
view of the spectacle as a manifestation of political and ideological systems. Consequently, it
is argued that in modern consumer societies a genuine realistic social life has been substituted
with its proxy representation (Thwaites 2015). While some spectacles reveal through images
what is pleasant, others conceal that which is unpleasant, such as sweatshops, computer cloud
carbon footprints and tech-pollution (Flyverbom & Reinecke 2017). The images’ ability to
manipulate, conceal, deceive and shift attention from more important events to less important
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ones gives the spectacle its appearance of control and impression-management capacity that
dominates social life (Crary 1989).
In the society of the spectacle, “images teach us what and how to see and think and, in doing
so, they mediate the way in which we interact with one another as social beings” (Garoian &
Gaudelius 2004, p.298). Douglas Crimp, a critical theorist (cited in Takemoto 2003, p.85),
noted that “an image isn't simple negative or positive but rather is the product of social relations
and produces contradictory social effects”. Therefore, Debord (1967, p.4) confirms that the
spectacle is not a simple group of images; instead, it is a “social relationship between people
that is mediated by images”. According to Kohn (2008), this means that within the
contemporary condition of capitalism, individuals are separated in their work and social life.
While the spectacle does not eliminate this separation, it gives a sense of unity through the
creation of a shared object through mass entertainment that links them in their separation. The
increasing role of mediating images is reflected in the fact that in the current society, even:
the exchange values of clothes and shoes are heavily connected to images
created by costly advertisement rather than their use values. Likewise, the
commercial success of movies is based on images of big names created by
widespread publicity, TV news is written according to potential size of
audience rather than the truth values of reporting, and electoral votes are
based as much on the political image of a candidate as their policy position
(Chang & Osborn 2005, p.339).
On the other hand, “the Spectacle does not dominate through hypnosis...but through a totalizing
social organization in which social control is built upon a flexible mix of force and consent”
(Briziarelli 2015, np). This power of totalising gives the spectacle the dominance and control
that mediate all aspects of social life (Briziarelli 2015).
Accordingly, to dominate social life the spectacle uses social institutional powers such as
literature, schools, sport, political and regulatory institutions, the municipal environment and
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the media. Since the mass media plays a fundamental role in communicating images, the
abundance of media suggests that:
the mass media space produce events that can be constructed, altered, and
shifted for purposes of maintaining, reifying, or destabilizing spectacles
(Mihailidis & Viotty 2017, p.442).
Consequently, mass media is considered as the main technology that helps to create,
communicate and consolidate spectacles. This capacity has been used by powerful players
throughout history to enforce their dominance and maintain the status quo through controlling
ideas and ideologies (Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000). While mass media is a technology used
by the creators of the spectacle to communicate their version of reality, some scholars, such as
Schirato and Webb (2004), mistakenly consider the spectacle as nothing more than mass media.
Since the end of the 20th century mass media has developed at an accelerated pace as a result
of technological developments, especially with the introduction of the internet. The
technological development has facilitated and accelerated economic, social and political
changes. This has facilitated the development of new approaches to spectacle, and new types
and technologies of spectacle. In contrast to the active nature of the ancient spectacles,
contemporary spectacle is characterised by the passive participation of spectators. There are
many examples of this spectacular experience, such as watching television or cinema, where
the audience, or spectators, are mere recipients (Gotham & Krier 2008). However, spectators
or consumers can resist through active engagement in the process of meaning-making and
interpretation (the art spectacle is an example) (Gotham & Krier 2008). With this engagement,
contemporary spectacles become “sites of struggle where powerful economic and political
interests are often forced to defend what they would prefer to have taken for granted” (Gotham
& Krier 2008, p.179).
Since Debord’s (1967; 1991) introduction of the idea of three types of spectacle – concentrated,
diffuse and integrated – many attempts have been made to modernise the theory by taking into
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consideration the new social, political and economic circumstances associated with the age of
globalisation. For example, scholars such as Kellner (2008), Boje (2001; 2001a) and Boje et
al. (2004) have gone into more detail by identifying specific examples of spectacle combined
with an interpretative approach. In addition, Gotham (2005) distinguishes between forms, types
and technologies of spectacles, introducing six forms of spectacle: political, economic, social,
cultural, religious and spatial. Technologies such as theming, simulation, virtual reality and the
internet are used to create different types of spectacles, such as cinemas, festivals and theme
parks, that are consumed by the public. Kellner (2003) suggests that spectacle forms emerged
and developed over time, benefitting from new technological developments. This includes
“media extravaganzas, sporting events, political happenings, and those attention-grabbing
occurrences that we call news” (Kellner 2003, p.2). In addition, Teurlings (2013) argues that
the spectacle is also manifested in the means by which regular commodities become objects in
themselves thorough the spectacular process. Examples of this form of spectacle include the
packaging of fast food, cappuccino machines in designer shops and photo-ops of political
events. Spectacles also exist in non-commodity form; for example, political (Watergate),
military (the Gulf War) and the media (the O.J. Simpson trial).

In addition, corporate spectacles include:
gala events with costumes, art, success stories, team awards, and celebrity
appearances to launch a new product, symbolize a change initiative or to put
the spot light on positive acts of corporate power (Boje 2001a, p.433).
All forms of spectacle aim to direct and control the dominant social order. However, there are
multiple logics and different contexts that affect the creation and distribution of spectacles
(Gotham & Krier 2008). Woodworth (2015, p.414) believes that “spectacles might also be
conceived as moments and spaces of contestation and vital sites of political struggle and
meaning making”. In this sense, Woodworth (2015) introduces the idea of counter-spectacle,
in which a spectacle can be resisted using another spectacle. Therefore, while the multi87

approach toward spectacle presents a challenge to apply the theory to practice, it does create
an opportunity to design a specific analytical framework to investigate transparency and
accountability in relation to NEITI in Nigeria.
While the Theory of Spectacle is discussed in the literature in detail from its philosophical and
intellectual perspectives, the practical application of the spectacle at different levels of analysis
allows the creation of new typologies of spectacle according to the focus and context of each
study. Therefore, the spectacle’s many definitions and typologies have emerged according to
the unit or level of analysis and context of application. Table 5.1 illustrates the main studies
using spectacle, definitions and practical examples.
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Table 5.1: Main forms of spectacles
Concept

Reference

Definition

Example

Historical Development of Spectacle
Ancient spectacle

Bergmann
&
A public show regarded in terms of its visual effects
Kondoleon (2000)

Dark
spectacle

Boje et al. (2004)

Ages

Renaissance
spectacle

A force to keep the masses under control through The church’s and king’s power in the Dark Ages (Boje et al.
religion, execution and torture
2004).

Bergmann
&
Reviving the ancient sciences, philosophies and arts
Kondoleon (2000)

Concentrated
spectacle

Debord (1967)

Diffuse spectacle

Debord (1967)

Integrated
spectacle

Debord (1991)

Public show such as festivals, rituals, weddings, funerals,
music, texts, races, Olympic games, political events
(Bergmann & Kondoleon 2000).

Writers, artists, ballet and theatre (Bergmann & Kondoleon
2000).

Debord's Spectacles
The bureaucratic political, social and economic systems The ideologies of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and
that prevail in totalitarian regimes
Maoist China (Debord 1967).
Shopping centres, magazines, fashion, public shows,
The abundance of commodities; social relationships
commodification of the economy, public language and
between people that are mediated by images
images (Debord 1967).
The realm of global capitalism based on an invisible The commodification of the NBA experience in the US
trade-off that maintains the status quo
(Andrews 2006).
Megaspectacle
Sport spectacle: the spectacularisation of sport events (Lee
2005).

Megaspectacle

Events that distract people from the pressing issues of
their everyday lives with endless hype on shocking Art spectacle: White Night Melbourne festival (Mercer &
Best & Kellner
crimes, sports contests and personalities, political Mayfield 2015).
(1997)
scandals, natural disasters and the self-promoting hype of
media culture itself.
Media spectacle: the 1991 Gulf war, the O.J. Simpson trials,
the Clinton sex and impeachment scandals (Kellner 2008).
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Organisational spectacles

Simulacra/
hyper-reality
spectacle

the

Performative
spectacle

Spectacle
fetishism

Baudrillard
(1993)

The spectacle totally replaces the reality to the extent that
spectacle will represent the reality itself and there will be Disneyland and reality shows (Baudrillard 1993).
nothing else other than the spectacle.

(Flyverbom
& The ability of the spectacle to construct realities and bring Education spectacle: university ranking (Chang & Osborn
Reinecke 2017)
it into being
2005).

of Flyverbom
& The spectacle makes some aspects of the organisation Accounting spectacle: organisational reports (Gotham &
Reinecke (2017)
visible at the expense of others.
Krier 2008; Pupovac & Moerman 2017).
Counter-Spectacle

Counter-spectacle

Woodworth
(2015)

Resistance to the spectacle by another spectacle
(fighting the evil with small doses of the same evil)
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Political spectacle: the Obama spectacle versus the GFC
spectacle (Kellner 2009).
Art spectacle: Graffiti as a form of social movement
(Woodworth 2015).

5.5 Debord’s original spectacles
Debord’s original spectacles are totalising spectacles that represent different stages in the
struggle between capitalism and its ideological opponent, totalitarianism. As discussed
previously, concentrated and diffuse spectacles were first discussed in Debord (1967); the
integrated spectacle was introduced later in the Comments on the Society of the Spectacle in
198817.
5.5.1 The concentrated spectacle
The concentrated spectacle reflects the bureaucratic political, social and economic systems that
prevail in totalitarian regimes (Debord 1967). It represents the dictatorship power of a
bureaucratic economy that:
cannot leave the exploited masses any significant margin of choice because
it has had to make all the choices itself, and any choice made independently
of it, whether regarding food or music or anything else, thus amounts to a
declaration of war against it (Debord 1967, p.64).
Therefore, the concentrated spectacle is enforced by violence, and incorporates and
concentrates everything into a single image of the solitary leader that guarantees the survival
of the totalitarian system with a “magical” answer for issues. Because it reflects a totalitarian
state, the concentrated spectacle has existed throughout the history of humankind. However,
with the introduction of mass media, such as radio and television in the 1920s, its effectiveness
intensified (Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba 2011). For example, the concentrated spectacle was the
dominant attribute of the ideologies of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and Maoist China (Crary
1989). In an organisational context, the concentrated form of spectacle is evident in managerial
techniques to control internal users (Boje et al. 2004).

17

The original book was published in 1988 in French; the English translation was published in 1991.
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5.5.2 Diffuse spectacle
The diffuse spectacle is reflected in the abundance of commodities in countries with developed
capitalist economic systems, such as the United States and most European countries (Debord
1967). This sets up competition between commodities in an attempt to control more of the
available economic, social and political spaces. For example, the automobile spectacle
competes with the city spectacle in urban spaces to facilitate traffic flow or for tourism (Debord
1967). The diffuse spectacles that prevail in global capitalism conceal the real conditions of
production by focusing on events that are less important or intended for entertainment as a
diversion (Boje et al. 2004). Further, the diffuse spectacle disseminates a false, yet desirable
impression of an empowered citizenry through the concept of consumer choice. Therefore, for
Debord (1967) the diffuse spectacle is more effective than the concentrated spectacle because
of its ability to control spectators through seduction, rather than violence.
5.5.3 Integrated spectacle
Debord (1991) considers this form of the spectacle as situated within the realm of global
capitalism and associated with an invisible trade-off that maintains the dominant social order
and the political and economic status quo. According to Rosati (2012), Debord added the notion
of the integrated spectacle into his earlier work in response to the political, economic, social
and cultural changes in the late 1980s. Therefore, it is considered as a:
tribute to Debord's genius that Comments on the Society of the Spectacle
was penned before the Berlin Wall was ripped down, before ‘globalization’
on every politicians’ lips, in every free-marketeers’ wet dream, and on every
business school syllabus (Merrifield 2004, p.327).
The fall of the Berlin Wall represented the defeat of the concentrated spectacle and the rise and
dominance of the integrated spectacle (Campbell 2008). The Berlin Wall was an ideological
barrier that separated the Eastern concentrated spectacle from the Western diffuse spectacle.
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In the integrated spectacle, the application of both concentrated and diffuse spectacles differs
significantly from that of their original form. For example, in the integrated spectacle there is
the absence of a clear leader, such as Hitler, or a clear ideology, such Stalinism, as the centre
of control. Therefore, as Debord (1991, p.iv) noted:
when the spectacle was concentrated, the greater part of the surrounding
society escaped it; when diffuse, a small part; today, no part. The spectacle
has spread itself to the point where it now permeates all reality.
This means that the new integrated spectacle has spread to every aspect of life and become
even more powerful and dominant. This dominance of the spectacle over political, economic,
cultural and social life allows it to control and mould new generations into its structure with
the use of new technologies (Merrifield 2004). Thus, the integrated spectacle is characterised
by:
incessant technological renewal; integration of the state and economy;
generalized secrecy; unanswerable lies; and an eternal present…
commodities outdate themselves almost each week and it is beyond
criticism (Merrifield 2004, p.327).
Within this form of spectacle and without any real form of resistance:
public opinion has been silenced. Masked behind game shows, reality
television, and CNN, news of what is genuinely important, of what is really
changing, is seldom seen or heard (Merrifield 2004, p.16).
For example, Andrews (2006) studied the means through which the American National
Basketball Association (NBA) converted the sport into an integrated spectacle. Andrews (2006,
p.89) explains that the sport is a “highly corporatized, commercialized, and mass-mediated
form” that can only be studied within its social, technological and economic conditions and
relations of late capitalism. Within this system, all sports, especially those that can generate a
high public presence and commercial coverage, become a device to generate revenue, and the
NBA as an integrated spectacle is mediated through texts, commercial products, mass-media
coverage and services (Andrews 2006). This transforms the NBA into a daily consumable and
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commodified experience. The NBA integrated spectacle controls and directs spectators, serves
consumption needs and reflects the neoliberal ideology of capital accumulation.
In another example, Campbell (2008) explores the US left's approach to the Balkan war
between 1992 and 1999 in Bosnia and Kosovo. His approach to the war is based on the
hypothesis that the Western media created a spectacle to justify NATO18 military intervention.
This spectacle, in which the role of media was fundamental, focused on fabricating a genocide
and blocking “true” information. However, Campbell (2008) contends that this approach strips
the events of the war from their political, geographic, economic and temporal context. Instead,
he offers a different approach to the events, arguing that:
[u]nderstanding the different forms of the society of the spectacle provides
the grounds for appreciating that Miloševic ́’s Yugoslavia—from the time
he deployed Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s until his demise—was a
spectacular society par excellence (Campbell 2008, p.545).
Therefore, Campbell (2008) considers Yugoslavia as an example that illustrates the defeat of
the concentrated spectacle under communism by the diffuse spectacle of Western capitalism.
This resulted in the emergence of an integrated spectacle following the NATO campaign
against Miloševic and the birth of the new independent states.
At this ideological level, Briziarelli (2015, np) examines the relationship between the dominant
neoliberalism spectacle and the specific illustrations of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
2007-08 and its effects on society. Briziarelli (2015) concludes that the Theory of Spectacle
introduces a useful instrument to understand and explain the process of meaning-making and
cultural practices created by the GFC.

18

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created at the end of World War II by the United States,
Canada, and several Western European countries (several Eastern European countries have since become
members) as a defence treaty against the former Soviet Union.
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Debord’s (1967; 1991) approach to the spectacle represents it as hegemonic, monolithic and
accepted by society. However, other scholars, such as Kellner (2008), consider society as a
competing terrain between different spectacles using similar tools to gain a competitive
advantage and advance the interests of their creators. Gotham (2007) argues that the process of
spectacle production has always been of a socio-political nature. Yet, with the rise of
globalisation, the incentive to control production of mediated images is intensified. According
to Mercer and Mayfield (2015, p.511) this new approach, with its multiple dimensions and
representations, is different from Debord’s “representation of spectacle as a totality, or
monolithic structure”. Therefore, since the emergence of new technologies and the
proliferation of the economic, social and political conditions encouraged by neoliberalism, the
application of the Theory of Spectacle has diversified and spread into new areas and different
disciplines.
Briziarelli (2015) argues that the major difference between Debord’s spectacles during most of
the 20th century and the current spectacles is the introduction and use of Web 2.0 media
technology19. While Debord’s spectacles were primarily passive and one-way, spectacles in
the age of Web 2.0 technologies, such as internet and social media, are active and collaborative
Briziarelli (2015). In this new form of spectacle, the spectators or users can produce as well as
to consume. They can also shape and control the content and engage in the creation of, and
even resistance through, less alienating spectacles.

5.6 Megaspectacle
Best and Kellner introduced the concept of the megaspectacle in 1997 to explain events and
crises. Kellner (2003, p.93) explains that:

19

“Web 2.0” refers to “World Wide Web websites that emphasise user-generated content, usability (ease of use,
even by non-experts), and interoperability (this means that a website can work well with other products,
systems, and devices) for end users” (Iafrate 2018, p.xxx).
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Megaspectacles fixate attention on events that distract people from the
pressing issues of their everyday lives with endless hype on shocking
crimes, sports contests and personalities, political scandals, natural
disasters, and the self-promoting hype of media culture itself.
These media-hyped events or scandals become the defining events of their time. According to
Kellner (2008, p.19) this includes:
commodity spectacles…which define an era of consumption, or
entertainment spectacles like Elvis Presley, rock and roll, or hip hop, which
help define cultural epochs. The Internet spectacle has been a major force
since the 1990s with the emergence of the World Wide Web and more
recently subcultural forms like MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube that
constitute new forms of the interactive spectacle. Megaspectacles also
include sociopolitical dramas that characterize a certain period, involving
such things as the 1991 Gulf war, the O.J. Simpson trials, the Clinton sex
and impeachment scandals, or the Terror War that is defining the current
era.
These megaspectacles continue to dominate, even with the rise and disappearance of other
megaspectacles such as the “war on terror” or the “Iraq war” (Kellner 2008). While people are
distracted by the events, scandals or war, the fundamental dynamic of spectacle remains
uninterrupted and intact. In the realm of globalisation, the ultimate manifestation is the
appearance of MNCs with their unrestricted power (Passaris 2006). However, “corporations
produce and distribute spectacles of their heroic power for our consumption...and on occasion
the momentum of spectacle erupts temporarily into scandalous megaspectacles” (Boje et al.
2004, p.769). For example, Boje et al. (2004) analyse Enron’s collapse by applying four types
of spectacles: concentrated, diffuse, integrated and megaspectacle. They conclude that Enron
used megaspectacle to distance its shareholders from the real economic conditions of the
corporation until its collapse in late 2001. Since spectators are affected and controlled through
spectacular events, they are considered to be part of a wider system of cultural control (Boje et
al. 2004). The following are examples of different manifestations of the megaspectacle.
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5.6.1 Sport spectacle
The sport spectacle refers to sporting events that are controlled, mass-mediated and
commercialised

by

corporations.

Lee’s

(2005)

study

on

the

commercialisation,

commodification and spectacularisation of sporting events cites the example of two European
soccer teams: Liverpool FC and Real Madrid. Through the use of highly commercialised news
and media coverage, the teams’ visit to Hong Kong in 2003 was transformed into a spectacle.
Lee (2005) contends that in this case the spectacularisation of a sporting event depends on the
level of media coverage and the involvement of sports fans. This involvement includes the
activities in the stadium and, more importantly, fans participating in commercial activities such
as buying products endorsed or favoured by teams and players. This two-sided behaviour does
not just contribute to the commercialisation of the event, it also transforms social relations and
social experiences. The consumption of the sporting festival diverted the attention of the
citizens of Hong Kong from the economic downturn in 2005. In this case, the spectacle
concealed as much at it made visible, which resonates with Touskas’ (1997) belief that the
more information people have, the less they know.
5.6.2 Art spectacle
Mercer and Mayfield (2015) adopt an extended form of the urban spectacle20 introduced by
Gotham and Krier (2008) to “explore the impact of an urban arts festival on the spatial politics”
of the city of Melbourne in Australia. While Debord’s spectacles focus on the dominance of
the visual experience over the lived experience in an era of hyper-capitalism, Mercer and
Mayfield (2015) emphasise the entertainment side of the spectacle in their examination of the
White Night Melbourne festival21. This spectacle is the transformation of the public’s topUrban spectacles are “spectacular public displays, including festivals and mega-events, that involve capitalist
markets, sets of social relations, and flows of commodities, capital, technology, cultural forms and people across
borders” (Gotham 2005, pp.226-27).
21
White Night is a three-night festival in the Australian city of Melbourne to showcase local, national and
international artistic innovation. An average of 500.000 people attended this festival annually (White Night
2019).
20

97

down passive engagement with an art and culture festival into a commodified, commercialised
event that promotes the brand identity of Melbourne and particular economic interests.
In another example of art spectacle, Lyford and Payne (2005) analyse the relationship between
photography, mass media and the spectacle based on the ability of images to affect and even
shape public sentiment, and hence public policy. Lyford and Payne (2005) argue that the
“image” also has the ability to give visibility to some events and to distract or conceal others.
For example, the images of the September 11 attack and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq mediated
the relationship between the spectator and the event. This process does not only commodify
events. Photojournalism also plays a major role in building national identities and personal and
collective cultural memories; thus, it reflects the power of a society to circulate images using
media channels to create cultural, political or social meanings (Lyford & Payne 2005).
5.6.3 Media spectacle
Media spectacles occur when news, information and events processed by media corporations,
the state and political groups, institutions and individuals have the power to construct political
and social realities (Kellner 2009). These technologically mediated events through
“broadcasting, print media, or the Internet process events in a spectacular form” (Kellner 2009,
p.1).
Kellner (2008) argues that media spectacles, such as texts, images, videos and audio, serve
different purposes and interests. For example, sports events such as the World Cup promote
competition and winning. Media spectacles, such as Dayan and Katz’s media events, serve
institutional values. Media extravaganzas, such as the Oscars, serve lifestyle and competition
values. Political events, such as scandals and campaigns, news or war events serve political,
economic and even cultural purposes. For example:
the 2003 Iraq war was a major global media event constructed very
differently by varying broadcasting networks in diverse parts of the world.
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Whereas the U.S. networks framed the event as Operation Iraqi Freedom
(the Pentagon concept) or War in Iraq, the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) used the logo War on Iraq, and various Arab networks
presented it as an invasion and occupation (Kellner 2008, p.20).
In addition, Gotham (2007) studied the process that transformed the Hurricane Katrina disaster
in New Orleans into a spectacle for entertainment and revenue generation. Entertainment
corporations presented the social life of Hurricane Katrina disaster victims through a series of
signs, entertainment and iconic shows (Gotham 2007). In another example, Joyce and Martinez
(2017) studied the representation of domestic violence in two Brazilian prime-time TV shows.
They concluded that the presentation of domestic violence through TV shows was manipulated,
and subsequently diverged from its original social function to serve as a media spectacle and
an end-commercial product. Moreover, the media spectacles of terror, like the September 11
attacks, vary considerably from other spectacles that aim to maintain the status quo or
regenerate the prevailing culture. They create and intensify fear to demoralise the targets of
the terrorist attack and are constantly “manipulated by conservative groups…to push through
rightwing agendas, cut back on civil liberties, and militarize the society” (Kellner 2008, p.19).
The above examples illustrate that media spectacles serve the political agenda of their
producers.

5.7 Organisation spectacles
Flyverbom and Reinecke (2017, p.1626) argue that creating spectacles is:
what most organizations do and what most organising is about: Creating a
brand. Marketing a product. Doing leadership. Creating forecasts and
visions in strategy. Narrating a corporate sustainability report. Even
publishing a financial account. Submitting a tax return.
At this level, Flyverbom and Reinecke (2017) argue that spectacles serve three major roles in
modern organisations: spectacle as a means to hide, replace or perform reality through the
spectacle of fetishism; spectacle as hyper-reality; and spectacle as performativity. The first
occurs when the spectacle makes some aspects of the organisation visible at the expense of
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others. In this sense, “Debord’s arguments about appearance, visibility and celebrity are echoed
in the way organizations increasingly focus on their brand, image, impression, and reputation”
(Flyverbom & Reinecke 2017, p.1625). The hyper-reality spectacle is derived from Baudrillard
(1993) and his notion of simulacra22, in which the spectacle totally replaces reality so that the
spectacle becomes the reality. Finally, the performative spectacle is developed through the
work of Austin’s (1962) concept of performative utterances that reflect the ability of the
spectacle, in any of its forms or types, to construct realities and bring them into being. A
modern example of this is virtual or digital currencies such as Bitcoin (Flyverbom & Reinecke
2017). While gold currencies represent the physical value of gold and paper currencies stand
for the promise of the government to pay its value, digital currencies stand for nothing other
than a fund with no actual existence. In the same realm, the performative spectacle refers to
organisational reports that represent transparency and accountability that serve the modern
organisations. By issuing reports, organisations create transparency and accountability. The
following examples include both education and accounting spectacles.
5.7.1 Education spectacle
Keet (2014) used the Theory of Spectacle to study how higher education in South Africa
contributes to the disappearance of democracy. Higher education plays a major role in framing
the State as the ultimate fusion of political thought and representation. In addition, higher
education marginalises the absence of political and social public spaces to increase the
visibility of the State’s position.
In another study, the Theory of Spectacle was employed to study the higher-education system
through the US News & World Report system of college rankings. The ranking spectacle has

The “simulacrum” is a concept proposed by Baudrillard (1994; 2009) that represents a radical phase of the
spectacle in which the observer cannot differentiate between reality and the artificial reality conveyed by
images/spectacles.
22
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“a powerful role in determining exchange values among colleges and universities” (Chang &
Osborn 2005, p.338). This ranking exchange value replaces the use value of universities and
colleges. The social relations between students and other individuals, on the one hand, and
colleges and universities, on the other, are mediated by the image portrayed by the USN system
of rankings. What is interesting and useful from this study is the application of the spectacle
based on text, numbers and statistics instead of the conventional basis of media, images
physical products and spectacular artistic or festive entertainment events. In addition, the
ranking spectacle is characterised as more enduring compared with the entertainment or media
spectacles, which diffuse following the completion of the event. Further, Chatterjee et al.
(2020) examine the university research assessment system (RA) at an individual (in New
Zealand) and systemic (in the United Kingdom) level. Chatterjee et al. (2020) conclude that
RA operates as a performance-measurement public spectacle that makes academic research
visible, and allows academics and other stakeholders to evaluate, motivate and promote
academic research. Finally, Thwaites (2015) uses spectacle in the education field to study the
effects of globalisation on education. He concludes that globalisation, in all its economic
(capitalism), social and cultural dimensions, turns the education sector into a mere spectacle.
5.7.2 Accounting spectacle
To create their own spectacle, organisations use computer technologies, public-relations firms
and consultants to produce desirable reports and a public image that promotes their social,
environmental and economic outcomes (Boje 2001a). This can be in the form of mandated
financial statements, voluntary CSR reports and other texts such as EITI reports. As a result,
the spectacle may be used in a business context to exempt multinational corporations from
responsibility (Boje, 2001a). Chatterjee et al. (2020, np) contend that “accounting often
provides the dominant imaginary or organizational spectacle that managers, as well as other
organizational members, embrace and endorse”. This is based on the belief that accounting
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information, “through its use of calculations and valuations, helps to sustain, introduce, change
and/or rationalize certain practices and perspectives (i.e. particular manifestations of a
spectacle) in organizations” (Chatterjee et al. 2020, np). In addition, Cooper (2015, p.79)
argues that “accounting is an integral part of the symbolic universe of neo-liberalism” because
accounting techniques and rationalities legitimise state’s policies that “are enacted in financial
and government” (Cooper 2015, p. 64).
Gotham and Krier (2008, p.179) consider spectacles as part “of a wider and multifaceted
totality of capitalist modernity that includes the changing dynamics of the economy, culture,
political system, and so on”. In the accounting literature, the Theory of Spectacle has been
applied by accounting scholars to understand the role of accounting in shaping the wider
economic, social and political systems in the age of globalisation (Boiral 2013; Boje
2001;Cooper 1999; Pupovac & Moerman 2017; Pupovac & Moerman 2020; Uddin, Gumb &
Kasumba 2011). This reflects accounting's role as a major player in the meaning-making
process and in the rationalisation of social and economic reforms (Hines 1988; Catchpowle &
Cooper 1999; Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba 2011). In a more recent example, Pupovac and
Moerman’s (2017) use the Theory of Spectacle to study the recursive relationship between the
corporation, its shareholders and the public through a letter to shareholders. They conclude that
MNCs use their accounts as spectacles to rationalise “controversy and suppress resistance”
(Pupovac & Moerman 2017, p.1184). Further, Boiral (2013) studies how corporations use
sustainability reports as simulacra that conceal, more than reveal, the reality of sustainable
development practices to present a pleasant and desirable corporate image. He infers that
energy and mining corporations use intensive images of “unpolluted” nature in their
sustainability reports to conceal their negative eco-footprint. At the same time, these images
create an idealised image of the corporation that replaces the reality of their environmental
effects.
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Uddin, Gumb and Kasumba (2011) use spectacle as an interpretative framework to
comprehend accounting changes and practices. They conclude that accounting reforms in
developing countries are spectacles that contribute to the pseudo-diffusion of western
accounting principles such as transparency. They illustrate their case through a study of
accounting standard reforms and techniques in Uganda’s local councils aimed at attracting and
maintaining foreign aid and donations.
Boje (2001), a scholar from outside the accounting field, also used four forms of spectacle in
accounting in relation to integrated accounts:

eco spectacle, tribal spectacle, robotic

“hyperreal” spectacle and consumption spectacle. The eco spectacle involves the
organisational use of accounting and accounting reports to tell a story of enacting
environmental awareness and caretaking. The tribal spectacle positions accounting reports and
accounting methods as the site of struggle between various stakeholders such as regulators,
activists and legislators. The robotic “hyperreal” spectacle occurs when “accounting becomes
one more part of Baudrillard's “hyperreal world”” and “[a]ccounting numbers cease to
represent any real world and become simulacra”23 (Boje 2001, np). The consumption spectacle
involves the ability of accountants to “construct (I mean spin) accounts that are consumed, not
just by clients, but by politicians, examiners, partners, and investors” (Boje 2001, np). By
applying a critical postmodern approach to the concept of spectacle, Boje (2001a) argues that
corporations and transnational companies increasingly use the accounting spectacle within
their operational and strategic frameworks. The spectacle is “a display intended to persuade
the masses of spectators from a distance that its global corporations have implemented moral
codes of conduct, and therefore merit public trust” (Boje 2001a, p.432). This suggests that the
spectacle can be used for the purpose of legitimation, public relations and discharging

23

The missing full stop between those two clauses is a typo; this edit fixes the effects of the typo without
altering Boje’s text
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accountability. Further, Gumb (2007) studied the spectacular aspects of management discourse
and concluded that it allows management to hide undesirable aspects of the organisation. Gumb
(2007) examines disclosure materials by French CEOs regarding internal controls imposed to
respond to corporate failure at the beginning of the 21st century. Gumb (2007, p.826) concludes
that “the compulsory tendency resulting from recent scandals is part of the spectacular dialectic
or itself consists of a megaspectacle” that camouflages and hides the organisation’s essential
mistakes behind financial themes and metrics. Thus, the spectacle is used by management to
hide corporate problems by focusing on virtual positive corporate performance.

5.8 Counter-spectacle
Woodworth (2015, p.414) believes that “spectacles might also be conceived as moments and
spaces of contestation and vital sites of political struggle and meaning making”. In this sense,
Woodworth (2015) introduces the idea of counter-spectacle by studying the artwork of Zhang
Dali, a graffiti painter in Beijing, between 1995 and 2005. The idea of counter-spectacle is
based on the mode of resistance to the dominant spectacle used by members of the Situationist
International movement in the 1967. Through the use of theatrical actions in public spaces,
counter-spectacle uses the tools or media of the dominant spectacle (similar to the idea of
fighting evil with small doses of the same evil). For example, when the Chinese government
embarked on a redevelopment project in the urban space of Beijing, several forms of resistance,
including lawsuits, protests and graffiti, were observed. The graffiti highlighted how the city
became a post-socialist spectacle that served the control purposes of corporate power
(Woodworth 2015).
Bottici (2015) attempts to reconcile the idea of democracy and the society of the spectacle in
advanced capitalist societies. According to Bottici (2015), while the spectacle unites societies
and spectacles, it can also distance individuals and cause the demise of democracy in advanced
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capitalist societies. Therefore, the only way “to prevent democracy from degenerating into the
democratic despotism of individuals isolated from one another” is to create another spectacle
that unites the spectators (Bottici 2015, p.241). This represents a way to resist the domination
of a spectacle by creating another. For example, the American presidential election in 2008
was considered the Obama spectacle, an example of a political spectacle. The amount of
money, the political and ideological affiliation and the economic interests were the spectacle
of change and hope offered to spectators in light of the 2007 Global Financial Crises (GFC)
(Kellner 2009). In this example, the GFC spectacle was in opposition to the Obama spectacle.
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5.9. Summary
In summary, spectacle is an ancient concept that has manifested in different forms according
to the available technologies in an historical era. Although the concept has evolved into a
contemporary theory that is related to the modern capitalist system, there has always been a
shared core element between all forms of spectacle: “an event or scene regarded in terms of its
visual impact” (Oxford online dictionary 2017, np). This dominance of image over content is
what characterises Debord’s Theory of Spectacle and represents “the very heart of this real
society’s unreality” (Debord 1967, p.3) as a “social relationship between people that is
mediated by images” (Debord 1967, p.4). In the Theory of Spectacle, Debord (1967) replaces
Marx's concept of accumulation of production to explain the primary force that ensures the
continuity of capitalism and the development it brings to the consumer society (Catchpowle &
Cooper 1999). In this sense Debord‘s Theory of Spectacle replaces the commodity in Marx’s
concept of accumulation of production with mere images and signs. The spectacle thus has the
power of perception management and manipulation through its ability to conceal or reveal
specific aspects of reality.
The spectacle is used as a social, political and economic control technology to “redirect
citizens’ attention from structural inequalities to spectacular events designed to subdue social
criticism” (Kersten & Abbott 2012, p. 324). In this sense the spectacle represents the dominant
social order and reflects “the ideological position of those who have architected society for
their own interest” (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.73).
Gotham and Krier (2008) argue that Debord’s discussion of the spectacle is contemplative,
tends to make abstract generalisations and is limited in theorising concepts in the absence of
empirical support. Therefore, in this thesis the NEITI reports are used as a case study in Nigeria
in light of the Theory of Spectacle to support and extend the empirical application of the
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spectacle in the field of accounting. NEITI is an organisation that has a unique arrangement
with representatives of the Nigerian government, companies and CSOs. To study NEITI
demonstrates the effects of spectacle on important contemporary topics, such as transparency
and accountability, at organisational and country levels and reflects the ideological and
economic dominance of capitalism in the realm of globalisation. This reflects the spread of
capitalist dominance to developing countries and the way it shapes social, political and
economic aspects of life within Nigeria.
The methodology of the thesis is presented in Chapter 6. The chapter will cover the
methodological assumptions of the thesis, critical discourse analysis and its application in
accounting studies and Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) method of analysis.
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Chapter 6: Methodology
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 introduced the concept of spectacle as the theoretical framework used in this thesis.
Debord (1967) conceptualised the Theory of Spectacle as a sharp critique of a capitalist society.
Theories are used as conceptual frameworks to explain and predict specific phenomena using
relevant methods to conduct a data analysis (De Vaus 2001). A methodology outlines the
analytical approach and the process of collecting and analysing data for research studies (De
Vaus 2001). This chapter adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA) in an organisational context
to examine the transparency and accountability discourse in NEITI reports and the NEITI Act
2007 (the Act). In particular, Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) CDA approach using a three-level
analysis of visualisation, valuation and mobilisation assists in untangling the complexities of
discourse for analytical purposes.
Since there is no single correct way to conduct CDA (Meyer 2001), Clegg and Kornberger’s
(2015) approach is considered a new development in a broader frame of Organisational
Discourse Analysis. Organisational Discourse Analysis is based on critical constructionist
assumptions that reveal how organisations use language within discourses to socially construct
and shape organisational power relations and realities (Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien 2012). Therefore,
the ability of CDA to investigate a text’s networks of power, discursive features and broader
social and political context is compatible with the Theory of Spectacle. Thus CDA in this thesis
is used as a method to analyse how NEITI reports and the Act are organised, what the discourse
of NEITI is doing to further or hinder transparency and accountability, what ideas and social
settings this discourse is creating and what its ideological underpinnings are.
The next section outlines the methodological assumptions of the thesis, followed by a
discussion of organisational discourse. The application of CDA in accounting studies is
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discussed prior to an outline of Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) method of analysis. The chapter
concludes with the sources of data for the study and their relevance to the methods, and how
the data contributes to an understanding of the nature of transparency and accountability and
their ideological dimensions in NEITI.

6.2 Methodological assumptions
Hardy (2001, p.25) argues that “[s]cholars are increasingly conceptualizing societies,
institutions, and identities as discursively constructed”. This approach has risen with the
assertion from linguists that discourses both produce and mediate phenomena (LeclercqVandelannoitte, 2011). Institutional or organisational phenomena, such as EITI, can thus be
subject to deconstruction and interpretation using language-based analyses (Phillips & Oswick
2012). The social constructionist approach asserts that:
[o]rganizations exist only as far as their members create them through
discourse. This is not to claim that organizations are ‘nothing but’
discourse, but rather that discourse is the principal means by which
organization members create a coherent social reality that frames their
sense of who they are (Mumby & Clair 1997, p.181).
This approach is also concerned with the power of discourse to create shape and communicate
the concepts that systematise how audiences experience and understand the world (Marshak &
Grant 2008). This power gives organisational discourse the capacity to shape realities in
addition to controlling and manipulating the meaning-making process (Marshak & Grant
2008). Therefore, the power dimension is an important feature of this constructive ontology.
Critical constructivist ontology postulates that “there is no objective reality. Rather, there are
multiple realities constructed by human beings who experience a phenomenon of interest”
(Krauss 2005, p.760). Thus, a methodology that aims “to understand the world as it is, to
understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience”
(Burrell & Morgan 1979, p.28) is relevant for this thesis and compatible with the Theory of
Spectacle.
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Discourse, in particular, constructs subjects and objects in social frameworks, so that social
actors understand and interact with social phenomena (Burke 1969; Parker 1992; Phillips &
Hardy 1997). In addition, dominant discourse determines the direction, views and approaches
of organisations in a particular situation towards a specific topic, as discourse and texts create,
legitimise and maintain power relations and social and political inequalities (Boje 1995;
Chouliaraki 2008), particularly where there are multiple spectacles in an arena of struggle for
domination of social, political and economic realities (Chouliaraki 2008).
Chia (2000) argues that discourse does not merely describe organisations as pre-existing social
phenomena. Instead, discourse forms the social identity of organisations, and thus their natural
existence, by providing the discursive tools to talk about them. This confirms Phillips and
Hardy’s (2002, p.2) assumption that “without discourse, there is no social reality, and without
understanding discourse, we cannot understand social reality, our experiences, or ourselves”.
In this thesis NEITI is considered a social phenomenon that discursively reflects a network of
power and concepts of transparency and accountability in the extractive industry in Nigeria.
The NEITI reports are produced within a social context; thus, analysing the discourse increases
understanding of “the meanings assigned by actors” (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, p.5). The
following section elaborates on the definition of discourse and its use in an organisational
context.

6.3 Discourse and texts
Although discourse has been widely used in organisational research, it still has no uniform
definition. For example, Wetherell (2001, p.194) defines discourse as a “recognisable
collection of statements which cohere together”. Davies and Harré (1990, p.47) consider
discourse as the “institutionalized use of language and language-like sign system” (Davies &
Harré 1990, p.47). Cortés (2010, p.17) writes:
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Discourse is understood as language in action and is made up of a chain of
linguistic signals which convey information with a view to developing an
intrinsic instrumental language function which produces some effect on the
receiver, not to mention other considerations such as sociocultural factors.
However, to put discourse within its broader context, Merkl-Davies and Koller (2012, p.180)
argue that:
discourses can be differentiated by the time period and/or country in which
they originate, by a particular topic around which they centre, by their
producers or, related to that, specific stances expressed by a group of people
who share specific beliefs and values.
In a critical approach, studies have a dual purpose by revealing unjust circumstances and
structural inequality and identifying potential for emancipatory change (Habermas 1996).
Therefore, this approach considers discourse as the major apparatus through which ideology,
power and control are enacted, reproduced and communicated. This is possible because
through discourse “actors can both take control or manipulate how they present issues, as well
as employ selective perception in order to protect and maintain their routinized or comfortable
ways of perceiving issues” (Heracleous 2004, p.177). In addition, according to speech act
theory, language or discourse has the ability to perform certain actions (Austin 1962; Gond et
al. 2016). An example of this performativity aspect of language is the statement “I do” in a
marriage ceremony; in this case, the statement performs and legitimates the social status of the
participants (Kärreman 2014).
Organisations are “arenas where discourses are built and implicated” (Alakavuklar 2009, p.1).
In an organisational context, a particular form of discourse as text is produced to contribute to
knowledge and beliefs (Ainsworth & Hardy 2004; Putnam, Phillips & Chapman 1996). For
example, text includes interviews, meetings, workshops, bargaining and caucus sessions,
written texts, board minutes and letters, transcripts from scientific conferences, speech acts,
pictures, documents, artefacts, books, media accounts, committee reports, symbols and drafts
of legislation (Grant & Hardy 2003; Phillips & Oswick 2012). Therefore, text is considered to
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be a discursive unit that can be investigated systematically (Hardy 2004). Consequently,
organisational discourse analysis includes a range of discursive methods including
conversation; rhetorical and narrative analysis; deconstruction; and intertextual and critical
discourse analysis (Phillips & Oswick 2012). This thesis adopts CDA to analyse the NEITI
reports and the Act within its broader social network of power.

6.4 Critical Discourse Analysis
While Weiss and Wodak (2002) suggest that CDA has its roots in text and socio-linguistics,
applied linguistics, classical rhetoric and pragmatics, the latest trends are credited to the efforts
of influential linguists in the mid-1980s such as Fairclough, van Dijk and Wodak (Blommaert
& Bulcaen, 2000; van Leeuwen 2008). These trends emerged, particularly in Europe, as a
pragmatic development in discourse studies. Since then, CDA has been used in many
disciplines to analyse various phenomena; accordingly, various definitions of the term CDA
have emerged. For example, Fairclough (1993, p.135) defines CDA as the study of:
opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive
practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures,
relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts
arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles
over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between
discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.
On the other hand, van Dijk (2015, p.466) defines CDA as:
discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power
abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by
text and talk in the social and political context.
Regardless of the differences, CDA fundamentally considers language, including verbal or
written texts, as a form of social practice that is ideologically and contextually driven (Janks
1997; Sheyholislami 2001). It has become one of the most significant methodologies in
discourse analysis, as it complements other approaches through its ability to also critique social
phenomena.
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Since CDA has multiple definitions and theoretical applications, there is also no standardised
approach or uniform analytical model for conducting it (Meyer 2001). Wodak and Meyer
(2009, p.5) assert:
CDA has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide one single
or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of
research in CDA. Quite the contrary, studies in CDA are multifarious,
derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards
different data and methodologies.
Therefore, the particular type of CDA used depends on the theoretical background, the
objectives, the context of the case and the nature of the available data. In addition, the method
varies according to the research question, the level of complexity of the text under study and
the process of creating, enacting and disseminating discourse (Chouliaraki 2008).
Consequently, van Dijk (2015, p.466) considers CDA from an analytical framework or a
methodology perspective as:
a critical perspective that may be found in all areas of discourse studies, such
as discourse grammar, Conversation Analysis, discourse pragmatics,
rhetoric, stylistics, narrative analysis, argumentation analysis, multimodal
discourse analysis and social semiotics, sociolinguistics, and ethnography
of communication or the psychology of discourse-processing, among others.
In other words, CDA is discourse study with an attitude.
Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach toward conducting CDA is a common and beneficial
practice that can take advantage of the methodology’s multilayer analysis that includes a
micro-linguistic analysis of the text in relation to its broader social, economic and political
contexts (Wodak 2007; Wooffitt 2005). This thesis adopts Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015)
approach in conducting a multilayer discourse analysis. While it is well-known that discourse
is used to achieve an organisation’s strategic aims (Clegg & Kornberger 2015), this thesis is
concerned with processes that make things visual and valuable, and that mobilise ideas of
transparency and accountability in the extractive industry as a part of a larger strategic
objective.
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6.4.1 What does critical mean in CDA?
Meaning is derived from the collective cognition of social groups, their interactions with social
structures and the communicative events in which discursive practices take place (Grant,
Keenoy & Oswick 1998; van Dijk 1997). These social structures and communicative events
are the broader context of discourse that should be taken into consideration, as they are essential
to understand the meanings, messages, objectives and functionality of the discourse (van Dijk
1997). This broader context represents the “frame” in which language and discourse are
enacted and practiced, and gives CDA its critical dimension that recognises the power of
language (Fairclough 2003; Gee 1990; van Dijk 2001). This critical dimension reveals social
structural inequality, unequal power distribution, the role of ideologies, and dominance in
social relations (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; van Dijk 1993a). Therefore, CDA enables an
analysis of the power relations between different interested groups in a social phenomenon
such as between the Nigerian government, the extractive corporations, and CSOs involved in
NEITI. As such CDA reveals the dominant social system that favours certain social actors at
the expense of others and how this social system is enacted and validated through the discourse
of powerful social actors (Phillips & Hardy 2002; van Dijk 1993; van Dijk 1996).
In addition, social, political and economic events give the word “critical” its socio-political
and ideological implications (Rogers 2004). Accordingly, the term “critical” in CDA means
that researchers are concerned with what a text offers as “facts”, how it presents these “facts”,
what a text does and how the meaning and messages embedded within the broader social
context should be interpreted (Meyer 2001). Because power, dominance and resistance are
exercised in a reciprocal relationship between discourse and its social setting, rhetorical
strategies and the meaning and style of texts reflect the hidden social power of the social actors
who are involved in creating these texts (van Dijk 1993; Wodak 2007).
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According to van Dijk (2015), power means control, and social power means social control. In
this realm:
groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control
the acts and minds of (members of) other groups. This ability presupposes a
power base of privileged access to scarce social resources, such as force,
money, status, fame, knowledge, information, “culture,” or indeed various
forms of public discourse and communication (van Dijk 2015, p.469).
Consequently, this power may be incorporated in legislation, culture, social norms, rules and
economic and political institutions that privilege powerful groups over less powerful ones.
Although most people have control over their personal communications and discourse, they
are subject to the discourse of powerful groups through mass media and institutional discourse
based on authoritative functional positions such as university lecturer or judge (van Dijk 2015).
This dominance and ability to control discourse is also evident in spectacles that reinforce a
particular social order.

6.4.2 Principles of CDA
Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue that CDA in all its forms is founded on shared principles.
First, CDA studies language to understand how social problems and power relations are
mediated in texts. This implies that CDA has both an interpretative role in understanding
meaning and an explanatory role in understanding power relations. Therefore, discourse
strategies and the choice of certain discursive rhetorical methods in NEITI are examined in the
analysis. Second, power relations are exercised using discourse through the voice of social
actors that control the topic, content and even linguistic features (Paltridge 2012). This is what
Fairclough (1992) refers to as the orders of discourse and social practice; or, what van Dijk
(1993) calls social cognition. Social cognition includes the personal or group memories,
knowledge and opinions of language users or social actors (van Dijk 2015). According to van
Dijk (1993, p.252), social cognition is the “social representations in the minds of social actors”
and the “the necessary theoretical (and empirical) interface, if not the missing link, between
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discourse and dominance”. Third, based on the second principle, discourse shapes and
reproduces social relations and social cognition, or orders of discourse, through power relations
enacted through discourse. In addition, and since ideology is produced by and reflected through
discourse, ideology can be understood through CDA (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Paltridge
2012). Therefore, understanding discourse within its social, cultural and ideological context
makes CDA a form of social action that enables change in social, political and ideological
practices (Fairclough & Wodak 1997).

6.4.3 CDA approaches
While CDA aims to investigate “hidden power relations between a piece of discourse and wider
social and cultural formations” (Corson, 2000, p.95), the multiplicity of discourse definitions
creates multiple approaches. This includes the Sociocognitive Approach (Teun van Dijk), the
Discourse-Historical Approach (Ruth Wodak), the Corpus Linguistics Approach (Gerlinde
Mautner), the Social Actors Approach (Theo van Leuuwen) and the Dialectical–Relational
Approach (Norman Fairclough) (Wodak & Meyer 2009). Taking into consideration the various
approaches to CDA, topics of CDA may include power, ideology, dominance and control,
gender inequality and sociology. For example, for Fairclough (1992; 1995) the main concerns
are the social, political and economic relations of power, dominance, ideology and hegemony
evident in the use of language or discourse. In a similar vein, van Dijk (1993; 1998) focuses
on the problem of power abuse, social inequality and discrimination, and the way they are
legitimised to create and maintain the dominance of specific social orders and elite groups.
Further, Wooffitt (2005) suggests that the main goal of CDA should be to explore and expose
the role of discourse in disadvantaging minorities and dominated groups.

Van Dijk (1993) argues that CDA should focus on top-down relationships and the practices of
dominant groups. These groups determine the time, location, audience, participants, content
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and objectives of the discourse (van Dijk 2015). They can also control text by choosing what
topics are revealed and what topics should be concealed. In addition, at the text level:
the local details of lexical or syntactic style, propositional meaning, turntaking in conversation, rhetorical devices, and narrative structures (among
many other discourse structures) may be controlled by powerful group
members, professionals, groups, organization, or institutions (van Dijk
2015, p.471).
Therefore, since the ability to control public discourse, information, knowledge and
communication is a crucial resource, one of CDA’s objectives is to uncover the unequal power
relations that produce biased and prejudice dominance in social settings, and to reveal the social
actors behind them (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; van Dijk 1993; van Dijk 2015) To achieve this
level of dominance it is not sufficient to control the text structures; the contextual conditions
must also be controlled through the use of authoritative and reliable sources such as
professionals, scholars and officials to enhance the credibility of the discourse (Nesler et al.
1993). Possessing this power in a context-specific event allows the dominant groups not only
to dominate the social cognition of the individual, but to shape the collective knowledge,
opinion and ideology of society. In conclusion, van Dijk’s (2015) approach to CDA links the
text structures and context with social, political and economic events and the social groups and
institutions that orchestrate these events.
Consistent with a CDA approach, this thesis adopts Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) three-level
specific method of analysis to study the broader socio-political and economic relations of
power, dominance and ideology. Further, Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) method converges
with van Dijk’s approach to the legitimation of powerful groups and how it dominates the
mental models of other marginalised groups; this best fits the concepts of social dominance
achieved and legitimised through the Theory of Spectacle. Finally, Clegg and Kornberger’s
(2015) three-level specific method of analysis also complements the notion of a spectacular
production.
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The aim of this thesis is to study processes, the network of power, social actors and discursive
practices in relation to transparency and accountability in the Nigerian extractive industry
through NEITI through achieving the following objectives:
•

To explore how the meaning of transparency is constructed, conveyed and
legitimised in NEITI reports.

•

To examine how NEITI discourse maintains the objective of promoting open
and accountable management of the extractive industry.

•

To critically evaluate the network of power and ideology that maintains EITI in
Nigeria.

6.4.4 CDA in accounting research
Similar to other disciplines, CDA has been applied in several accounting studies to reveal the
power relations within text and context. In one of the first attempts to apply CDA holistically,
Gallhofer, Haslam and Roper (2001) adopted Fairclough’s approach to CDA to examine the
struggle over the legislative process in New Zealand from 1990 to 1993, particularly through
analysis of the power relations between two lobby groups, the Institute of Directors (IOD) and
the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR), and the New Zealand government. Using a
textual level of analysis, they explored the significance of the use of certain key words and
vocabularies to reveal ideological implications and differing points of view toward the process.
This study demonstrates how dominant groups impose their ideological views through their
discursive practices and their professional, social, political and economic powers.

In another early study, Craig and Amernic (2004) used CDA to examine the discursive
language of the chief executive officer of the Canadian National Railway Company as
delivered through the company’s internal newspaper prior to its privatisation. While the authors
focused their analysis essentially on the textual features of the discourse, they were also able
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to reveal how the technical accounting language, including jargon and accounting methods,
shaped, enabled and constructed the privatisation approach by leading employees to accept and
embrace the change in organisational structures.
In addition, Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis (2010) applied Fairclough’s (1993; 1995; 2003) CDA
analytical framework within the interpretative frame of regulatory capture theory to study how
the accounting profession used its power to influence the international standard-setting process
for the extractive industries. This study reflects the ability of CDA to reveal power relations by
focusing on the context. CDA demonstrated the influential role of the accounting profession
and other social actors in the consultative phase of the standard-setting process.
Malmmose (2015) used Fairclough’s (1993; 1995; 2003) framework to compare managementaccounting discourse with medical discourse in Denmark. What is interesting in this study is
the detailed level of textual analysis, which includes grammatical and vocabulary analysis and
their rhetorical and meaning implications. At the contextual level, the ideological effects of
management-accounting discourse on shaping, building and maintaining certain patterns of
power relations was also revealed. These three studies inform this thesis from different
approaches to study the role of accounting jargon, rhetorical devices, grammatical strategies
and other textual features in the creation of meaning. In addition, they develop an
understanding of the impact of the broader organisational context on the dissemination of
accounting information to an audience.

However, discourse is not only text. Kyriacou (2016 p.35) used CDA as a methodological
framework with a special focus on Kress and van Leeuwen (1996)’s approach to:
relate the content of the Greek Accounting Professional Institute’s [Σώμα
Ορκωτών Ελεγκτών Λογιστών (SOEL)] digital space to the broader
structures and the gendered accounting discourses deployed by accountants.
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Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) focus on exploring the meaning embedded in visual features
such as pictures. This includes, but is not limited to, analysis of the colours featured in the
images, the objects illustrated and the captions. Kyriacou (2016) argues that the SOEL’s digital
space and the images of accountants are not neutral. Instead, they are used as a mechanism to
reproduce “diachronically established power relations, gender inequalities and gendered
hierarchies” (Kyriacou 2016, p.35). This is demonstrated through the constant portrayal of
women as subordinates in listening roles, support roles, or the role of the “other”, not occupying
the centre of the picture (Kyriacou 2016). In this thesis, visual displays in the form of tables
and graphs will also be studied as a rhetorical strategy.
Moreover, Pupovac (2014) applied Fairclough’s (1989; 1992; 1995; 2001) model of CDA to
explore the responsibility of social actors such as MNCs, Royal Dutch Shell and the
government for oil spills in Nigeria. Pupovac (2014) studied the power relations evident in
Royal Dutch Shell’s environmental narrative disclosure of oil spills in Nigeria to demonstrate
the ability of powerful social actors to dominate and control the public discourse about social
and environmental disasters. According to Pupovac (2014), this dominance allowed Shell to
avoid its responsibility for oil spills and to portray itself as an accountable company. Similar
to Pupovac (2014), this thesis also focuses on transparency and accountability in the context
of the extractive industry with respect to a specific company and its relation to shareholders
and citizens.
Additionally, Nwagbara and Belal (2019, p.2395) used CDA to “investigate how language
(choice) in CSR reports of leading oil companies in Nigeria is used to portray an image of
‘responsible organisation’”. The use of CDA allowed the authors to conduct a thorough
analysis on a micro-level (words, clauses and sentences), meso-level (organisational discourse)
and macro-level (organisational social practices). Nwagbara and Belal (2019) concluded that
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to address the escalating criticism of their corporate behaviour, the major Nigerian oil
companies use linguistic strategies in their CSR reports to disseminate the self-image of a
“responsible organisation” to the wider community. Similarly, this thesis examines the oil
industry in Nigeria and the ability of organisational reports to create a specific image of the
industry to wider stakeholders.

Thus, NEITI reports are not mere accounting or audit reports; instead, they are documents with
accounting information used strategically. Several studies have investigated the ability of CDA
to explore the relationships between language as a discursive practice and the formulation and
execution of organisational strategies (Hardy, Palmer & Phillips 2000; Phillips, Lawrence &
Hardy 2004; Phillips, Sewel & Jaynes 2008). Therefore, while CDA studies demonstrate the
influence of context on language and vice versa through discourse, the Clegg and Kornberger
(2015) approach to CDA described below has been adopted, as it has an explicit focus on
mobilising the strategic dimension of discourse that resonates with spectacular productions.

6.5 CDA and NEITI
In their quest to explore how theories of power and strategy inform each other, Clegg and
Kornberger (2015) developed an analytical frame to study strategy as noun, strategising as verb
and strategic as adjective. “Strategic” concerns the process of making things strategic. Clegg
and Kornberger (2015, p.396) argue that “strategy is most powerful when seen as an adjective
– as something that exercises power through its ability to attach itself to people, objects, ideas
and events”. Clegg and Kornberger (2015) assert that this is achievable through the processes
of visualisation, valuation and mobilisation. While this thesis is not explicitly concerned with
strategic motivations of managers per se24, it is concerned with the strategic use of discourse,
processes and practices that make things visual and valuable and how the discourse mobilises

24

An examination of individual managers or the designers of NEITI is outside the scope of this thesis.
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ideology. It is important to note that while Clegg and Kornberger (2015) do not explicitly
classify their approach as CDA25, it is a critical approach that has a text, discourse and context
dimension.
By visualisation, Clegg and Kornberger (2015) refer to the means, processes and devices
through which power and meaning take strategic dimension. For example, the text of rankings
allows competition between cities to take place and create meanings ascribed to certain
terminologies according to specific characteristics and variables used to compare cities to each
other. The role of rankings in this example is to make the relations between cities visible and
to give the ranking process, including its tools, strategic power. To put it in another way,
rankings:
distribute a heterogeneous population into bands (the top ten, the top fortyfive journals etc.); and they summarize their results in simple, seductive
formats that can easily be reproduced by newspapers, enacted in meetings,
and enrolled in strategies. In other words, it is through visualization
techniques that rankings can travel, spread globally, and exercise their
power locally (Clegg & Kornberger 2015, p.398).
This ability of the text to visualise reflects the transcendent symbols and images inherent in
spectacles and how they “come about”. In this thesis, the process of visualisation is conducted
through a rhetorical text analysis of NEITI reports.
In the valuation phase there needs “to be an account, some form of rationalizing mechanisms
that makes valuable which has been made visible” (Clegg & Kornberger 2015, p.399). It
represents the discourse level of analysis and how the text “takes hold” with the spectator or
intended audience. The term “valuable” indicates the means and strategies by which the objects
and principles that have been made visible in the first stage are legitimised and made credible.
For example, as discussed above, rankings are a credible source that provides legitimate or

25

Fairclough and van Dijk confirm that there is no standardised approach to conduct CDA (Meyer 2001).
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rational calculative methods to evaluate cities and compare their relative value. In another
example Clegg and Kornberger (2015, p.399) explain that in a baseball match:
it is not the ball that is valuable, but the apparatus around it that makes it
mean something. Without players, judges and coaches, audience, media,
sponsors and a myriad of other network actors as well as material and
symbolic elements such as the lines drawn on the playing field, conventions
and rules, league tables to track performances, tournaments to establish
winners etc. – all these elements conspire when the ball touches the ground
and give that serendipitous moment meaning beyond its occurrence.
Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) process of valuation is reminiscent of van Dijk’s (1993, p.252)
concept of social cognition, as the valuation process helps to create “social representations in
the minds of social actors”, leading them to accept and embrace the content of the texts. This,
in turn, represents “the necessary theoretical (and empirical) interface, if not the missing link,
between discourse and dominance” (van Dijk’s 1993, p.252). The legitimation function of this
phase of analysis converges with the ability of spectacle to legitimise organisational conduct,
especially through the taken-for-grantedness of accounting and other organisational reports
(Boje 2001a; Strathern 2000). In this thesis, the valuation process occurs in the structure of
presentation, and the rules and processes of producing NEITI reports that create “credibility”
for the objectives of transparency and accountability.

At the mobilisation level of analysis, seemingly insignificant elements become strategic
through networks, and social actors shape, control and dominate public opinion about a specific
topic or event. These strategic power networks are explored at the material-technological and
socio-political levels (Clegg & Kornberger 2015). For example, at the material-technological
level, power networks practice their social powers or social controls through protocols.
Protocols are apparatuses in the form of standards and rules that manage access and
relationships within and between networks. These protocols represent control mechanisms
through which principles, events and ideas are shaped, edited and presented to the public.
Taking into consideration their ability to grant and seize access to information and events,
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protocols operate as gatekeepers for what can be revealed to, or concealed from, the public
(Clegg & Kornberger 2015). At a socio-political level, the discourse of social actors or
communication networks to exercise dominant power relationships is used to mobilise
collective action. In this thesis, this level of analysis resembles the social-practice phase in
Fairclough’s (1992) and van Dijk’s (1993) approach, in which discourse shapes social power
relations. In particular, the broader context of the Act and NEITI reporting practice are
examples of mobilisation. This level of analysis corresponds to the ability of spectacle to
dominate, conceal, reveal and maintain certain social orders and creating others.

6.6 The application of visualisation, valuation and mobilisation
Since Clegg and Kornberger (2015) do not specify a specific method of analysis to conduct a
discourse analysis, this thesis borrows from a framework devised by Spitzmüller and Warnke
(2011). They developed an analytical framework that combined aspects of discourse linguistics
at the text level (visualisation), as a descriptive methodological approach, with a critical
approach at the discourse level (valuation) and context level (mobilisation). Referred to as
Diskurslinguistische Mehrebenen-Analyse (DIMEAN), it literally means discourse-linguistic
multi-layered analysis. While the model is very detailed and deals with textual and linguistic
features that are beyond the scope of this analysis, a simplified model was developed to
accommodate the visualisation, valuation and mobilisation aspects of NEITI. Developing a
simplified model based on DIMEAN is acceptable because not “every single phenomenon and
method listed in the model is to be considered by any single analysis” (Spitzmüller & Warnke
2011, p.88). Table 6.1 illustrates the complete analytical model designed for this thesis and
combines Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach with Spitzmüller and Warnke’s (2011)
model, followed by an explanation.
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Table 6.1: The analytical model26

Level

Mobilisation

Description

Analytical Construct

Rhetorical Devices

Political context
Legal context

Political conditions in Nigeria
Legal conditions in Nigeria

Economic context

Economic conditions in Nigeria

Social context/social actors

Multinational corporations
Civil-society organisations
National Stakeholder Working Group
Auditors

Visual text structure

Layout/design
Typography
Text-picture relations
Materiality/text carrier

Network of power, dominance and control analysis

Macrostructure: text subject
Valuation

Analysis of the text structure

Text-oriented analysis

Mesostructure: topics in text part

Proposition-oriented analysis
Visualisation

Rhetorical and textual
analysis

Multi-Word-Units
Word-oriented analysis

26

Microstructure: propositions

One-word units

The text-oriented analysis, proposition-oriented analysis and word-oriented analysis are adopted from Spitzmüller and Warnke (2011).
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Lexical fields
Topic development
Text strategies/text functions
Text type

Syntax
Rhetorical figures
Social, expressive, deontic meaning
Presuppositions
Implicatures
Speech acts
Keywords
Stigmatised words
Names
Ad hoc formations

6.6.1 The visualisation level of analysis
The visualisation analysis of text borrows from Spitzmüller and Warnke’s (2011) intratexual
process. It begins with a word-oriented analysis and moves to proposition-oriented analysis
and then text-oriented analysis. The word-oriented analysis is concerned with the analysis of
one-word and multi-word units of analysis such as keywords, stigmatised words, names and ad
hoc formations. These words have meaning-creating functions and make things visible.
Throughout the NEITI reports, certain keywords, technical jargon and grammatical techniques
are examined to explore their ability to produce a functional intrinsic language that
communicates an intended message and conveys a specific effect on the audience. The
keywords and vocabularies at this level of analysis (Chapter 7) include recurring words such
as “must”, “should” and “recommend” and performative words that create specific meaning
and perform specific actions, such as the ability of the word “validated” to convey assurance
and trust.

Since the reports are prepared by accounting firms, the technical language consists of
professional jargon. Finally, the appropriate grammatical techniques for the analysis are those
that have meaning and rhetorical implications, such as the use of certain pronouns, especially
non-neutral grammatical devices used for political and rhetorical purposes (Pennycook 1994).
The analysis also considers textual syntax such as the grammatical voice (passive and active
voices), rhetorical devices and social and deontic meanings that express ethical stances and
responsible obligations (Spitzmüller & Warnke 2011). An active voice means the use of the
verb “when the subject acts”; on the other hand, “when it is in the passive voice, the subject is
acted upon” (Alred, Brusaw & Oliu 2009, p.557). The passive voice is considered to be a more
diplomatic form to prevent accusing others and is appropriate to describe a procedure, method,
practice or process. However, the passive voice can also be used to obfuscate information that
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should be known and clarified as it relieves and distances the author from responsibilities
(Williams 2000).

The study of rhetorical devices in NEITI helps in understanding and analysing the credibility
of the speaker, ethos, logic and evidences in the message and logos, as well as the emotions of
the audience, often termed “pathos” (Berlanga, García-García & Victoria 2013; Hartelius &
Browning 2008). To create meaning and establish a complex reality in the mind of the
audience, the speaker/writer uses rhetorical devices such as alliteration, metaphor, simile,
irony, euphemism, litote, dramatisation, examples and repetition (Abrams 1999; Mumby &
Clair 1997). Appendix 1, adopted from El Hamad (2017, p.38), summarises the rhetorical
strategies and definitions that may be used by different organisations. In addition, the rhetorical
use of intertextuality is also analysed. In this thesis, intertextuality is defined according to
Fairclough (1992, p.270) as “how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing
conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones”.
The rhetorical devices are of interest at this level of analysis because in CDA “the relationship
between language and meaning is never arbitrary in that the choice of a particular genre or
rhetorical strategy brings particular presuppositions, meanings, ideologies and intentions”
(Paltridge 2012, p.191). While this thesis does not conduct a complete rhetorical analysis, a
critical analysis of some rhetorical devices used in the reports is appropriate: as Nørreklit (2003,
p.592) argues, “as long as there is an intention with human speech, rhetoric always forms part
of communication”. This is also confirmed by Burke (1969, p.72), who suggests that “wherever
there is meaning, there is persuasion”. Discourse can be persuasive by emphasising the
importance of certain ideas and understating others, through stressing specific meaning and
consequences of certain ideas, through examining what appeals are needed to approach the
audience and through constructing certain forms of subject (Heracleous 2004).
127

“Rhetoric” has been used interchangeably with “discourse” and “ideology” because it is the
tool by which ideology is defined and discourse is shaped persuasively (Higgins & Walker
2012; Zachry 2009). This is reflected in the use of language and other discursive means to
affect audience perceptions (Higgins & Walker 2012; Moerman & van der Laan 2007). Heath
(1990) argues that organisational rhetoric is directed both ways: to the stakeholders within and
outside the organisation. Organisations use rhetoric strategically to respond to existing
situations, to anticipate future rhetorical situations and to shape projected rhetorical situations
and organisational images and identities (Cheney et al. 2004).

At the proposition-oriented level of analysis, the analysis occurs at sentence level to assess the
impact of language on the quality of data. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the timeliness,
completeness, accuracy and materiality of the information. In addition, sentences that achieve
a speech-act function, such as a sentence that implies how certain characteristics of accounting
information have been achieved27, are highlighted.

6.6.2 The valuation level of analysis
The valuation level of analysis borrows from the text-oriented layer of Spitzmüller and
Warnke’s (2011) model. Text-oriented analysis is concerned with the “analysis of the text type,
of text strategies, of the topic development, of metaphorical and lexical fields that span parts
of or the whole text” in addition to the text’s images and layout (Spitzmüller & Warnke 2011,
p.84). Valuation is the structure of the text that gives it legitimacy and makes it valuable. Cope
and Kalantis (1993) argue that texts differ according to the purpose of their authors and the
objectives they intend to achieve. Each text is characterised by specific features that reflect its
purpose and help its readers to comprehend its content, recall its details and understand its

For example, “[w]e reviewed and validated returned populated templates” (2016 NEITI Report, p.14) to imply
the completeness and accuracy of the information.
27
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message (Marzban & Seifi 2013). According to Wegner and Bartlett (2009, np) many studies
demonstrate that text structure “has been shown to promote an effective strategy for
understanding text, identifying the main idea, and recalling details”. Thus, these features that
direct ideas and paragraphs of the text and organise the coherence of its contents are called text
structures (Akhondi, Malayeri, & Abd Samad 2011; Armbruster 2004).

Text can be classified into two broad categories: factual (or expository) text and literary (or
narrative) (Marzban & Seifi 2013; Pike & Mumper 2004). While literary text aims to entertain
or to create an emotional response, factual text is designed to provide information, explain and
classify a phenomenon or persuade the reader to accept or agree with certain ideas (Pike &
Mumper 2004). According to Meyer (1985), there are five types of written exposition:
description, sequence, comparison; problem-solution; and cause and effect. This type of text
aims to inform:
readers by presenting facts and ideas in direct and concise language; it
usually relies less on colorful or figurative language…. Exposition is aimed
at the readers’ understanding rather than at their imagination or emotions; it
is a sharing of the writer’s knowledge…. Because it is the most effective
form of discourse for explaining difficult subjects, exposition is widely used
in reports, memos, and other types of technical writing (Alred, Brusaw &
Oliu 2009, p.182).
The focus of the analysis is the NEITI reports that present reconciled financial flows between
the Nigerian government and the companies within the extractive industry. Therefore, they are
factual, persuasive, expository texts. There are many ways to analyse their structure, such as
identifying the physical shape and logical classification techniques. This includes classification
based on difference in topics, logical grouping techniques, the number of chapters, subchapters,
paragraphs and subparagraphs, their sizes and whether the size reflects the importance of their
topics (Dynock & Nicholson 2007; Saunders-Smith 2009). Taking into consideration the
physical and logical aspects of the reports, many features of the structure are examined. This
includes the title of the report and text structural sections such as the table of contents, list of
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appendices, executive summary, introduction, audit methodology, body text, glossary,
headings and sub-headings. In addition, visual devices, including the table of contents, index,
photos, captions, diagrams, charts, maps and graphs, will be examined to explore their impact
on the overall perception of the reports and their role in creating legitimacy or taken-forgrantedness authority.

6.6.3 The mobilisation level of analysis
This level of analysis will study the network of power between various social actors involved
in the process of the production, legitimation and dissemination of NEITI reports and the wider
social and political environment in Nigeria. This is achieved through the analysis of the Act to
reflect the network of power and the ability of the Act to mobilise and enact transparency and
accountability in the Nigerian extractive industry. These include the sections that deal with the
National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) and its composition, the appointment of the
auditors, the legal and operational conditions of local civil societies in Nigeria and sanctions
applied to noncompliant parties. In addition, this level also addresses the general economic and
political context of Nigeria before and during the adoption of NEITI.
The Theory of Spectacle is used as an interpretive framework to pull together the analytical
findings in relation to transparency and accountability that link NEITI to the broader context
of global capital.

6.7 Data
NEITI has published 11 audit reports covering the 1999 to 2018 period. The reports include
financial, physical and process audits. According to NEITI (2011, p.17) the financial audit:
reconciles financial flows following the chain of custody for finances
derived from the sector over a period of time with a view to establishing
what was paid and what was received and identify specific agencies that can
be held accountable for any discrepancies.
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In contrast, the physical audit:
tracks the sector’s oil and gas and refined product flows. It checks if the
extracted volumes are accurately reported and if each company’s reported
production tallies with the numbers the government uses for tax and royalty
calculations (NEITI 2011, p.18).
The physical audit is highly technical, as it deals with measurements of the quantities of oil and
gas produced, transported and sold. The process audit also “examines how key agencies run
the business. It explores how the regulator auctions and sells oil blocks” (NEITI 2011, p.18).
Since they deal directly with accounting information such as tax, royalty and revenues from
the sales of crude oil and gas, the financial audit reports are used in this thesis.
The reports vary in size and content. For example, the early financial and physical audit reports
up to 2009 were presented separately, with fewer than 100 pages each and no information about
NEITI activities in Nigeria, nor any information about the Nigerian extractive industry. The
first financial audit report covers the first six years between 1999 and 2004. The report is 77
pages long and covers only oil and gas, and the mining sector is not mentioned or included in
the report. The report starts with a short summary of financial flows in the oil and gas industry
to and from the Nigerian government. This is followed by an introduction and a description of
the scope of the audit, including objectives, entities covered and audit methodology. Next, the
report includes the financial and non-financial flow to the Nigerian government through the
petroleum profit tax, royalties, the gas flair penalty, cash calls, and revenues from the sales of
oil and gas. These financial flows are reconciled between the amount companies remitted and
what the government received. It is noted that the term accountability does not appear in this
report and there is limited use of the term transparency, which is in any case not defined, and
its form is not specified.

The 2005 report is 88 pages long and covers only the financial audit for only one year. It has
the same structure and content as the previous report except that there are no appendices. The
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following report in 2008 covers three years in only 47 pages, and its content is similar to the
previous reports, with only one exception: for the first time, it contains an overview of the oil
and gas industry in Nigeria28. The 2011 report is 116 pages and includes extra sections such as
a table of exchange rates used, data sources, the auditing standards and the materiality levels.
This report is the first that mentions accountability in addition to transparency as an objective
of EITI since its inclusion as an EITI objective in 2009 revisions.

The size of the reports dramatically increased beginning in 2012 onwards. In addition, since
2012 each report has covered one year only and each contains a background to the global EITI,
a brief historical perspective of EITI implementation in Nigeria and contextual information on
the Nigerian oil and gas industry, in addition to the usual information about financial flows. In
addition, since 2012 each report has included a physical and process audit in addition to the
financial audit. Table 6.2 summarises the NEITI reports, covered periods, sizes and publication
dates. The audit reports (NEITI reports) are prepared by accounting firms 29, and their
fundamental product is accounting information under the financial audit report.

28

NEITI began issuing an independent mining report in 2007.
Examples include Hart Nurse Ltd (international firm), SS Afemikhe & Co (Nigerian firm) and Sada, Idris &
Co (Nigerian firm).
29
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Table 6.2: Summary of the NEITI reports
Reports as named in this thesis

Covered period

Publication date

Size

2004 NEITI Report

1999-2004

August 2006

77 pages

2005 NEITI Report

2005

October 2008

88 pages

2008 NEITI Report

2006-2008

July 2011

47 pages

2011 NEITI Report

2009-2011

December 2012

116 pages

2012 NEITI Report

2012

March 2015

347 pages

2013 NEITI Report

2013

September 2015

396 pages

2014 NEITI Report

2014

December 2016

322 pages

2015 NEITI Report

2015

December 2017

206 pages

2016 NEITI Report

2016

January 2019

150 pages

2017 NEITI Report

2017

November 2019

88 pages

2018 NEITI Report

2018

March 2020

110 pages

Despite the considerable variation in the length of the report the auditors do not provide an
explanation for the differences. This issue is further explored in Chapter 7.
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6.8 Summary
This chapter addressed the methodological assumptions of this thesis. As by “accessing the
meanings participants assign to them” (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, p.5) the NEITI reports
reflect the broader aspects of EITI, CDA will be used to analyse the reports. Although there is
no specific or standard approach for applying CDA, Clegg and Kornberger (2015) provide an
approach to discourse using three levels of analysis: visualisation, valuation and mobilisation.
In addition, Spitzmüller and Warnke’s (2011) model provides the technical detail for the
analysis at the visualisation and valuation levels. The mobilisation level of analysis addresses
the network of power between NEITI’s stakeholders through the analysis of the Act and the
relevant parts in the NEITI reports. The analytical findings are discussed in Chapter 10 in
relation to the Theory of Spectacle and insights for transparency and accountability. The
chapter concluded with the sources of the data used in this thesis and its relevance to the thesis’s
methods.

Next, the first analysis chapter, Chapter 7, presents the visualisation level of analysis that deals
with the rhetorical analysis of the text (the NEITI reports).
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Chapter 7: Visualisation
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 introduced the methodological assumptions of this thesis, the methodology of CDA
and its application in the accounting literature. It also discussed the application of CDA in this
thesis using Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach combined with Spitzmüller and
Warnke’s (2011) model of text analysis to inform the visualisation and valuation levels of
analysis. This chapter examines the rhetorical features of NEITI reports at the word and
sentence levels as per the structure and examples in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Visualisation level of analysis

Rhetorical
and textual
analysis

Syntax
Rhetorical figures
PropositionMicrostructure: Social,
oriented
propositions
expressive,
analysis
deontic meaning
Speech acts

Wordoriented
analysis

Multi-word
units

Keywords
Stigmatised
words
Names
Ad hoc
formations

Examples
Rhetorical devices,
intertextuality,
passive and active
voices

“We”, “must”,
“should”,
“recommend”,
professional jargon

NEITI has published 11 audit reports that cover the period from 1999 to 2018. The reports
include financial, physical and process audits. These reports are prepared by accounting firms
and, therefore, their fundamental product is financial information. In particular, the content of
the financial audits in the reports includes accounting information such as taxes, royalty
payments and revenues from the sales of crude oil and gas. Therefore, the financial audit reports
fall within the scope of this study. In the following sections, the financial audit reports from
2004 to 2018 (referred to as [year] NEITI Report) are analysed to identify the rhetorical features
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and their intended meaning and message. This level of text analysis focuses on the cohesion of
the text and how meaning is produced by anchoring the text in the overall structure of the report
(Chapter 8).

7.2: Rhetorical analysis
The NEITI reports display a number of rhetorical features including pronouns, use of
vocabulary, technical jargon and grammatical techniques, including the use of passive and
active voice, to communicate an intended message and have a specific effect on the reader. The
following section will discuss the use of the pronoun “we”, followed by an analysis of the
other rhetorical features, including the use of strong and soft voice in making
recommendations, the use of passive and active voice, the use of professional language and
evidence of intertextuality to determine how meaning is made visible or “realised” through
text.
7.2.1 The pronoun “we”
Pennebaker (2013) argues that pronouns are not used arbitrarily to replace words in verbal or
written discourse. Rather, they link the words they replace and reflect social and psychological
states (Pennebaker 2013). The choice of pronouns affects meaning and reinforces notions about
social and power relationships, personality, personal and professional backgrounds, priorities,
responsibilities, emotional states and social and political beliefs (Pennebaker 2013). The NEITI
reports use the pronoun “we” to achieve different objectives: highlighting the positive
contributions of the auditors30, shifting responsibility for undesirable outcomes; emphasising

30

The producers or preparers are the appointed auditors (accounting firms) that conduct the reconciliation and
author the report on behalf of NEITI. They are referred to as the auditors. The composition of different auditors
is addressed in Chapter 8.
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the auditors’ authority and the credibility of the information; and conveying the impression of
a complete audit.
First, the pronoun “we” is used in the reports to highlight the positive contributions of the
auditors representing NEITI. For example, under the Assessment of Petroleum Profits Tax
2004 (PPT Act) section of the 2004 NEITI Report (p.5), “we” is used to refer to “[t]he highlevel comparisons” the auditors “made between the audited accounts and the PPT returns” that
“indicated differences that require further discussion”. This is associated with the positive role
attributed to the auditors that is reflected in the use of the adjective “high-level” to describe
their reconciliation work. However, when discussing the unreconciled financial differences,
the auditors distance themselves by shifting attention away from their role in the process. This
is illustrated by the following example:
We issued financial templates to capture payments and receipts. Our
reconciliation thereof together with verification to the ledger and supporting
documentation did not confirm the ABZ allegation (2004 NEITI Report,
p.12).
We selected sample returns from each upstream company and confirmed the
calculation of PPT and Royalties. There are several areas we consider FIRS
should enquire into (2004 NEITI Report, p.12).
There are two facets of ‘bloated costs’: (a) whether costs were claimed in
PPT returns which were never incurred – we have reviewed this and the
results are set out in section 6, which suggests that there are grounds for
further investigation; and (b) whether the costs incurred were reasonable –
this is an allegation that can only be verified by a Value for Money (VFM)
review (2004 NEITI Report, p.12).
Again, the auditors highlight their contribution and detailed professional work using the
pronoun “we”, albeit without explaining the significance of this work or its effects on the
outcome of the report. On the other hand, the auditors switch from an active voice, with the use
of “we”, to a passive voice when indicating incomplete work. For example, the auditors use an
authoritative and assertive voice to support their own assumptions – “we consider FIRS should
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enquire into” – but a passive voice for “this is an allegation that can only be verified by a Value
for Money (VFM) review”31 (2004 NEITI Report, p.12).
Other examples of the use of “we” include: “We observed a two month time lag in the booking
of PPT payment by FIRS” (2004 NEITI Report, p.27) and “We observed that the assessment
of Royalty by DPR…differs significantly from the actual payments made by the Producing
companies”. In these two examples, “we” is accompanied with the verb “observed”. This
technique emphasises the direct and positive work that the auditors have performed to give the
statements “factual power”, further highlighting a positive contribution to the report.

In addition, a number of other processes performed by the auditors are highlighted through the
use of “we”. The first is the auditors’ extensive effort to validate and provide transparency in
relation to several calculative practices, such as the PPT computation in the following example:
We reviewed the Petroleum Profits Tax returns of selected companies,
comprising the computations set out in the respective companies’ PPT
Returns and audited financial statements. We also obtained PPT data
(volume, value etc.) from the companies in the form of templates. We have
considered relevant provisions in the tax laws to enable us conclude on items
that may have material impact on tax revenue accruing to the Government
(2005 NEITI Report, p.25).
Another example is the auditors’ application of the correct procedure in pricing domestic crude
oil:
We have reviewed the process of pricing and the application of the pricing
procedure set out, above. We have confirmed on a sample basis that the
procedure is applied in practice (2008 NEITI Report, p.21).
Third, the auditors that replaced the Hart group in 2011 NEITI Report continue to use “we”.
For example, the discovery of an unremitted amount of US$4.84 billion from the CBN/NNPC
JP Morgan Account was attributed to the auditors:

31

VFM is a review of cost-effectiveness that evaluates the cost and benefits throughout all phases of a project.
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Financial flows from NLNG32 include dividends and repayment of loans of
which an amount of $4.84 billion was received by NNPC. We have
confirmed that these amounts have not been remitted to the CBN/NNPC JP
Morgan Account or Federation Account (2011 NEITI Report, p.7).
Although it is not mentioned whether the amount exceeded the materiality threshold, it is
still substantial, especially for a country such as Nigeria. The positive use of the pronoun
“we” obscures the fact that a clear explanation is not given for the error; nor is a clear
recommendation provided, or a specific remedy suggested. In another example from the
2017 NEITI Report (p.14), the auditors state, “We carried out all validation and
reconciliation of data as defined in the TOR.”33 In this example the auditors highlight the
reliability of the data and attribute its quality to the measures and process applied in the
audit.
Fourth, “we” is used to reinforce the authoritative position of the auditors. For example,
the auditors state, “In this introductory section, we explain the scope of the report and
draw attention to certain key issues” (2004 NEITI Report, p.7). In another example, the
auditors draw attention to the request by the NSWG to complete the 2004 final report.
Since the request was from an influential group that included the government, CSOs and
company representatives, it supports the auditors’ authoritative position:
We reported in April 2006 on the reconciliation work completed up to that
date…. Subsequent to presenting that report, we were requested to continue
to work with companies and the CBN to undertake further searches for
missing transactions, and to report our findings (2004 NEITI Report, p.10).
Furthermore, the auditors reinforce an authoritative voice by combining the pronoun “we” with
formal expressions such as the verb “validated”; for example, “We reviewed and validated
returned populated templates” (2016 NEITI Report, p.14).

32

Nigeria LNG Limited (NLNG) is a liquefied natural gas-producing joint venture between the NNPC, Royal
Dutch Shell, Total and Eni.
33
TOR: Terms of Reference.
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Fifth, the auditors use “we” to emphasise the credibility of the overall report:
We reviewed the Petroleum Profits Tax returns of selected companies,
comprising the computations set out in the respective companies’ PPT
Returns and audited financial statements. We also obtained PPT data
(volume, value etc.) from the companies in the form of templates. We have
considered relevant provisions in the tax laws to enable us conclude on items
that may have material impact on tax revenue accruing to the Government
(2004 NEITI Report, p.30).
This paragraph explains how the auditors review the information and inspect payments in
accordance with specific and appropriate laws. This reflects the level of credibility of the
published information. This meaning is also elaborated and enhanced in another example:
In the course of carrying out the assignment we documented the various
limitations that was encountered and leveraged on our expertise and
experience in handling similar assignments for resolutions (2014 NEITI
Report, p.16).
Similar to the previous examples, the pronoun “we” is used to refer to the role of the auditors
in auditing and also confirming the payments. The auditors also identify various limitations
that highlight and reinforce the status of professional knowledge, and enhance the credibility
of the information.
Finally, the use of the pronoun “we” combined with words such as “recommend” and
“should” is a responsibility-shifting technique, as in the following example:
We recommend that NSWG through FIRS should investigate these
differences in detail in order to obtain a clearer understanding of what is
responsible for them. We recommend that FIRS should discuss the
differences with the companies’ concerned and issue supplementary
assessments as appropriate (2004 NEITI Report, p.32).
The auditors shift the responsibility for investigating discrepancies in financial flows to both
the NSWG and FIRS. For example:
We recommend that for subsequent audits, the Auditor General of the
Federation should provide an attestation letter for all government agencies.
This is to provide additional level of assurance for data quality (2015 NEITI
Report, p.26).
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It is worth noting that, although the auditors provide recommendations in the previous
examples, they have no legal authority to enforce these recommendations. In addition, the
subsequent reports indicate that neither government agencies nor companies follow up on such
recommendations. This renders the process of recommendations a mere responsibility-shifting
technique to give the impression of completed work, which may in fact be incomplete. The
following example reinforces this deficit:
Companies have not signed off the reports on PPT and Royalty assessments
because of the nature and extent of disagreements and the incomplete
discussions and examination of the reasons for differences. The extent of
reconciliation work required of companies is considerable and has not been
completed in the timeframe of this review. We recommend that FIRS initiate
a programme of detailed work to investigate the causes of the differences
and if necessary adjust assessments (2004 NEITI Report, p.5).
The terms “nature” and “extent” are ambiguous, and the use of “we” reinforces the impression
that the auditors have actually completed their responsibility for the audit. However, no followup measures or investigation were indicated in subsequent reports to determine whether the
problem was resolved or not. The following section further analyses recurring words such as
“must”, “should” and “recommend” in terms of strong versus soft voice.

7.2.2 Strong versus soft voice
The NEITI report auditors express their recommendations using terminology ranging from a
strong voice, such as with the word “must”, to, more commonly, a soft voice with words such
as “should”. For example, the term “must” is used only three times in the 2004 NEITI Report,
and in each case is not expressed as an order, or even an assertive recommendation.
The point must be made that not paying monthly instalment of PPT does not
mean a loss of PPT revenue provided that the 13th month instalment is
accurately calculated and paid (2004 NEITI Report, p.12).
“Should” is present in the same report 36 times over 15 pages. In the majority of instances,
“should” is accompanied by the term “recommend” and its derivatives, such as
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“recommendation”. This combination of language produces professional-seeming authoritative
recommendations and assertive opinions. For example, it was stated that:
CNL34 claimed it set off $52.6 m against Cash Call arrears in 1999/2000.
Our review of Cash Calls showed that all Cash Call demands made by CNL
on NNPC NAPIMS were paid. The allegation by ABZ against CNL in this
area therefore appears to be correct and CNL should refund $52.6 million to
FIRS (2004 NEITI Report, p.12).
In this example, the term “should” is in combination with “our review” to reinforce the position
of a professional opinion and recommendation. To give another example:
DPR is the agency that collects signature bonus. The NSWG should ensure
that DPR fully discloses all signature bonus assessed and collected. The
CBN and other appropriate agency of government should confirm that such
monies are received into the respective bank accounts and duly notified to
and reconciled between CBN, OAGF and DPR (2008 NEITI Report, p.35).
The term “should” is used here to authoritatively shift the responsibility to other entities, such
as the companies, DPR and CBN. In addition, its use in proximity with “our opinion” gives the
impression of a non-binding professional recommendation:
We have reviewed the legal/statutory requirements for both companies and
MDAs with regard to quality of data/information provided for 2015 Oil and
Gas Audit and hereby express our opinion as follows: ….We recommend
that for subsequent audits, the Auditor General of the Federation should
provide an attestation letter for all government agencies. This is to provide
additional level of assurance for data quality (2015 NEITI Report, pp.2526).
However, the term “should” is occasionally used to express a common expected practice that
reflects a professional authoritative voice. For example, to deal with CBN unidentified
collections of more than US$10 billion PPT payment, the recommendation was that “CBN,
FIRS and OAGF should meet and reconcile these payments. To avoid reoccurrence, regular
reconciliation exercise should be carried out within the year of transaction” (2011 NEITI
Report, p.22). The substantial amounts involved in these transactions call into question whether
the stronger term “must” would have been appropriate to resolve the issue and avoid

34

Chevron Nigeria Ltd.
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reoccurrence. However, in other examples “should” has a stronger position than a mere
recommendation, as in the following example:
There are issues of interpretation of tax laws which it appears are currently
being applied by companies in ways that reduce tax take. Some examples
are incentives granted on the MOU and on Gas for PPT, Taxation of Gas
under CITA, gas flare as a cost to be deducted under CITA and not PPTA
etc. The FIRS should as a matter of urgency seek legal advice on these issues
so that appropriate interpretation can be obtained (2004 NEITI Report,
p.40).
Using expressions such as “a matter of urgency” gives the recommendation a sense of
determination, durability and firmness that reinforces importance. Although the
recommendations are non-binding, they are crafted using an active voice accompanied with the
pronoun “we” to make them authoritative. This also justifies the completeness of the work and
reinforces an impression that issues have been resolved, and therefore discharges NEITI from
taking further measures. This is illustrated in the recommendations provided to solve issues
related to the multiple and differing interpretations of the PPT Act to calculate the capital
allowance on non-associate gas. NEITI recommends “that the FIRS should review the above,
in line with what actually constitutes an expense (CAPEX + OPEX or OPEX only) and issue a
supplementary assessment on the PPT tax implication” (2005 NEITI Report, p.36). The use of
“we recommend” and “should” illustrates that the recommendation is a solution. However,
there is no evidence or means to confirm that these recommendations are binding and therefore
subject to a form of sanction or penalty. The same use of “should” is expressed in the
recommendations made to deal with the issue of oil theft, oil vandalism and sabotage:

1.
Seismic sensors should be installed along the pipeline network to
alert security operatives on the activities around the pipelines.
2.
The timetable for repair and replacement should be upgraded and
implemented rigorously because not all breaks are as a result of vandalism.
3.
Communities where pipelines are laid should be regularly
enlightened on the steps to take when there are incidences of pipeline breaks
and vandalism.
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4.
The government should deploy more enhanced technologies in pipe
laying (i.e. around increased depth). This will reduce immensely the
propensity of pipeline breaks caused by the acts of vandals and “sabotuers
[sic]”. (2017 NEITI Report, p.75)
The four recommendations using a strong voice shift the responsibility to deal with this issue
to the government and local communities and reinforce that NEITI has discharged its duty.
7.2.3 Professional jargon
Formal professional language, including accounting and business jargon, is evident within the
reports. For example, the term “audit” appeared 49 times (excluding the header) in the 2004
NEITI Report. Similarly, the term “reconciliation” and its derivatives, such as “reconciled”,
were used 84 times in 25 pages of the 2004 NEITI Report. Reconciliation is a process to
confirm and authorise the credibility and reliability of company accounts through the
comparison of appropriate amounts in different accounts (Collin 2003). For example:
The hydrocarbon volumes used for PPT purposes were materially consistent
with those reconciled in the course of the Physical audit (2004 NEITI
Report, p.5).
In addition, the report contains the phrase “high level comparisons…between the audited
accounts and the PPT returns indicated differences that require further discussion” (2004
NEITI Report, p.5). This explanation provides a definition of the term “audit” that is
commensurate with the idea of reconciliation, rather than with an accounting understanding of
auditing35.
Other accounting jargon is used extensively, including “operating cost”, “bloated costs”,
“liabilities”, “cut-off date”, “financial flows”, “net inflows”, “cash flows”, “materiality”, “cash
basis of accounting”, “accrual basis of accounting”, “assets”, “revenue”, “expenses” and

35

The accounting meaning of auditing is the systematic, independent process of investigation and examination
of companies’ books and financial and non-financial reports to ensure that the information faithfully represent
the true image of the company (Power 1997).
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“equity”. These examples reinforce the status of professional financial and audit accounting
reports. For example, in discussing the materiality of revenue flows to the Nigerian
government, the auditors state:
We have reviewed the EITI requirements for materiality threshold as
applied by NSWG in 2015 Oil and Gas Audit and hereby confirm that: The
consideration made by NSWG on the companies and revenue streams are a
true and fair representation of the flows in the Nigerian oil and gas sector
(2015 NEITI Report, p.23).
The objective of data quality is to establish and maintain a system of quality
control to give reasonable assurance that: The information provided by
covered entities is accurate and complete (2015 NEITI Report, p.23).
Materiality, faithful representation, completeness and accuracy are defining characteristics of
financial information in accounting reports (IASB 2010). Therefore, the use of such jargon
enhances the credibility of NEITI discourse, giving it the appearance of professionalism.

7.2.4 Passive voice
Grammatically, active voice exists “when the subject acts” with the use of the verb (Alred,
Brusaw & Oliu 2009, p.557). On the other hand, “when [the text] is in the passive voice, the
subject is acted upon” (Alred, Brusaw & Oliu 2009, p.557). Passive voice is considered a more
diplomatic form of writing to prevent accusing others and is appropriate to describe a
procedure, method, practice or process. However, passive voice can also be used to obfuscate
information that should be revealed to relieve and distance the author from responsibility
(Williams 2000). Several examples of the use of passive voice to shift responsibility for
incomplete work and to create a neutral voice are evident in NEITI reports.

First, while a significant amount of positive contribution from the auditors is acknowledged in
an active voice using the pronoun “we”, the shortcomings and incomplete work are expressed
through the use of passive voice. For example, when dealing with the incomplete reconciliation
work related to the company Addax in the 2004 NEITI Report, the following was reported:
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The PPT and Royalty outstanding for Addax for 1999 – 2003 has not been
finalized as Addax and NNPC are still working to reconcile and establish
what was due and what is outstanding. We recommend that the NSWG
follow up the progress of these reconciliations with a view to ensuring
balances are ultimately agreed and settled (2004 NEITI Report, p.40).
In this instance, passive voice is evident in the reference to the incomplete work that “has not
been finalized”, while an active voice with the pronoun “we” is used to attribute the
recommended solution to the auditors. In another case, it is mentioned that in “April 2006, an
earlier version of this report was presented; the present report reflects the findings of certain
further work undertaken in the period May – August 2006”36 (2004 NEITI Report, p.2). In the
earlier version of the report the unreconciled difference of US$232 million represents 0.25%
of total financial flow within the industry. Therefore, the use of passive voice distances the
auditors from the high level of difference. In addition, in the Preface of the 2005 NEITI Report
(p.4) and repeated in the 2008 NEITI Report (p.3), the following text appears:
The report reflects data and information received by Hart Group from
covered entities up to 31st August 2008. Comments and adjustments
received after that date have been taken into account where feasible but not
all could be accommodated.
The use of the passive voice here allows the auditors to be vague about taking into consideration
only feasible comments without specifying when and how these comments are feasible. In the
same way, the use of passive voice to refer to the issuing date of the 2008 NEITI Report as the
3rd of February 2011 shifts the responsibility for the publication delay to an unknown party. In
another example:
The amounts totalling of $68.4 million which relates to flows to the
Federation account and which was collected by the CBN were not confirmed
to covered entities’ records. Similarly, the contributions made to NDDC
amounting to $69.44 million and N2. 525 billion which were reported by
the Commission could not be confirmed to covered entities’ records (2011
NEITI Report, p.18).

36

The 2004 NEITI Report was published in August 2006.
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Although each unreconciled payment did not exceed the limit of US$100 million37, the amounts
are still significant since they are unreconciled. Considering the economic conditions in Nigeria
this amount is considered material. On the other hand;
[a]mounts totalling $311.85 million representing flows to the Federation
account were claimed to have been paid by the covered entities to the
relevant accounts but such payments were not confirmed to CBN bank
statements (2011 NEITI Report, p.18).
Amounts exceeding the limit of US$100 million were not considered part of the unreconciled
amounts, nor did they require any further investigation from the auditors. This questions the
accuracy of the information, its materiality and the completeness of the auditor’s engagement
with the process of reconciliation. This rhetorical use of passive voice to abrogate responsibility
for incomplete work has persisted through to the latest 2018 NEITI Report (p.64):
Total company level financial flows stood at US$16.639 billion – out of
which US$15.431 billion (92.74%) was reconciled, while US$1.208 billion
(7.26%) was unilaterally disclosed.
The responsibility for the unilateral disclosure (unreconciled) US$1.208 billion is unspecified,
and thus shifted away from the auditors through the use of passive voice.

Second, while the use of passive voice can shift responsibilities and distance the auditors from
the consequences of incomplete work, it can also serve as a technique to promote the formality,
objectivity and neutrality of the report (Anson & Schwegler 2000). This function of passive
voice is illustrated in the following example:
Progress has been made in resolving most of the differences except a few
open items…. The financial flows statements were updated with payments
traced and open items remarked for further investigation by CBN and the
upstream companies (2004 NEITI Report, p.11).
When elaborating on the progress that has been made, a passive voice flattens and neutralises
the language by discussing progress without specifying the extent. This is also an example of

37

The NSWG considered any payment/receipt of an amount in excess of US$100 million to be material.

147

the use of the rhetorical euphemism, in which a less direct word replaces an offensive one, such
as in the use of the term “to resolve differences” rather than highlighting the shortcomings
(Harris 2002). Rhetorical euphemism is a common technique in all NEITI reports. In other
examples, to enhance the formality and the authoritative nature of their work in the 2008 NEITI
Report (p.3), the auditors stated:
Hart Nurse Ltd and SS Afemikhe & Co (Chartered Accountants) (“the
Consultants”) were required to undertake the work set out in the Terms of
Reference (TOR) for the engagement. The assignment has been carried out
under the TOR included as Appendix Q.
And in the 2011 NEITI Report (p.9) they stated:
The proceeds from sales for the Federation Account were reconciled with
the statement of accounts maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
for export crude oil and gas sales at JP Morgan Chase Bank.
The use of the passive voice in both examples, once again, strengthens the neutrality and
formality of the language, which is one of the common linguistic characteristics in report
writing (Blake & Bly 1993).

7.2.5 Active voice
Active voice has been used to deliver information about roles, responsibilities and the positive
contributions of the auditors in particular, or NEITI in general. This is illustrated in the
following statement from the scope and coverage section of the 2005 NEITI Report (p.6):
To allow us to analyse the financial flows between international companies
and local companies, we requested information from company covered
entities as to their beneficial ownership. Whereas several companies
responded to the effect that they were internationally owned, many
companies refused to provide this information. Accordingly, where
financial tables indicate an analysis between the international and local
companies, we have analysed it to the best of our knowledge and belief but
not necessarily on the basis of information provided by the covered entities.
The statement demonstrates how the auditors, on behalf of NEITI, reflect positive efforts in
relation to the confirmation of financial flows between international and local companies.
However, the fact that many companies refuse to provide requested information to complete
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the reconciliation raises questions about the level of transparency that NEITI intends to achieve
in the extractive industry.

Another example of the use of active voice to highlight the contribution of the auditors is found
in the 2013 NEITI Report (p.20):
Standard data collection templates were prepared by NEITI and issued to
Covered Entities. The consultant reviewed, validated and updated the
populated templates for all relevant financial transactions and Oil and Gas
volumetric for the year 2013 where necessary.
In this example, the auditors highlight their positive contribution and professional work when
referring to their role in populating and validating the financial templates used to collect
required data. Different auditors in other NEITI reports continue to use the same discursive and
rhetorical strategies to highlight their positive contributions, as in the following example:
We carried out further analysis and determined material companies for
reporting. This analysis showed that at a threshold of 0.3%, 22 companies
contributed 97.83% to the total revenue from companies (2017 NEITI
Report, p.15).
The use of “we” in this example shifts the attention from the results of the analysis
to the positive work performed by the auditors:
...we are of the opinion that the percentage established for material
company’s compliance in Appendix 8 is a true representation of the level of
compliance to extant statutory requirements for auditing and assurance in
Nigeria (2017 NEITI Report, p.20).
Further, although the auditors are not expected to give assurance, the active voice
when formulated with formal diction expresses auditing and assurance opinions.

7.2.6 Intertextuality
Intertextuality is based on the notion that text is a combination of previous and present texts
that creates a new text to serve an author’s objectives (Fairclough 1992; Kamberelis & Scott
1992). The auditors of the reports draw on other texts by reference to or directly quoting legal
texts such as the 1998 Nigerian budget, the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 2004 (PPT Act) and the
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Companies Income Tax Act (CITA). This intertextual reference is used to justify accounting
techniques, applicable taxation rates and the differences between payment amounts from
companies and government agencies, especially in the validation process of PPT computation.
For example, when referring to the companies’ applicable rate of Investment Capital
Allowance, the auditors of the 2004 NEITI Report (p.38) cite the 1998 Government Budget
and the PPT Act:
The companies’ response is that the Federal Government Budget
pronouncement for the year 1998 expressly stated that as part of the
incentive given for the development of the gas industry, the Investment
Capital allowance was increased from 5% to 15%, Section 13 of the PPT
Act provides that all capital investments on gas facilities and equipment
shall be treated for tax purposes as part of allowances arising from capital
investments for oil development. It therefore follows accordingly that any
investment allowance granted on gas projects would be taken as an
allowance in the PPT returns. Whilst we agree that the 1998 budget provided
for increase in Investment Capital Allowance of up to 15% it must be noted
that all the other elements of the budget with reference to incentives of the
utilization of Gas were comprehensively codified in PPT Act CAP P 13 LFN
2004 Section 11 but the 15% investment is conspicuously left uncodified.
The intention of government should therefore be inferred from this to
support its unavailability for claim. We recommend the two views to the
NSWG.
In another example, the auditors quoted the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations
Act No. 69 LFN of 1996 to justify the method used to calculate royalty payments and the
appropriate rate applicable to the “chargeable value of crude oil and casing head petroleum
spirit under the regulation” (2005 NEITI Report, p.32).
Intertextuality is also used as a rhetorical device of “rebuttal” by using facts, evidence and
reasoning in situations to disprove the arguments of others (Harris, 2002). For example, the
deduction mentioned in the above quote in the 1998 government budget was refuted based on
the PPT Act. These texts have authority, as they are the primary legislative instruments that
deal specifically and directly with tax deductions. A further example reads:
We noted that the companies charge expenditures relating to this item in its
PPT Returns despite the FIRS opposition to this treatment. We have
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reviewed the relevant laws (Associated gas Re-injection Act). We believe
that the expenditure is a genuine business charge; nevertheless, there is
considerable doubts as to whether it should be a deduction under PPT. The
alternative is that it could be an allowable charge against gas income, since
it can be distinctly separated from oil cost (2004 NEITI Report, p.39).
The auditors use the Associated Gas Re-injection Act to demonstrate professional scepticism
and highlight the credibility of both the information and the auditors. The use of “we believe”
also supports authoritative power to apply and interpret the law.

In the 2005 NEITI Report the auditors provide a comprehensive discussion of the interaction
between the PPT Act 1959 and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 2000. It provides
a justification of the “highly significant” amounts of underpaid PPT and royalties of
US$333,603,278.34 from the companies to the Nigerian government. The use of an intertextual
dialogue gives the impression that the “problem”, arising from different interpretations, is
solved by the auditors. However, this would not resolve the issue of different interpretation as
long as there is no agreed authoritative agency that can provide a uniform interpretation of the
law. In addition, the intertextual references allow the auditors to shift responsibility for the
differences in cash flows to that of different interpretations of the tax laws related to FIRS.
Further, the auditors use intertextuality to justify the significant cash-flow differences from the
investment tax allowances using the Company Income Tax Act (CITA), PPT Act and the 1998
Federal government budget, and the Associated gas Re-injection Act is used to justify the
differences in the amount of Gas Flare Penalties.

The reference to legislation is a common feature in all NEITI reports. For example, to justify
the basis for creating the NEITI reports, the EITI Standard is used in the following example
from the 2018 NEITI Report (p.12):
The Report, prepared in line with the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) Standard 2019 and the NEITI Act 2007....
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These examples demonstrate the use of intertextuality as a form of rhetoric in the NEITI
reports to provide credibility.

Identifying intertextuality within public texts such as NEITI reports assists in: decoding the
purpose these texts serve; understanding the discursive meaning of NEITI; reflecting and
creating certain social orders, such as legitimising NEITI’s reporting mechanism. Studies
critically examining public texts and the use of intertextuality as a rhetorical device is common
in the accounting literature. For example, in studying Shell’s response letter regarding oil spills
in Nigeria, Pupovac and Moerman (2017, 1189) explored intertextuality “as a method to decode the response letter as little more than a public relations (media) spectacle in which Shell
as a virtual global corporation is the authors of their own progress and evolution”. Similar to
Pupovac and Moerman’s (2017) findings, the above intertextual analysis demonstrates how
NEITI are using other texts, especially legal texts, to write their own version of transparency
and accountability through the production of NEITI reports.

7.3 Qualitative Characteristics
Section 7.2 provided an analysis of text in terms of its rhetorical components, how meaning is
created and how the intended message is embedded in the text. In addition, the information
provided to the auditors to prepare NEITI reports is also of interest in relation to claims about
the quality of information in the reports and their impact on the concept of transparency and
accountability. Several processes are embedded in the NEITI process. For example, in the 2017
NEITI Report (p.18) the process of Quality Data Assurance aimed to:
i. Review the legal and institutional framework or requirement(s) that
support data quality and assurance in Nigeria;
ii. Assess the compliance with laid down data assurance procedure by the
covered entities in Nigeria;
iii. Evaluate of the quality, comprehensiveness, and reliability of data
collected and utilised; and
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iv. Review the compliance level of the preceding year’s recommendation.
The IASB reinforce the idea that the quality of disclosure is more important than its quantity
through the conceptual framework’s focus on the qualitative characteristics of financial
reporting (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019). While NEITI does not report in the same
manner, its spectators are similar to the users identified by the IASB as those relying on
publicly available information. Therefore, the following analysis uses the characteristics of
timeliness, materiality, completeness, verifiability and accuracy in relation to NEITI reports.
7.3.1 Timeliness
In accounting, timeliness means information is available to users of financial information
within a sufficient period to assist in decision-making. It is generally understood that the longer
it takes to make this information available, the less valuable it is in terms of relevance to
stakeholders (IASB38 2010). While the EITI Standard permits a delay of two years, the NEITI
Act 2007 (the Act) allows only six months to conduct and publish the NEITI report following
the end of the financial year. Further, the auditors of the 2008 NEITI Report recommended that
NEITI should publish its annual reports within eight months of the end of each year. This
recommendation was reinforced by the 2013 NEITI Report (p.19), which states that “the report
[be] published annually alongside contextual information on the extractive industry”. Table 7.2
confirms a constant time lag in publishing NEITI reports that affects the timeliness, and
therefore the quality, of this information.

38

The definitions of timeliness, materiality and completeness are adopted from IASB 2010. These definitions
are not adopted from IASB 2019, as all NEITI reports up to 2018 are within the period when IASB 2010 was
applied.
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Table 7.2: NEITI reports publication dates
NEITI report

Period covered

Publication date

Delay

2004

1999-2004

August 2006

2 years for 2004

2005

2005

October 2008

3 years

2008
2011
2012

2006-2008
2009-2011
2012

July 2011
December 2012
March 2015

3-5 years
1-3 years
3 years

2013

2013

September 2015

2 years

2014

2014

December 2016

2 years

2015
2016
2017
2018

2015
2016
2017
2018

December 2017
January 2019
November 2019
March 2020

2 years
3 years
Around 3 years
2 years

In the 2004 NEITI Report (p.5) it is stated that “[t]he extent of reconciliation work required of
companies is considerable and has not been completed in the timeframe of this review”. This
indicates that even during the audit there was a delay in providing and reconciling information.
Further, the 2005 NEITI Report was not published until October 2008 and is available only on
the NEITI website as “Financial Report: Confidential Draft”. Taking into consideration that
transparency is one of the main goals of NEITI, it is difficult to understand why the report is
confidential, given that a considerable amount of time has elapsed. Again, this delay in
presenting information to the NSWG and making it publicly available affects the usefulness
and relevance of the information. The delay also hinders the ability of the interested parties,
such as the government, the parliament and CSOs, to take the necessary measures to identify
misconduct and trace anomalous, missing or unreconciled funding and payments. The delay
also applies to the appointment of auditors. For example, for the period of 2009-2011 the
appointment was made in March 2012, a delay of three years even to appoint the auditors who
are to conduct the audit for the year 2009 and two years for the year 2010.
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7.3.2 Materiality
In accounting, if omitting or misstating financial information causes users of financial reports
to alter their decisions, this information is classified as material (IASB 2010). The NEITI
reports conclude that the level of discrepancies and unreconciled payments in the financial
flows is within the accepted materiality threshold. The unreconciled payment differences
referred to previously represent the difference between what the Central Bank received and the
companies paid. The NSWG considers any payment or receipt of an amount in excess of
US$100 million to be material, while a net difference of US$5 million or less must be reported
but does not require further investigation. In addition, the NSWG determined the acceptable
margin of error for aggregate financial flows as 0.5% of the total value. However, there are
many areas of concern. For example, some NEITI reports use ambiguous language that
provides an opportunity for different interpretations and extends the acceptable practice for
determining materiality levels:
In the event that the aggregate value of the collective discrepancies, within
any individual financial flow, is in excess of US$100,000,000 (for core EITI
Report and US$5,000,000 for EITI + + Report), further investigation of such
discrepancies shall be required, utilizing best efforts to understand and
resolve such discrepancies satisfactorily (2011 NEITI Report, p.28).
This is the only time the EITI ++ report is mentioned, and no definition or explanation is given
as to its purpose or how it differs from other NEITI reports. Second, to conduct further
investigation, the reference to best efforts is not specified and there are no clear rules to
determine whether these efforts have been met.

Further, there is a trend of unreconciled differences throughout the NEITI reports. For example,
in the 2008 NEITI Report it was stated that the unresolved differences in royalty, signature
bonus and other oil/gas sector-specific flows are US$701.1 million for 2006, US$99.9 million
for 2007 and US$116.1 million for 2008. These amounts were reported in the 2008 NEITI
Report without any comment on the nature and cause of these discrepancies, their materiality
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or appropriate recommendations to resolve the differences. Additionally, the 2011 NEITI
report lists around US$3 billion of under-assessments in relation to PPT validation, of which
only US$442 million was paid by companies after the 2008 NEITI Report, and when they
communicated to pay the rest the “majority objected and have forwarded the matter to their
legal teams” (2011 NEITI Report, p.19). Furthermore, “[s]ignificant Royalty under assessment
arising from cost recoveries in Carry Agreements by JV partners need[s] to be reassessed by
DPR”; as late as the 2009-2011 report the reconciliation of these amounts had still not been
provided (2011 NEITI Report, p.19).

In addition to the above, the reconciliation of the sale of Federation export crude oil and
gas/feedstock in the 2012 NEITI Report revealed an unexplained difference of US$589.263
million in the NNPC accounts. Again, the amounts are material, and there is no
recommendation about how to deal with these unexplained differences. This trend further
continues in the 2014 NEITI Report, where a cumulative amount of US$14.34 billion related
to NLNG dividends received by the NNPC at the end of 2014 was not remitted to the Federation
account. This practice by the NNPC is a regular occurrence, based on its description in the
report as “recurring”. It is recommended that this practice be investigated; however, no sanction
is applied. For the 2015 NEITI audit the NSWG confirms that “all material companies provided
data as required” to conduct the reconciliation (2015 NEITI Report, p.21-22). This is supported
by the auditors’ opinion that the information presented in this report is “complete” and
“comprehensive” (2015 NEITI Report, p.22). They also consider the information to be a “true
and fair representation” of the payments in the oil and gas sector. Finally, they deem the
information to be free from material error because there is “nil difference in the payments”
(2015 NEITI Report, p.22). However, only 86.67% of the companies provided their audited
financial statements, and 14 out of 30 companies provided a letter of attestation.
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There are many examples of unreconciled amounts in the 2015 NEITI Report. For example, an
analysis of the company-level financial flows shows a total unreconciled difference of
US$28,499,426, which is attributed to differences in signature bonuses, education taxes,
pipeline transportation fees and NDDC levies. Nonetheless, “the NSWG is satisfied with the
comprehensiveness and reliability of the reconciled financial data as sufficient for the purpose
of the EITI process” (2015 NEITI Report, p.25). Similar issues are experienced in the latest
reports, such as the 2018 NEITI Report, in which “[t]otal company level financial flows stood
at US$16.639 billion – out of which US$15.431 billion (92.74%) was reconciled, while
US$1,208 billion (7.26%) was unilaterally disclosed” (2018 NEITI Report, p.64). This
disclosure calls into question the reliability of the information, as it is not reconciled, as well
as whether the amounts are material or not.
7.3.3 Completeness, verifiability and accuracy
Completeness refers to the characteristics of faithful representation, the second fundamental
qualitative characteristic of financial information. To be described as complete, “all
information necessary for a user to understand the phenomenon being depicted, including all
necessary descriptions and explanations” (IASB 2010, p.18) must be present. In contrast,
verifiability can be achieved through direct observation of data or by indirect data-checking
against a specific formula or model. Several examples of incomplete and unverified
information in the NEITI reports show that the completeness, verifiability and accuracy of the
information presented in the NEITI reports is compromised. For example, to “validate the
completeness and correctness of all underlying calculative practices of PPT and Royalty
payments to Federal Government” (2004 NEITI Report, p.30), the auditors reconcile the
amounts in the PPT returns reports with the costs reported in financial statements of selected
companies. This approach was adopted on the assumption that the external audited financial
statements provide reliable information.
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The annual financial statements of companies should however provide a
reliable basis for confirmation of costs incurred, as they are subject to
external audit (either audit of joint venture accounts, or of company accounts
or both) whereas the PPT returns were not systematically audited by FIRS
in the period under review (2005 NEITI Report, p.25).
This means that the auditors do not apply professional scepticism: the company financial flows
are reconciled against the information provided by the government agencies without further
investigation. For example, the 2004 NEITI Report (p.5) states, “Companies have not signed
off the reports on PPT and Royalty assessments because of the nature and extent of
disagreements and the incomplete discussions and examination of the reasons for differences.”
This means that information is not validated, verified or completed, which may compromise
the completeness and accuracy of the results obtained in NEITI reports.

Further, the audit methodology in the 2004 NEITI Report (p.9) indicates that:
[o]ur work did not extend to reviewing all payments received by nor all
payments made by each entity. If payments were made but omitted from the
submitted templates of both the payer and the payee, our work was
insufficient to detect them.
This statement represents a major flaw in the audit: there is no mechanism to inspect payments
if they are omitted from both sides of the transaction. This again raises concerns about the
completeness and accuracy of the financial information. This problem is also evident in all
subsequent NEITI reports.

In the 2005 NEITI Report, the problem of completeness and accuracy of information is more
prevalent. For example, it reports on the amounts of cash flows that have not been validated
plus the amount of differences that have not been justified, such as: “[t]he amounts of Taxation
and other flows from companies are confirmed subject to a net difference of US$155,702,000”
(2005 NEITI Report, p.8). In addition, cash flows that have not been confirmed include a
company income tax receipt of around US$55,595,000; a net difference for petroleum profit
tax of US$241,871,000; a difference in reserves additional bonus of US$65,292,000 and
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unreconciled difference of US$327,521,406.88; and a difference in royalty computation of
US$327,521,406.88 (2005 NEITI Report). All these unreconciled differences result from the
inability of the auditors to obtain the required information from the covered entities, especially
the government agencies as specified by the auditors.

Further, much of the required work regarding the reconciliation of financial flows in the 2011
NEITI Report was intended to be documented and published in a separate report, the Non-Core
EITI report. For example, “a detailed review of all the MCA39 arrangement is in progress and
will be reported in the Non-Core EITI Report” (2011 NEITI Report, p.11). In addition, the
report states that “[f]urther validations are being conducted on subsidy payment transactions
during the period under review. The outcome will form part of the non-core EITI report” (2011
NEITI Report, p.15). However, even today the Non-Core EITI report is not available on the
NEITI website; nor there is any information whether this report has been completed or
published. Further, an amount of more than US$10 billion related to PPT collection that had
been expected to be validated in the 2011 Non-Core EITI Report was not, in fact, validated by
the CBN. The issue of information accuracy and verifiability is further evident in the latest
reports:
A deviation we observed from the covered entities (mainly government
MDAs) that the financial regulations requirement to have accounts of all
government agencies doing business audited six months at the latest after a
preceding year has not been adhered to (2017 NEITI Report, p.19).
This means that the financial information from the government Ministries, Departments and
Agencies (MDA) has not been verified prior to submitting the NEITI reports to the preparers
(auditors). In addition, the word “DRAFT” appears as a watermark on the pages of 2017 NEITI
report, which casts doubts on the accuracy and completeness of its information.

39

The Modified Carry Arrangement is an alternative funding arrangement in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.
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Another issue that affects the completeness of information in the reports arises from
government agencies’ lack of cooperation in sharing information. For example, serious
incomplete record-keeping by FIRS in relation to payments concerning both PPT and the
Education Tax administered by FIRS in the 2004 NEITI Report is evident. FIRS did not
cooperate with NEITI to provide the required information.

In addition, the NNPC expresses concern about the completeness of the financial information.
For example, when discussing unresolved differences from the previous audit in the 2012
NEITI Report (p.26) it is stated that “[f]urther information about arrears due or payable by the
NNPC, if any, could not be obtained”. This shows a lack of cooperation from the NNPC to
solve unreconciled financial flows. Further, in the course of the audit of the 2014 NEITI Report,
the “NNPC did not provide further explanation of the other miscellaneous receipts totalling
$986.775 Million” in addition to another amount of US$19.723 million that was classified as
insurance (2014 NEITI Report, p.88). However, the recommendation was only that the “NNPC
is to provide further details and relevant source documents with respect to the transactions
classified as miscellaneous Lodgements to enable further reconciliations and validations to be
carried out in future audits” (2014 NEITI Report, p.88). Another example of a government
agency that does not cooperate in sharing information with NEITI is NIMASA40. The financial
flows received by NIMASA as disclosed by entities covered in the 2013 audit amounted to
US$164,945,000. However, “these payments could not be traced to NIMASA’s records” (2013
NEITI Report, p.165). Furthermore, CBN refused to provide information about a difference of

The National Petroleum Investment Management Services is a government agency that, although “charged with
the administration of Cabotage Act did not provide information on the actual Cabotage levy collection from Oil
and Gas sector” (2013 NEITI Report, p.46).
40
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more than US$37 million between NESS41 collections computed from its bank statement and
those that CBN reported to NEITI. This demonstrates a lack of cooperation from government
agencies and the effect on the completeness, and thus the credibility, of information. This also
poses a challenge to the concepts of transparency and accountability.

41

The Nigeria Export Supervision Scheme (NESS) Fee is a “statutory payment to the Federal Government on all
legitimate goods which include payments for crude oil and it derivatives and payments for non-oil goods” (2013
NEITI report, p.165).
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7.4 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, the NEITI reports were analysed to determine their textual and rhetorical
features and assess the qualitative characteristics of information provided. The analysis was
conducted at a micro-word level and a rhetorical level to determine the discursive features and
potential messages embedded throughout the reports. The reports reveal a formal, neutral and
technical language that is consistent with an audit report through the use of accounting jargon
and vocabulary. The text analysis reveals that pronouns such as “we”, terms such as “should”
and “recommend”, the use of passive and active voice and intertextuality were used to achieve
certain outcomes. These outcomes include highlighting the auditors’ significant contribution,
emphasising the authoritative position of the auditors and indicating the credibility of the
information presented in the reports. In addition, the analysis at this level demonstrates how
the language is used to shift the responsibility for incomplete work away from the auditors and
distance them from its consequences.

While the objective of the reports is to provide comprehensive reconciliation of extractiveindustry financial flows in Nigeria, the analysis raises some concerns about the quality of the
information in terms of its timeliness, completeness, accuracy and credibility. In conclusion,
while the formal accounting professional language conveyed a sense of credible and transparent
information, the reports reveal several deficiencies that affect the objectives of NEITI in
promoting transparency and accountability. This corresponds with Clegg and Kornberger
(2015)’s approach to visualisation techniques such as grammatical means, rhetorical devices
and terminologies, through which meaning takes strategic power and becomes visible. This
also resembles the power of the spectacle that makes certain things visible at the expense of
others and contributes to the dominance of certain social settings.

162

At this initial level of analysis, the use of rhetorical language to reinforce the concept of
transparency and to shift and assign responsibility was made visible. The process of validating
transparency and its links to accountability continues in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8: Valuation
8.1 Introduction
Cope and Kalantis (1993) argue that texts differ according to the purpose of their authors and
the objectives they intend to achieve. Several studies have demonstrated that each text is
characterised by specific features that reflect purpose and help readers to comprehend the
content, recall details and understand its message (Marzban & Seifi 2013; van Dijk 1999;
Wegner & Bartlett 2009). The features include features such as text type, text layout/design,
topic development and pictorial representations. These text structures direct ideas and organise
the coherence of a text, as well as associating it with a specific genre (Akhondi, Malayeri, &
Abd Samad 2011; Armbruster 2004). Text structure can be classified into two broad categories:
factual (or expository) text and literary or (narrative text) (Marzban & Seifi 2013; Pike &
Mumper 2004). While literary text aims to entertain or to create an emotional response, factual
text is designed to provide information, explain and classify a phenomenon or persuade the
reader of certain ideas (Pike & Mumper 2004).

The NEITI reports are an example of factual, persuasive, expository texts that present
reconciled financial flows to ensure transparency and accountability in the Nigerian extractive
industry. According to Meyer (1985), there are five types of written exposition: description,
sequence, comparison, problem-solution and cause and effect. Expository texts aim to inform
readers:
by presenting facts and ideas in direct and concise language; it usually relies
less on colorful or figurative language…. Exposition is aimed at the readers’
understanding rather than at their imagination or emotions; it is a sharing of
the writer’s knowledge…. Because it is the most effective form of discourse
for explaining difficult subjects, exposition is widely used in reports,
memos, and other types of technical writing (Alred, Brusaw & Oliu 2009,
p.182).
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Works within a specific text genre exhibit consistent structural and linguistic features (van Dijk
1999). For example, Young (2003, p.622) argues that accounting standards “follow similar
formats of presentation and are written in similar styles; each of these also have persuasive
effects that build and compound one upon the other as standard after standard after standard is
issued”. Therefore, there are many ways to analyse the structure of texts. The analysis may
involve analysing their physical shape and classification techniques, including: the difference
in topics, logical grouping techniques; the number of chapters, sub-chapters, paragraphs, subparagraphs; and whether font size reflects the importance of their topics (Dynock & Nicholson
2007; Saunders-Smith 2009). Consequently, the following analysis takes into consideration
both the physical and logical aspects of NEITI reports: title of the report, cover page, table of
contents, index, photos, captions, diagrams, charts, maps, graphs, glossary and headings and
sub-headings. This level of analysis represents the links between the text and the context,
identifying what is visible, valuable and credible, prior to mobilising the concepts of
transparency and accountability to a wider audience of spectators. Table 8.1 demonstrates this
level of analysis.
Table 8.1: Valuation level of analysis

Analysis
of the text
structure

Lexical fields
Topic development
Macrostructure
Text strategies/text functions
Text type

Visual text
structure

Layout/design
Typography
Text-picture relations
Materiality/text carrier
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Examples
Cover/title page
Table of contents
List of appendices
Letters of engagement
Executive summary
Introduction
Audit methodology
Statistical/numerical
modelling
Tables and charts

8.2 Structure
According to Lannon (2005) a formal report should answer three questions: how is the
information presented in the report, what conclusions can be drawn and what future
recommendations should be applied? Therefore, the clarity of the information, its logical and
physical structure and visual aids are important features. A professional report usually contains
sections such as a title page, table of contents, glossary and abbreviations, executive summary,
introduction, method, body, results/findings, discussion, conclusion and appendices (Brick
2011). The NEITI reports are professional, audited reports, as evident in their structure,
presentation and language. While all NEITI reports contain an introduction, table of contents
and executive summary, other sections, such as a list of abbreviations and acronyms, list of
tables, table of exchange rates and list of figures, only appear following the 2008 NEITI Report.
Therefore, the length and comprehensiveness42 differs from report to report. For example, the
list of abbreviations and acronyms in the 2012 NEITI Report is six pages long, while that in
the 2013 NEITI Report extends to 10 pages, indicating an increase in the number of entities,
legislation and professional jargon used.

Prior to the 2011 NEITI Report, NEITI only reported on the oil and gas sector and consisted of
financial audits. From the 2011 NEITI Report, separate mining reports were introduced. Since
the 2012 NEITI Report, the reports contain financial, process and physical audit sections. While
this reflects the development of the audit process, at the same time it demonstrates an
inconsistency in the report content and structure.

From the 2011 NEITI Report the title, headings and tables are provided in green. Green is a
national colour of Nigeria and is at the core of the Nigerian flag, representing the natural wealth
of the country (CIA World Factbook 2019). This rhetorical device of “imagery” is an example

42

In this thesis, “comprehensiveness” means the ability to present all aspects of a subject matter.
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of an ethos and pathos strategy, addressing national significance in terms of authority and
emotion (Harris, 2002). While the pathos appeal is rarely used in reports, ethos and logos
strategies are evident in the use of authoritative, legal and professional devices and a formal,
logical, neutral diction. According to Young (2003), the specific choices of text structures such
as sections, sub-sections, paragraphs and titles creates an intended response, legitimises
specific ideas and authorises the text and its producers. In this case, the use of textual features
in NEITI reports enhances the credibility of its information and its producers, as well as
supporting a perception of a legitimate, audited report.

8.2.1 Cover/title page
A formal report informs the reader about the topic through the title and the choice of visual
aids. In addition, the cover page specifies the name of the author, the name of the organisation
and the target audience (Blicq & Moretto 2004). The cover/title pages of the NEITI reports
specify the nature and time-frame addressed in the reports. These titles are both informative
and descriptive, and have changed with every report. For example, the title of the 2011 NEITI
Report is “Financial Audit: An Independent Report Assessing and Reconciling Financial Flows
within Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry – 2009 to 2011”. The use of the word “independent”
emphasises the objectiveness of the auditors and enhances the credibility of the information.
Further, the title reveals the objective of the report: to reconcile the financial flows in Nigeria’s
oil and gas industry for 2009-2011. In contrast, the 2016 NEITI Report is titled “2016 Oil &
Gas Industry Audit Report”; the title stresses the term “audit” to enhance the credibility of the
information. Thus, the title of the NEITI reports reflects the effective use of the qualities of a
good title: to set the tone of a report, reflect its content and attract the interest of its audience
(Hairston & Keene 2003). For the majority of NEITI reports the auditor’s name is positioned
directly after the title, accompanied by a logo, address and contact details.

167

The specified target audience is the governing body of NEITI, the NSWG. It represents
different interest groups including representatives of the Nigerian government (Federal and
State), media, CSOs and representatives of companies in the sector. The role of the NSWG, the
nature of its composition and the fact that it presents NEITI reports to the Nigerian National
Assembly heighten the sense of the information’s verifiability and credibility.

Because the auditors are rotated on a timely basis, currently every two years, the NSWG has
appointed several accounting and financial consultancy firms to conduct the reports. For
example, the British accounting firm Hart Group produced the first three NEITI reports (2004,
2005 and 2008), in association with a Nigerian domestic firm, SS Afemikhe Consulting (Ltd)
on behalf of NEITI. The Hart Group is a well-known international accounting consultancy firm
that has a long record of experience in the international extractive industry. The company was
founded in the United Kingdom in 1988 to provide:
a range of cross-cutting services, in the fields of: Technical and Financial
Audit; Human resource development and training; Institutional
development; Project management and monitoring; Assurance reporting on
public information (Hart Group 2018, np).
SS Afemikhe Consulting (Ltd) is a professional-services consultancy firm with headquarters
in Lagos, Nigeria. The company provides independent financial and management consulting
services (SS Afemikhe Consulting 2018).
For the 2011 NEITI Report, new auditors were appointed from a Nigerian accounting and
consulting firm, Sada, Idris & Co. Chartered Accountants (Sada, Idris & Co.). This firm was
established over 25 years ago as wholly owned domestic firm to provide “audit, accounting,
assurance, taxation and management consultancy services to Federal Government Agencies”
in Nigeria (Sada, Idris & Co. 2019, np). In addition, the auditor of the 2012 and 2013 NEITI
Reports is Taju Audu & Co., “a member of TGS Global Network, an international network of
professional business advisors. TGS Global Network spreads to ““Thirty Nine [sic]” (39)
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Countries and more than Ninety (90) Offices around the World” (Taju Audu & Co. 2016, np).
It is important to note that Taju Audu & Co. provides its accounting and business consultancy
services in Nigeria “for organizations in the Public Sector including Federal Ministry of
Finance, Central Bank of Nigeria” and many other government agencies such as the Federal
Inland Revenue Service (Taju Audu & Co. 2016, np). Many of these public organisations are
leading government agencies in the oil and gas sector or agencies that deal directly with the
financial flows from this sector. This represents a self-review, advocacy and intimidation threat
for auditor independence, as they may be auditing work that they performed previously for
government agencies or they may have special interests and relations with some of these
agencies due to previous or possible future business relations (Moroney, Campbell, &
Hamilton 2014).

Finally, SIAO conducted the 2014 and 2017 NEITI Reports, Haruna Yahaya & Co. conducted
the 2015 and 2016 NEITI Reports and Adeshile Adedeji & Co., (Chartered Accountants)
conducted the 2018 NEITI Report. These firms, all of which are Nigerian, are among the top
accountancy firms in Nigeria (Haruna Yahaya & Co. 2019).

The auditor logos on the cover page are an ethos device that enhances the credibility of the
information and depicts a verifiable, credible and authoritative “badge” or “stamp”. In addition,
the NEITI logo is placed at the centre top of the cover page to identify the topic. The legitimacy
of NEITI is derived from its international acceptance and advocacy and from the NEITI Act
2007 (the Act); since the 2011 NEITI Report, the Seal of the President of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria has also appeared on the cover page to authenticate authoritative power. Further,
on the cover page of the 2014 NEITI Report onwards, the auditors’ logo is superimposed on
an image of an offshore oil platform.
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In addition, a slogan, “Promoting Transparency, Enabling Prosperity”, was introduced on the
cover page from the 2012 NEITI Report onwards. This slogan signifies the central thesis 43 of
NEITI reports and acts as a pathos device to evoke an emotional response by the use of a
thriller44 frame. The “Promoting Transparency, Enabling Prosperity” slogan links the ideal of
transparency, envisioned through the NEITI reporting process, to the achievement of prosperity
in Nigeria. This relationship between transparency and prosperity is explained further in the
body of the reports. For example, NEITI is identified as a tool to fight the resource curse and
corruption. However, the narrow scope of transparency (Chapter 7 and Chapter 9) and the
questionable quality of data (as discussed in Chapter 7) renders the slogan a mere cliché from
overuse and exhausted novelty (Harris, 2002).

To reinforce and consolidate the credibility and verifiability of the information, NEITI, its logo,
the names of the auditors and their logos, in addition to the Seal of the President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria are used in the headers and footers of all NEITI reports. To enhance further
the traits of verifiability, authority and credibility, the following warning is placed on the inside
of cover page of the majority of NEITI reports:
The report and all appendices relating to the report are intended for the use
of the National Stakeholder Working Group of the NEITI for the purpose of
that initiative and are not to be relied upon by other parties (2004 NEITI
Report).
While the stated intended audience is the NSWG, the fourth and fifth EITI principles clearly
identify the general public as targeted spectators as well. This contradiction raises questions
about public accountability. From the 2011 NEITI Report onward, the following statement is
included: “any reliance placed upon them by third parties shall be in accordance with the NEITI
Act of 2007” (2011 NEITI Report, p.iv). Section 4(3) of the Act states that:

43
44

A thesis is a central idea around which the main argument is built (Harris 2002).
A thriller is a sentence that evokes excitement and suspense in the reader (Harris 2002).
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[u]pon the completion of an audit, the independent auditors shall submit the
reports together with comments of the Extractive Industries Company to the
NEITI, which shall cause same to be disseminated to the National Assembly
and the Auditor-General of the Federation and also ensure their publication.
The idea of the public as spectators is reinforced in the legislation, as the Nigerian democratic
system of government follows the principle of accountability to citizens. Finally, the publisher
of the 2012 NEITI Report is the NEITI Secretariat, which gives the report the authoritative
power of the Act and a level of social acceptance as a mechanism to fight corruption and the
resource curse in the country.
8.2.2 Table of contents
Like most reports that exceed 10 pages, NEITI reports include a table of contents (Brick 2011).
Because the table of contents of the 2004 NEITI Report is similar across all reports, this
analysis is largely confined to the initial NEITI report to avoid repetition. A table of contents
introduces the topics covered in a report and provides an overview of its structure and the
ordering of information (Blicq & Moretto 2004). The numbering in the table of contents of the
NEITI reports is cascading, as shown in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Table of contents – 2004 NEITI Report
The level of detail of the table of contents, as reflected by its length, varies, ranging between
two pages, such as in the 2011 NEITI Report, to four pages, such in the 2016 NEITI Report.
While it is very detailed and comprehensive in most NEITI reports, only eight items are
addressed in the 2008 NEITI Report (Figure 8.2).
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Figure 8.2: Table of contents (2008 NEITI Report, np)

The most common sections in the table of contents include: preface; executive summary;
introduction and scope of this report; audit methodology; aggregate financial flows to the
federation; disaggregated financial flows to the federation, observations on tax-related financial
flows; validation of PPT computations; non-oil related flows; proceeds of sale of crude oil;
cash calls; gas sales proceeds; payments to NDDC; signature bonus on licensing; reserves
additional bonus; capital financing – NLNG; and company representations. The arrangement
of the terms moves from general to specific to give the report coherence and to integrate its
various parts. The subsequent reports reveal additional and distinguishing features. For
example, the 2005 NEITI Report includes a detailed analysis of company-level PPT and royalty
issues.

8.2.3 List of appendices
The 2004 NEITI Report also includes a list of appendices numbered in a cascading manner
(Figure 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: Extract of list of appendices – 2004 NEITI Report (p.4)

While a list of appendices signifies a formal report, in some NEITI reports the appendices are
completely or partially unavailable. For example, appendices for the 2005 NEITI Report are
unavailable on either the NEITI website or the international EITI website, both of which are
supposed to make them publicly unavailable. This contradicts the principle of transparency,
especially when important information, such as the terms of reference, the audit methodology
and the primary data from MNCs and government entities, is not available. The list of
appendices in the 2004 NEITI Report (Figure 8.3) is followed by a preface that specifies the
content of the report and identifies the auditors of the report, the audience, the period covered
and the cut-off date to receive information. This rhetorical strategy of repetition or tautology45
is to draw the reader’s attention to the key players in relation to the report’s production,
message and distribution.

45

A tautology is the repetition of a term’s meaning using different words (Hamilton 2007).
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8.2.4 Letters of engagement
A letter of engagement is a document that clarifies expectations on both sides of an agreement
by describing its terms and scope. Beginning with the 2005 NEITI Report, the letter of
engagement has been included; for example, “We have performed the procedures agreed with
you, in accordance with our engagement terms dated 15th March 2005” (2005 NEITI Report,
p.5). Although it is stated that the terms of engagement are attached to the report, these are not
publicly available46. From 2007, the auditors are appointed by the NSWG according to the
provisions of the Act to conduct a “reconciliation” or “engagement”. In the 2012 NEITI Report
(p.2) the engagement letter specifies that the audit is conducted “in accordance with the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on Related Services applicable to agreedupon procedures engagements”. The IFRS on Related Services provides standardised guidance
for performing an agreed-upon procedure regarding financial information. The auditors
perform the audit and report their findings without assurance, as the responsibility to draw
conclusions is upon the users of the report (IFAC 2010). Therefore, the reports do not represent
audited reports in accordance with international accounting standards. However, they do
provide findings about the extractive industry in Nigeria, which are used by the NSWG to draw
conclusions and take the required measures to enhance transparency and accountability.
The engagement letter reinforces that the audit is “not designed to constitute an audit or review
made in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA)” (2012 NEITI Report,
p.2), and the auditors “do not express any assurance on the transaction beyond the explicit
statement set out in this report” (2012 NEITI Report, p.2). The purpose of the 2013 NEITI
Report (p.20), for example, is to:
present in explicit terms the results of the review and validation of all
material payments and receipts associated with crude oil and gas as well as
the reconciliation of these payments made by participants in the oil and gas
46

No explanation is given for the missing terms of engagement.
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sector and government receipts of such payments in accordance with
International Auditing Standards and the Terms of Reference included in
Appendix 1.2.
Although NEITI reports are not formal audit reports by definition, the reference to IFRS on
“Related Services applicable to agreed-upon procedures engagements” and the International
Auditing Standards reinforces rigour and therefore transparency and accountability.

The content of the letter has not changed significantly since 2011. Further, in the 2011 NEITI
Report (p.iii) the letter “relates only to the subject matter specifically set out herein and does
not extend to any financial statements of any entity taken as a whole”. Therefore, NEITI does
not conduct work to confirm the credibility of information presented in the financial statements
of the covered entities. Nevertheless, the use of a letter of engagement, along with other
structural features, gives an impression of assurance and legal authority.

8.2.5 Executive summary
The use of an executive summary is a prevailing feature of report writing and helps to
distinguish its genre. This reflects the ability of the writing style and choice of linguistic and
structural features to convey specific meaning, credibility and professionalism (van Dijk 1999).
An executive summary establishes the fundamental aspects of a report, and:
it must accurately and concisely represent the original document. It should
restate the document’s purpose, scope, methods, findings, conclusions, and
recommendations, as well as summarize how results were obtained or the
reasons for the recommendations (Alred, Brusaw & Oliu 2009, p.181).
The features of a formal executive summary, which are similar to a concise and well-written
overview, include a purpose, a methodology, findings and a conclusion (Blake & Bly 1993;
Blicq & Moretto 2004; Pitkin & Branagan 1998). For example, the purpose of the 2004 NEITI
Report (p.3) is “to summarise, analyse and confirm the financial flows between the Federation
and the oil and gas industry in the years 1999 to 2004”. This objective is reiterated in the 2005
NEITI Report; albeit using slightly different wording. The executive summary also presents
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the financial flows to and from the Federation of Nigeria, the unreconciled payment
differences, an assessment of Petroleum Profits Tax (PPT) and the systems of internal control.

While all NEITI reports provide an executive summary, the content, length, structure and
purpose vary according to the auditor. For example, the executive summary of the 2012 NEITI
Report is 67 pages, which is longer than the entire 2008 NEITI Report. This poses questions
about the scope and quality of the earlier report, which includes three years of information in a
shorter space than the executive summary of the 2012 NEITI Report, which covers one year
only. This example also shows how authors cannot distance themselves from their texts, as
their voice is reflected in their choice of genre, style and textual devices (Mouck 1992). The
dominant genre identified for NEITI reports is an “audit report”.

8.2.6 Introduction
In a formal report, the introduction specifies the purpose and the scope of the report and sets
the stage for the reader by constructing a background (Blicq & Moretto 2004; Young 2003).
The introduction in all NEITI reports satisfies these features. For example, the introduction in
the 2004 NEITI Report introduces the technical scope of the audit, which is limited to the sales
of crude oil, PPT, royalties (gas and oil), gas flare penalties, general non-oil specific flows
(such as VAT, withholding tax and PAYE) and payments to the Niger Delta Development
Corporation (NDDC). In later reports, additional payments, such as the Companies Income Tax
(CIT), the Education Tax, signature bonuses, cash calls, concession rentals and subsidy
payments, are included. Once again, these payments represent cash transactions.

The scope of the reports also includes list of covered entities, including multinational
companies such as Royal Dutch Shell Nigeria, Chevron and Mobil and the local Nigerian
national petroleum company (NNPC). For example, the 2008 NEITI Report is representative
of what an introduction does in a formal report. It provides an overview of the extractive
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industry and government agencies involved, including the Department of Petroleum Resources
(DPR), the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), the Office of the Accountant General of
the Federation (OAGF), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC), NNPC, and the National Petroleum Investment Management Services
(NAPIMS). The role of the agencies includes, but not limited to, issuing regulation for the oil
and gas sector, monitoring the production and marketing of oil and gas, collecting taxes and
assessing government finances. In addition, private-sector arrangements include joint ventures,
production-sharing contracts (PSCs), sole-risk operations, unitisation agreements and marginal
fields. Since the NSWG has a direct and close professional relationship with these government
agencies and the private sector, this information is also directed to other users such as
international funding organisations.

While the content is similar, the amount of contextual material differs among the reports. For
example, the introduction of the 2005 NEITI Report is a mere two pages and only covers the
report’s purpose, scope and data sources. In contrast, the introduction of the 2017 NEITI Report
is 17 pages and provides a detailed description of the structure, historical overview, legal
framework, legislation and fiscal regimes in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. In addition, the
introduction of the 2017 NEITI Report contains the purpose, structure, data sources, basis of
accounting, materiality of reporting, methodology, data quality assurance, limitation,
recommendation and aggregate financial flows of the report, an overview of the industry reform
and highlights of oil and gas contribution to the economy. This difference in the level of detail
in the introduction reflects the size of the reports and the scope of their reconciliation.

Ethos and pathos techniques are used in the introduction to support the credibility of the
information and the authenticity and authoritative position of NEITI. For example, the
introduction of the 2011 NEITI Report (p.2) states:
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The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), through
the National Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG), continued its statutory
mandate of ensuring transparency and accountability of the oil and gas
industry in Nigeria by the appointment of Sada Idris & Co. (Chartered
Accountants) in March 2012, as Auditors for the 2009 – 2011 Oil and Gas
Industry audit.
In this example, the mission is a “statutory mandate” that implies the status and power of a
legal duty, a clear example of ethos appeal. Further, NEITI is given the authority of a legal
person that is responsible for ensuring transparency and accountability. While transparency
was an objective from inception, it is only with the 2011 NEITI Report that the term
“accountability” appears. By 2013, NEITI is described as an apparatus to fight corruption and
to ensure a fairer distribution of the revenues from extractive activities.
NEITI was also acknowledged as part of former president Obasanjo’s economic and political
work plan for the first time in the 2014 NEITI Report (p.14):
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo committed to EITI in November
2003 and launched Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(NEITI) in February 2004 as part of his overall economic reform
programme.
This is an example of use of pathos that demonstrates a commitment to achieve both political
and economic objectives and disseminate a discourse of fighting corruption and fostering
equality in wealth transfers from the industry to the government, and subsequently to the
citizens.

8.2.7 Audit methodology
The audit methodology, or mechanism of reconciliation for NEITI, is based on a cash-basis
system to comply with common accounting practice in Nigerian government departments. It
includes the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Prepare documentation of relevant systems
Submit data requests to Covered Entities
Covered Entities complete and return data collection templates
Verify template date
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5.
Reconcile transactions between Covered Entities
6.
Report reconciled financial flows
7.
Reconcile hydrocarbon volumes used for taxation and royalty
computations to findings of the Physical audit (2004 NEITI Report, p.9).
This use of a list simplifies and clarifies a process and is a common tool in report writing that
adds to the quality of understandability (Gerson & Gerson 2012). The auditing process alters
over the years; however, the core audit methodology remains. For example, the 2004 NEITI
Report reconciliation method presented in Figure 8.4 is comparable to the 2017 NEITI Report
in Figure 8.5. The use of a flowchart to explain the reconciliation process is based on the notion
that pictorial representations or images exhibit complex information in a visual and more
comprehensible manner (Lannon 2005).

Figure 8.4: The mechanism for NEITI reconciliation (2004 NEITI Report, p.10)

The later reports present the process in a more detailed manner to reflect the development of
auditing work.
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Figure 8.5: The mechanism for NEITI reconciliation (2017 NEITI Report, p.12)
Thus, “for any transaction, three comparisons are made: between records of the company,
records of the Central Bank and records of the respective regulatory agency” (2004 NEITI
Report, p.10). This includes reconciling payments and receipts of all oil-related and non-oilrelated flows from the sector and the proceeds of equity crude sales and gas sales between the
companies and the Nigerian government, represented by CBN. These main financial flows
include the sale of crude oil, PPT, royalties, gas-flare penalties, general non-oil-specific flows
(such as VAT, withholding tax and PAYE) and payments to the NDDC. The payments vary
slightly between reports, which makes it challenging to compare payments. For example, the
2008 NEITI Report includes extra financial flows such as signature bonuses and education
taxes. For each report, these payments represent the scope of the financial audit and are paid to
the CBN and deposited in a special account in JP Morgan, New York.

While the audit method is explained in detail in the 2004 NEITI Report, it is not explained in
the 2005 NEITI Report. Instead, the 2005 NEITI Report shows the “transactions and accounts
involved in the sale of oil and gas, the receipt of “moneys [sic]” and its subsequent transfer
either to the Federation account (highlighted) or its disposition to pay cash calls to the joint
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venture companies” (2005 NEITI Report, p.11). In terms of verification and accuracy, NEITI
indicates that:
[t]he audited financial statements obtained from all the covered entities
were reviewed to ensure that the populated templates are linked to the
financial statements and prepared in line with International Standards in
Auditing (IASs) (2011 NEITI Report, p.2).
One of NEITI audit assumptions is that “[t]he data and/or information to be received from the
covered entities are genuine and consistent” (2014 NEITI Report, p.17). However, the only
way to confirm this information is by direct comparison with the financial statements of the
covered entities. Many of these are not publicly available. In later NEITI reports, data
verification and accuracy are increased by expanding the scope of supporting documents
reviewed, including:
bank statements, audited financial statements, production reports, invoices
and receipts to ensure accuracy and completeness. In addition,… all policies
and procedures adopted in the preparation of financial statements by both
government and companies to ensure compliance with the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and other relevant extant laws
guiding the industry (NEITI report 2015, p.15-16).
Specifying the scope and the methodology is a common feature of an audit report (Gerson
& Gerson 2012) that attests to the professional authority represented by the auditors’
professional expertise. This indicates the development of the audit process of financial
flows and reconciliation combined with an increasing reliance on IFRS to develop the
qualities of completeness and accuracy. In addition, it is an appeal to the credibility of the
information and the auditing process and the involvement of government agencies and
international banks such as JP Morgan. Further, as part of the audit methodology of the
2016 NEITI Report, the auditors specify that:
we consulted past NEITI Reports, CBN 2016 Annual Reports, FAAC
Reports, NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin, records from Revenue
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, NBS data, DPR 2016
Annual report as well as third-party confirmations where necessary (2016
NEITI Report, p.15).
181

According to the NNPC (2019, np), the NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin is “the
annual version of the Monthly Petroleum Information (MPI) and includes an annual summary
of Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry activities”. In other words, it is an alternative to the corporate
annual report. There is no evidence that the NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin is subject to
external audit.
Although NNPC endeavours to ensure accuracy of information in these
documents, it cannot guarantee 100% accuracy nor can it be held liable for
errors that may occur. Users are to note that use of any information herein
is purely at their discretion (NNPC 2014, p.2).
The above information, in particular the statement about accuracy, may seriously compromise
the quality of information that NEITI reports. However, NEITI gives a certain level of
assurance about the quality of data provided by entities such as the NNPC. This is evident in
the 2013 NEITI Report (p.25):
It is in the opinion of the audit, that reconciled data reported by Government
Entities and Companies are reliable and consistent with the underline
records made available at the respective Entities. Appropriate
confidentiality agreements were also signed in order to safeguard
information provided by the companies.
This poses questions about the basis and reliability of assumptions, and ultimately effects the
overall quality of information presented.
8.2.8 The body of the report
In a formal report, the body section presents the findings, analyses the data and discusses the
evidence (Lannon 2005). The NEITI reports do not contain independent conclusions and
recommendation sections. However, in several reports a summary and recommendation follow
at the end of each chapter. Further, ordering is evident by moving from general aggregated
information to specific and detailed information. This is a common technique used in
organisational discourse to enhance the understandability of information (Sejnost & Thiese
2007). The dominant structural feature in the body of the reports is the extensive use of
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statistical and numerical modellings such as tabular representations and pictorial and graphical
devices.
The business model in Western society in general accepts “without question what is produced
by apparently scientific means and what is ‘technological’” (Winiecki 2008, p.186). Therefore,
organisational performance measurements using statistical or numerical modelling are often
used rhetorically, as they are regarded as a true, scientific, unquestionable, credible and valid
scientific apparatus to confirm specific organisational assumptions (Gephart 2006). These
statistical tools use numbers to achieve a level of control that is regarded as an essential feature
of contemporary neoliberal society (Gephart 2006). Because the production of organisational
statistics for performance measurement is a social process, the collection, analysis, presentation
and perception are affected by its social context (Gephart 2006).
The emerging literature in “ethnostatistics” or “qualitative study of quantitative processes”
provides a method (and methodology in some instances) to understand the presentation of
statistical information for spectators (Stephens, Heller & Chan 2014, p.745). While an in-depth
analysis is beyond the scope of the thesis, the following provides a basic understanding in the
context of the study. First, the study examines the social context in which data production is
situated, including who is producing the data for the statistics and their motivations, as this
affects the choice of what objects and criteria are measured (Boje, Gardner & Smith 2006;
Landrum & Boje 2008). In this case, the context is a highly contentious site of oil production
with strong evidence of the resource curse and its deleterious and unequal wealth distribution.
Extractive companies, the government and its agencies and the auditors as nominated
representatives supply the data. The stated objective is to provide transparency and
accountability in the industry; however, this has been challenged (Chapter 10). Second, the
study discusses the quantitative methods and the tools used to present the data as information
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and the assumptions and considerations that affect the choice of these methods (Stephens,
Heller & Chan 2014). For example, NEITI uses basic graphical and tabular representations to
elucidate information, illustrate the relationship between data, highlight and explain evidence,
summarise and simplify data and emphasise meanings and opinions. Third, the study examines
“the rhetorical practices used to affect the meanings assigned to numerical data, including the
labels and definitions used to talk about the statistics and their results” (Mills, Weatherbee, &
Colwell 2006, p.439). For example, the table of disaggregated differences in the 2004 NEITI
Report (p.26) details the individual items that gives rise to differences in financial flow. This
technique, especially the use of tables, is usually followed by the use of denotation: defining
strategies, techniques or accounts. This technique is used many times in NEITI reports to
inform the audience and subsequently enhance the usefulness or understandability of the
information.

Therefore, the statistical and numerical modellings help to simplify the information for readers
and assist the authors in creating a story to persuade an audience (Gerson & Gerson 2012). This
story, or the rhetorical meaning of a “logical” structure, denotes a logos appeal that highlights
a credible reporting genre and reliable, comparable and understandable information that
rhetorically enhances transparency. For example, a table summarises information, displays
dense quantitative data and allows readers to make accurate comparisons (Lannon 2005). For
example, Figure 8.647 compares the aggregate financial flows for the years between 2012 and
2016.

47

The tables presented in this section are not used to show specific amounts. Rather, they highlight how
statistical information and tables in general are used in a similar manner to the way they are used in formal
reports.
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Figure 8.6: A table to show aggregate financial flows 2012-2016 (2016 NEITI Report, p.26)

Another example of the use of tables to enhance understandability is the table in Figure 8.7,
which summarises the revenue from sales of crude oil and gas.

Figure 8.7: A table to summarise sales of crude oil and gas (2011 NEITI Report, p.7)
In the 2011 NEITI Report, the auditors provide the first comparison between current and
previous financial flows as shown in the following Figure 8.8.

Figure 8.8: A table to compare financial flows (2011 NEITI Report, p.5)
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This comparison reveals the comparability of the information generated by NEITI and how
NEITI can measure performance and compare it year after year. This shows that NEITI is using
the best practice to measure performance, which helps to highlight the credibility and
transparency of the information. Informal tables are also used for ease of understanding (Figure
8.9).

Figure 8.9: An informal table (2004 NEITI Report, p.7)
Tables also display discrepancies in the financial flow between the government agencies and
the companies (Figure 8.10).

Figure 8.10: A table to illustrate financial flow discrepancies (2004 NEITI Report, p.16)
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Furthermore, tables are used to validate the completeness and correctness of financial flows,
as in the case of royalties in Figure 8.11.

Figure 8.11: A table to illustrate Royalty financial flows (2004 NEITI Report, p.33)
In addition to tables, bar graphs, line graphs and flow charts serve different purposes in the
reports and they are used in this thesis to elaborate on the use of graphs and other visual media
rather than using their contents as part of the analysis. Bar graphs are:
commonly used to show (1) quantities of the same item at different times,
(2) quantities of different items at the same time, and (3) quantities of the
different parts of an item that make up a whole…can also show the
different portions of an item that make up the whole (Alred, Brusaw &
Oliu 2009, p.36).
For example, in the 2011 NEITI Report a bar chart is used to compare the revenues from sales
of crude oil, gas and feedstock during 2009-2011 (Figure 8.12).

Figure 8.12: Bar chart of crude oil, gas and feedstock (2011 NEITI Report, p.7)
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In another example, a line chart is used to compare the average domestic and export realised
crude sales price over the years 1999-2004 (Figure 8.13).

Figure 8.13: Line graph (2004 NEITI Report, p.53)

A line graph is a graph that illustrates the relationship between variables over time on two axes
(Lannon 2005). Further, the reports also use flowcharts (Figure 8.14).

Figure 8.14: Flowchart of the sales of government equity crude (2011 NEITI Report,
p.50)
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A flowchart “provides an overview of a process and allows the reader to identify its essential
steps quickly and easily” (Alred, Brusaw & Oliu 2009, p.192). Finally, pie charts are also a
common feature of the NEITI reports. Pie charts represent the proportion or percentage of a
part comparing to the whole (Tufte 2001). For example, Figure 8.15 illustrates oil theft as a
percentage of crude oil production in 2018.

Figure 8.15: Pie chart of oil theft (2018 NEITI Report, p.28)
An ethnostatistical analysis helps to explore the “(1) reduction of reality to data, (2) assignment
of data to categories and subjecting of these data to statistical analysis, and (3) use of statistics
as a form of rhetoric to ‘make things’ and ‘get things done’” (Winiecki 2008, p.204).
Therefore, ethnostatistics considers statistics to be a social process that reveals a “true” and
unquestionable measure of a phenomenon (Gephart 2006). In the case of NEITI, the use of
numerical and statistical modelling highlights its model of performance measures as best
practice in the extractive industry. Reports by their very nature suggest an objective and
verifiable disclosure of information for decision-making. This generation of reliable and
objective information is a form of rhetoric to “make transparency” and “get accountability
done”. In addition, the use of statistics confirms the genre of a formal audit report.
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8.3 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has discussed the structural features of the reports including the cover page,
preface, table of contents, list of appendices, executive summary, audit methodology and body
of the report. The analysis shows that the reports were constructed and structured to resemble
the genre of the formal report through the use of a formal language and a heavy reliance on
pictorial and graphical information. These structural features convey credibility and
completeness that reinforces the notion of transparency and understandability.
In the following chapter, the rhetorical features of the Act and the NEITI reports demonstrate
how the discourse of transparency and accountability is mobilised for an audience of spectators.
This will include examining the scope of both transparency and accountability as established
in the Act and the reports in addition to an analysis of the network of power between the major
actors in NEITI’s governing body, the NSWG.
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Chapter 9: Mobilisation
9.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the mobilisation level of analysis from Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015)
model (Chapter 6). To assess the ability of NEITI to mobilise transparency and accountability,
this chapter considers the scope of reporting and the quality of disclosures to generate informed
public debate. In addition, NEITI’s capacity to apply sanctions and hold the extractive
companies and the government to account is also considered. While the quality of information,
its scope, the result of NEITI’s reports and their structural features were analysed in Chapters
7 and 8, this chapter provides an examination of the NEITI Act 2007 (the Act) and the network
of power in NEITI multi-stakeholder group (NSWG). The analysis reveals how the discourse
of transparency and accountability is enacted and mobilised to shape the opinions of a wider
audience of spectators regarding the Nigerian extractive industry.
As addressing each section of the Act is not the objective of this thesis, only the sections that
deal with transparency and accountability are considered. Further, the chapter also focuses on
the sections of the Act that reveal the network of power between NEITI’s primary stakeholders.
This includes the sections that deal with establishing NEITI as an independent legal entity; set
the objectives and functions of NEITI; deal with creating the NSWG; describe its composition
and the network of power between stakeholders; and outline penalties and sanctions. The
analysis of the composition of the NSWG is of particular importance because it uncovers the
relationship between the government, CSOs and extractive companies. Table 9.1 is taken from
the analytical model of the thesis in Chapter 6.
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Table 9.1: Mobilisation level of analysis

Network of power
and control
analysis

Political context
Legal context

Political conditions in Nigeria
Legal conditions in Nigeria

Economic context

Economic conditions in Nigeria
Multinational corporations
Civil-society organisations
National Stakeholder Working Group
Auditors

Social context/social
actors

9.2 Establishing NEITI as an independent legal entity
While the NEITI bill was proposed in December of 2004, the 22 sections of the Act were not
approved and published until 2007 (NEITI 2018b). NEITI is established as a body corporate in
s.1:
(2) The NEITI:
(a) shall be an autonomous self-accounting body, which shall report to the
President and the National Assembly,
(b) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession with a common seal,
and
(c) may:
(i) sue and be sued in its corporate name, and
(ii) acquire, hold and dispose of movable and immovable properties
in the discharge of its functions under this Act.
This makes NEITI accountable to the Nigerian President and the National Assembly, and
ultimately to the Nigerian public through the National Assembly as its representative.
According to this section, NEITI can sue and be sued. In addition, s.16 lists various sanctions
that are applicable in different scenarios for violations of the Act. For example:
16.(1) An extractive industry company which
(a) gives false information or report to the Federal Government or its agency
regarding its volume or production, sales and income; or
(b) renders false statement of account of fails to render a statement of account
required under this Act to the Federal Government or its agencies,
resulting in the underpayment of non-payment of revenue accruable to
the Federal Government or statutory recipients commits an offence and
is liable on conviction to a fine not less than N30,000,000.
However, as Ihugba (2014) argues, the power to sue in s.1 of the Act refers only to the power
to initiate a civil prosecution, including NEITI’s ability to represent itself in defence against
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any civil or criminal actions. Accordingly, NEITI lacks the ability to enforce the Act through
the prosecution of individuals or entities that violate its provisions. The power to initiate a
criminal prosecution is with the Attorney General, and his or her legal representative. NEITI’s
lack of ability to enforce sanctions is therefore contradictory to the general opinion that the Act
converts NEITI from a voluntary into a mandatory initiative. To date, there are no reports of
MNCs or local extractive companies’ sanctions or legal proceedings, despite many breaches of
the Act. These breaches include discrepancies between the records of MNCs, government
entities, such as the NNPC, and the records of the government agencies responsible for
collecting revenues from the extractive sector (e.g. CBN). This also includes product losses in
the form of oil theft and corrupt practices such as “[i]nadequate measurement infrastructure to
determine the quantity of Gas Flared by the Oil and Gas Companies” (2013 NEITI Report,
p.143). Finally, it includes evidence of non-cooperation by government agencies, such as DPR
and CBN, government companies, such as the NNPC, and MNCs in providing the required
information to complete the NEITI work (Chapter 7).

9.3 Objectives and functions of NEITI
The primary objectives of NEITI set out in s.2 of the Act authorise NEITI to:
(a) ensure due process and transparency in the payments made by all extractive
industry companies to the Federal Government and statutory recipients.
(b)
monitor and ensure accountability in the revenue receipts of the
Federal Government from extractive industry companies.
(c) eliminate all forms of corrupt practices in the determination, payments,
receipts and posting of revenue accruing to the Federal Government from
extractive industry companies;
(d)
ensure transparency and accountability by government in the
application of resources from payment received from extractive industry
companies; and
(e) ensure conformity with the principles of Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative
However, these objectives are open-ended and unattainable. While they assign responsibility
for eliminating corruption in the extractive industry to NEITI, it is a broad task without an
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identified strategy, tools or mechanisms (Akinrele 2014). As indicated in the analysis in the
previous chapters, NEITI’s only mechanisms to achieve transparency and accountability are
the appointment of an independent auditor that conducts financial, physical and process audits
each financial year to prepare NEITI reports; and the discussion of the reports at the National
Assembly and the NSWG in an oversight role.

While transparency and accountability are the core objectives of NEITI, they are not defined
in the Act; nor are the dimensions of the concepts explained. The Act also does not specify how
transparency and accountability are applied in the process of revenue collection from the
companies and revenue expenditure by the government. Further, while s.2 (a), (b) and (c)
require NEITI to eliminate corrupt practices related to the payments made to the government,
there is no specification of what constitutes a corrupt practice or its extent. In contrast, s.2 (d)
empowers NEITI to ensure transparency and accountability in the government’s application of
revenue distribution or revenue expenditure. NEITI achieves transparency and accountability
by producing reports to reconcile the payments of companies with receipts by the Federal
Government. A loose framework proposed in s.3 of the Act and the appointment of independent
auditors to prepare NEITI reports guide these measures.

(a) develop a framework for transparency and accountability in the
reporting and disclosure by all extractive industry companies of revenue
due to or paid to the Federal Government;
(b) evaluate without prejudice to any relevant contractual obligations and
sovereign obligations the practices of all extractive industry companies
and government respectively regarding acquisition of acreages,
budgeting, contracting, materials procurement and production cost
profile in order to ensure due process, transparency and accountability.
(c) ensure transparency and accountability in the management of the
investment of the Federal Government in all extractive industry
companies....
These subsections, however, do not define a clear framework to achieve transparency or
accountability; rather, they leave this at the discretion of NEITI. In addition, there is no
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specification in these subsections of a standard practice or even a reference to other legislation
to define what is meant by a “framework for transparency and accountability” or even how to
achieve the “due process” mentioned in subsection (b). This opens the door for different
interpretations and applications of the Act by various interested parties in the extractive
industry. In addition, the ambiguity in the Act creates loopholes for both international extractive
companies and government entities to avoid legal sanction for non-compliance with the “due
process, transparency and accountability” requirements. However, while the Act has the power
to mandate compulsory reporting, the ability of NEITI to promote good governance in the
extractive industry in Nigeria is compromised by weak compliance. As such, the Act is a dull
sword that gives the impression of sharpness but does not cut.

In addition to s.3 (b), s.3 (d) and (e) and s.14(1) might also be used to justify non-cooperation
in information disclosure. For example, s.3 states that for the purpose of achieving the
objectives in s.2 and other subsections, NEITI shall:

(b) evaluate without prejudice to any relevant contractual obligations
and sovereign obligations the practices of all extractive industry companies
and government respectively regarding acquisition of acreages, budgeting,
contracting, materials procurement and production cost profile in order to
ensure due process, transparency and accountability. [emphasis added]
(d) obtain, as may be deemed necessary, from any extractive industry
company an accurate record of the cost of production and volume of sale of
oil, gas or other minerals extracted by the company at any period, provided
that such information shall not be used in any manner prejudicial to the
contractual obligation or proprietary interests of the extractive
industry company. [emphasis added]
(e) request from any company in the extractive industry, or from any
relevant organ of the Federal State or Local Government, an accurate
account of money paid by and received from the company at any period, as
revenue accruing to the Federal Government from such company for that
period; provided that such information shall not be used in a manner
prejudicial to contractual obligations or proprietary interest of the
extractive industry company or sovereign obligations of Government....
[emphasis added]
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A similar clause appears in s.14 (1):
the independent auditor shall submit the [NEITI Audit] report with
comments of the audited entity to the NEITI…provided that the contents of
such report shall not be published in a manner prejudicial to the
contractual obligations or proprietary interests of the audited entity.
[emphasis added]
The highlighted clauses in these subsections are meant to safeguard companies and government
entities from any misuse of the information provided to NEITI. However, these subsections
use ambiguous language and represent confidentiality clauses that can be used to protect the
companies and the government entities from the sanctions and penalties that might be applied
for non-cooperation. There is no clarification as to what is considered to be “prejudicial to the
contractual obligations or proprietary interests of the audited entity”. For example, many
companies and government entities, such as the NNPC, refused to complete the templates
required by the NEITI auditors to complete the reconciliation and produce NEITI Reports
(Chapter 7). In addition, these confidentiality clauses are not in line with the global call for
more transparency, especially in sectors that are claimed to be highly corrupt such as the
extractive industry. The inclusion of these sections in the Act reflects the power exercised by
the companies and government entities to maintain their privilege of information secrecy, while
harnessing the advantages of being part of NEITI.

9.4 The NSWG – a multi-stakeholder group
To achieve EITI’s objectives, the involvement of citizens through CSOs and the other
stakeholders, including MNCs and the government, is required (Budina & Van Sweder 2008).
The involvement and participation of all stakeholders across the entire value chain of the
extractive industry is attained through the creation and operation of the NSWG. Since NEITI
should observe, scrutinise and ensure transparency and accountability of private companies and
government agencies in the extractive industry, the independence of the NEITI board and its
work are crucial. This creates a paradoxical situation whereby achieving the participation of
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stakeholders threatens the independent status of the NSWG. Therefore, the balance of members
in the NSWG is an important consideration to achieve its intended objectives and ensure that
the interests of citizens are preserved.

Both s.5 and s.6 of the Act deal with the responsibilities of the NSWG and its membership
structure. For example, s.5 specifies the NSWG as NEITI’s governing body. As such, according
to s.5 (2):
The NSWG shall be responsible for the formulation of policies, programmes
and strategies for the effective implementation of the objectives and the
discharges of the functions of the NEITI.
In addition, s.6 of the Act requires that:
6. (1) The NSWG shall be constituted by the President and shall consist of
a chairman and no more than 14 other members one of whom shall be an
Executive Secretary.
(2) (a) In making appointment into the NSWG, the President shall
include:
(i) representative of extractive industry companies,
(ii) representative of Civil Society,
(iii) representative of Labour Unions in the extractive Industries,
(iv) experts in the extractive industry, and
(v) one member from each of the six geopolitical zones.
The NSWG ensures accountability by approving the annual budget, NEITI’s work plans and
periodic review of programmes performed by NEITI. In addition, according to s.14 (1), the
NSWG appoints the auditors responsible for preparing NEITI reports and communicating these
reports to the President, the National Assembly and the public.
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9.4.1 The role of the government and extractive companies in the NSWG
The first NSWG was created in 2004 from 28 members, 14 of them from the government
(NEITI 2018b). The dominant position of the government has not changed significantly
following the Act. The President still has the legal authority to appoint members of the NSWG,
and thus acquires unchallenged dominance over NEITI activities. As shown in s.6 above, the
current total number of NSWG members is 15, including one representative each from a CSO,
the extractive industry, and labour unions and one from each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones.
The remaining six participants, who are appointed by the President, usually include a media
representative. The six members from Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones are usually appointed
on the basis of their closeness to the ruling political party and loyalty to the President (Ejiogu,
Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019). In other words, around 12 members out of the 15 are loyal to the
President and the government, although all stakeholder groups, such as the companies and
CSOs, are allowed to nominate and elect their own representatives prior to approval by the
President (Aigbovo & Atsegbua 2013).

According to NEITI (2016), the current 2016-2020 list of members includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Dr. Kayode Fayemi – current Minister of Solid Minerals Development in Nigeria and
Chairman of the NSWG;
Dr. Mahmmoud Isa-Dutse – permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance;
Dr. Maikanti Kacalla Baru – Group Managing Director of Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC);
Mr. Clay Neff – Chairman and Managing Director of Chevron Nigeria Ltd as the
extractive industry representative;
several former government officials such as Prof. Olugbenga Akindeji Okunlola,
Special Adviser for the Geological Surveys (NGSA) (a government agency); and
Zainab Shamsuna Ahmed48 – former Executive Secretary and National Coordinator of
NEITI.

48

Although s.6 of the Act specifies that the Executive Secretary is appointed for a single term of five years, she
was the Executive Secretary of the NSWG for the 2008-2012 and 2012-2016 terms. Further, Ahmed was a member
of the NSWG until 2018.
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Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that s.6 of the Act strips the stakeholder group of the
ability to elect independent representatives, as the President can veto the choice. Thus s.6 of
the Act opens the door for the political appointment of partisan members who serve the
President’s political agenda and gives the President a dominant majority in the NSWG.
Therefore, the majority of members may owe accountability to the President rather than to their
own institutions and the public.

In addition, the experts designated in s.6 are required to have at least 10 years of working
experience in the extractive industry. Further, s.9 (3) and s.10 state that:
9. (3) Questions proposed at a meeting of NSWG shall be determined by a
simple majority of members present and voting and in the event of an
equality of votes, the person presiding shall have a casting vote.
10. The quorum of the NSWG at any meeting shall be 8 members
This gives the government and extractive-industry representatives a majority in the NSWG and
the ability to form a quorum to control its strategy, agenda and decisions. This may explain the
lack of legal measures taken against the many breaches of NEITI obligations by extractive
companies and government entities discussed in Chapter 7. Ihugba (2016) also questions the
reliability of NEITI Reports, since the NSWG is able to censor the published information in
the interests of its members. Further, most of the corruption in the extractive industry involves
government entities and government officials (Corrigan 2014; Ihugba 2014; Schuler 2012).
Therefore, the ability of the NSWG to provide transparency and accountability is constrained
by the fact that persons who “should be held accountable are the same persons providing the
information and setting the standard” (Ihugba 2016, p.216).
Among other factors that play a significant role in the success of EITI’s implementation around
the world is the political will to support the initiative (Pitlik, Frank & Firchow 2010). However,
in countries characterised by weak institutional structures, such as Nigeria and other developing
countries, this may also present a challenge that compromises the success of EITI. This is due
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to the dependence on the interests and direction of individuals in the political administration.
In contrast, a country with robust institutions may guarantee consistency in supporting
initiatives such as EITI. Therefore, one of the challenges that impedes NEITI’s capacity to
achieve its desired objectives is the reliance on individual efforts. For example, during
Obasanjo’s administration, NEITI received unlimited support from the President and his
administration, which was reflected in appointing qualified staff who were committed to enable
NEITI to strive and achieve beyond the requirements of EITI (Shaxson 2009). Under this
administration, NEITI published the most comprehensive report of the oil and gas sector in
Nigeria to that date (Shaxson 2009). In addition, NEITI attained candidate status and made
satisfactory progress in its implementation. This administration culminated in the delivery of
the Act, which enabled NEITI to consolidate its authority.
However, after Obasanjo’s term in office and the departure of his appointed staff, NEITI lost
its impetus and performance dropped. This is reflected in a lower commitment from President
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and the reduced quality of NEITI reports after 2004 and 2005 (Chapter
7) and slower progress in the implementation of NEITI (Muller 2010; Shaxson 2009). Under
President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration (2010-2015), corruption had risen to an
unprecedented level and the quality of NEITI reports did not improve (Ralby 2017), to the
point where in 2015 Nigeria was “at the verge of being suspended from the global EITI owing
to its inability to meet the publishing deadline for its 2013 oil and gas and solid minerals
industry audit reports” (NEITI 2015). President Buhari, who was elected in 2015, reconstituted
the NEITI board and gave unlimited support to the process, which improved NEITI’s
performance.

In addition, the Nigerian government relies heavily on revenues from the oil and gas sector,
which represent almost 65% of Nigeria’s federal government income, 88% of its foreign200

exchange earnings and over 90% of its total exports (KPMG 2019; Okeiyi 2017). Therefore,
Nigeria has a limited need to tax citizens, which leads to “very low public expectations of
government, and very little pressure on government to improve its performance” (Utomi,
Duncan & Williams 2007, p.14). This further weakens both the social contract between citizens
and government and the citizens’ demand for public transparency and accountability.
Kolstad and Soreide (2009, p.218) argue that “[i]t is unlikely that corrupt government officials
would support or implement reform significantly reducing their take”. Many government
entities, including state-owned companies, regulatory agencies and government agencies,
receive revenue streams from the industry. Table 9.2 provides examples of government entities
and the revenue streams they collect.
Table 9.2: Nigerian government collected revenue streams
Government entity
Financial streams received
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Pipeline Transportation Fee
(NNPC)
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
Gas, Feed Stock, Federation Equity &
Profit Oil, Domestic Crude
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)
Gas Flaring Penalties, Royalty (Oil),
Royalty Gas, Concession Rentals,
Signature Bonus
Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS)
Education Tax-Oil, Petroleum Profit Tax
(PPT), Companies Income Tax (CIT)
Niger Delta Development Commission Contributions to NDDC
(NDDC)
Nigeria Content Development and Monitoring Contributions to NCDMB
Board (NCDMB)
Nigerian Export Supervision Scheme (NESS) NESS Fee

However, many of these entities have been accused of corrupt practices (Chapter 10 gives
further examples) (Donwa, Mgbame & Ogbeide 2015). Because they are simultaneously
regulatory agencies representing the government and audited entities in the NEITI process, this
calls into question their willingness to achieve transparency and accountability. For example,
the NNPC represents the government in six joint-venture arrangements that dominate the
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extractive industry and collectively generate around 88.6% of oil-specific tax (2014 NEITI
Report). This means that the NNPC and the other MNCs in these arrangements, such as
Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell and Mobil, share the same fiduciary interests. In addition, there
are examples in the media of past and recent corrupt and illegal practices between government
agencies and the MNCs (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019). For example, Global Witness
(2015) revealed a US$5.86 billion projected loss for Nigeria in one of the oil deals between
Royal Dutch Shell, Eni and the Nigerian government. The deal involved Nigerian officials,
including former ministers and a former Nigerian President (Chapter 10 gives for details).
Therefore, it is reasonable to question the involvement of these entities in terms of transparency
and accountability. However, this non-cooperation is not limited to MNCs, as most of the
domestic Nigerian companies do not pay taxes and do not cooperate with NEITI (Chapter 7).

In terms of funding, until 2009 NEITI depended on the support of donors, primarily from
international institutions such as the World Bank and the countries of origin of MNCs operating
in Nigeria, such as the US and the UK. Interestingly, it took the UK until 2014 to join EITI,
with its first report published in 2016 (EITI 2019a). In addition, the US joined EITI in 2014
and withdrew in 2017, as US law prevents EITI US “from meeting specific provision of the
NEITI standards” (EITI 2019b; United States Department of the Interior 2017). Neither country
has a high commitment to EITI, yet they have an impact on the outcomes of NEITI. This might
be to enhance the public image of MNCs domiciled in donor countries (Shaxson, 2009). Since
2009, around 90% of NEITI and the NSWG budget has been funded by the Nigerian
government, and this is still the case at the time of writing of this thesis (Disch & Crasto 2013).
While funding has shifted from external donors, the reliance on government funds also affects
NEITI’s independent status. The NEITI official website, “www.neiti.gov.ng”, uses the
Nigerian government domain “.gov.ng”, and the Nigerian Presidency stamp is on the majority
of NEITI reports.
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9.4.2 The role of civil-society organisations
CSOs play a major role in NEITI and its activities, and this is reflected in their position as
members of the NSWG. NEITI appoints a permanent civil-society liaison officer to
synchronise activities with CSOs and maintain an open communication channel. In addition,
NEITI has partnered with Nigerian CSOs and developed a Civil Society Steering Committee
to coordinate activities and ensure CSO participation in NEITI and its different programs
(Ekhator 2014). However, the role of CSOs in Nigeria is not clear, and opinion is divided on
their ability to act as whistle-blowers, observers and facilitators of NEITI’s practices.
It is argued that NEITI plays a positive role in ensuring the participation of the public in relation
to concerns about the extractive industry (Okeiyi 2017). In addition, CSOs have a primary role
in setting the agenda for NEITI, especially in determining the measures to improve
transparency and accountability between NSWG members (Ekhator 2014). Furthermore, CSOs
are expected to monitor and oversee the NEITI process, budget preparation, meetings,
operations and events in the extractive sector. There are also specific roles assigned to the CSOs
by the Act, including promoting and distributing the NEITI reports, improving community
participation, being involved in the extractive legislative process and assisting in addressing
the issues from NEITI audits (NEITI Act 2007). To achieve these outcomes, CSOs reach out
to the public, especially those who are illiterate, through activities such as roadshows and
workshops. CSOs act as agents of change by providing information and influencing public
opinion.

However, the role of CSOs in NEITI and their ability to make change is subject to criticism.
To begin with, the process of drafting the Act has been questioned, as only 24 hours’ notice
was given to CSOs to attend the public hearing of the NEITI Bill in 2005 (Uzoigwe 2011). This
did not give CSOs the required time to study the proposed legislation, create a legal opinion or
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attend the public hearing. Therefore, the voice of CSOs is believed to be almost absent from
the discussions of the Act. Further, conflicts within CSOs limit their ability to play a
supervisory role. In addition, while the local CSOs are closer to the local communities and their
needs, the Nigerian and international CSOs in Nigeria are concentrated in Abuja or Lagos,
which are isolated from the extractive areas (Ekhator 2014). For example, 10 out 14 members
of the current Civil Society Steering Committee are from Abuja or Lagos (NEITI 2016).

Further, the civil-society representatives (CSO, labour union and media) in the NSWG are
significantly outnumbered by representatives from the government and extractive companies.
In addition, the President has veto power to accept or refuse the suggested civil-society
representatives (Ako & Ekhator 2016). For example, Sequeira et al. (2016) assert that the
participation of CSOs in implementing EITI in developing countries has several benefits for
governments, including attracting foreign aid, improving the investment environment and
guaranteeing diplomatic support. In other words, CSO representation in NEITI could
potentially serve the government agenda more than achieving transparency and accountability
or community engagement in the process. This is how the participation of CSOs in initiatives
such as NEITI has been exploited to serve authoritarian regimes due to financial, political and
proficiency limitations, especially for local CSOs that rely on government support (Öge 2017).

Further, to promote transparency, accountability and governance it is not sufficient to simply
have a robust civil society; rather, this civil society should be empowered by educated,
informed and active citizens (Hoinathy & Jánszky 2017). Unfortunately, these conditions are
insufficient or non-existent through much of Nigeria. The roadshows and workshops organised
by the Nigerian CSOs do not generate the required attendance. Additionally, the workshops are
presented in English, rather than local languages (Uzoigwe 2011). Further, Uzoigwe (2011)
confirms that many of the Nigerian CSOs are not genuinely committed to achieving
204

transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. Even the few organisations that are
involved in the work of NEITI allocate their funds to many activities other than promoting
transparency or accountability in the extractive sector. Therefore, CSO engagement in NEITI
has been criticised as a means to gain legitimacy from the international community and attract
international aid (Ekhator 2014). This spectacle of cooperation and engagement with
communities affected by the extractive industry comes at the expense of transparency and
accountability for the effects “on the ground”.

9.4.3 The independent auditors and publication of reports
With regard to appointing independent auditors to conduct the financial, physical and process
audit, s.4 deals states:
4. (1) The NEITI shall in each financial year appoint independent auditors
for the purpose of Appointment auditing the total revenue which accrued to
the Federal Government for that year from extractive industry companies,
in order to determine the accuracy of payments and receipts.
(2) The independent auditors appointed under subsection (1) of this section
shall undertake a physical, process and financial audit on such terms and
conditions as may be approved by the National Stakeholders Working
Group (NSWG).
While, s.4 (2) specifies the auditors’ mission in preparing the financial, physical and process
audits, there is an absence of defining terms such as the extent of the audit, the covered entities,
the methodology or the required data. This is an example of the rhetorical use of “ambiguity”,
which allows different interpretations of meaning and “opens the door” for inconsistency in the
audits, especially among different auditors.
In addition, s.4. (5) specifies that “[a]n auditor or auditing firm that has audited any extractive
industry company in any given year shall not be appointed in the same year for the purposes of
subsection (2) of this section”. Further, in terms of the frequency of the reports, s.14 states that:
14. (1) the NEITI shall cause the account of total revenue which accrued to
the Federal Government from all extractive industry companies, its receipts,
payments, assets and liabilities to be audited not later than 6 months after
the end of each year by independent auditors appointed on such terms and
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conditions as the NSWG may approve and on the confirmation of the audit,
the independent auditor shall submit the report with comments of the audited
entity to the NEITI which shall cause same to be published for the
information of the public.
While this section stipulates that the audit has to be conducted not later than six months after
the end of each year, there is no specific timeline for NEITI to publish the reports. This is borne
out in Chapter 7, which describes how the publication of reports can be, and usually is, delayed
anywhere between two and five years.

9.5 Transparency and accountability in NEITI reports
This section analyses the notions and the scope of transparency and accountability as addressed
in the NEITI reports to discern how the Act has been applied in practice, and how the discourse
of NEITI is enacted and mobilised to shape the opinions of a wider audience of spectators about
transparency and accountability. Until 2009, transparency was the main objective of EITI, as
reflected in the objectives of NEITI. Accountability appeared as a further NEITI objective from
the 2011 NEITI Report.

Transparency is not explicitly defined in NEITI reports; however, an implicit meaning is
expressed with reference to the reconciliations that “are essential for transparency and
completeness of reporting” (2004 NEITI Report, p.63). This means that transparency is
connected with the process of reconciliation. However, no further information is available
except for the auditors’ objective specified in the 2008 NEITI Report (p.3) to ensure the
transparency and credibility:
of certain oil sector payments and receipts in Nigeria…the engagement
entailed an analysis and reconciliation of material payments and receipts
made by specified Covered Entities…in the oil and gas sector.
Therefore, the concept of transparency in the NEITI reports is elusive. For example, “there is
a general need to enhance transparency in PPT returns” by using a standardised template “to
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ensure that it is robust and will inject the much needed transparency into the implementation
of the PPT Act” (2004 NEITI Report, p.40). The much-needed transparency to implement the
PPT Act does not inform the reader as to what information is needed to ensure that transparency
is achieved. The same paragraph is also used in the 2005 NEITI Report (p.55).

This elusiveness is carried through to how NEITI is achieving accountability. For example, the
auditors of the 2014 NEITI Report identified three main challenges to their work: non-release
of information by covered entities; incomplete records of some covered entities; and political
influence. To deal with the issue of the non-release of information it was mentioned that “[t]he
escalation protocol for dealing with covered entities who refused to provide requested data in
the present round of audit as provided by NEITI was also followed” (2014 NEITI Report, p.16).
Not only are the escalating protocols not specified, there is no evidence or example of applying
them. In addition, political influence is not defined, the effects of such influence are not
identified and the parties that exercise this influence are not specified. In addition, it is unclear
how the suggested solution can protect the audit from political influence.

Shifting of responsibility for misconduct to relieve NEITI from its accountability function is
evident in the NEITI reports. For example, in the 2013 NEITI Report (pp.27-28) it is stated
that “[t]he refineries operate below full capacity because of operational failures, fires,
vandalism and sabotage on the crude pipelines conveying domestic crude oil to the refineries.
The combined capacity utilisation of the four local refineries was 22% in 2013”. This is a
worsening recurring problem evidenced by the disclosure of a mere 8% of potential full
capacity. For example, in 2018 only 13% of local crude oil was refined domestically, with the
remainder exported by NNPC subsidiaries (2018 NEITI Report, p.105). This causes
considerable financial loss for the government because the NNPC and its subsidiaries export
domestic oil they purchase at a discount price (2018 NEITI Report). In addition, this practice
207

forces the government to import expensive refined oil products to meet the needs of the local
market. It is not sufficient to point out deficiencies to achieve accountability. Instead, it is
important to specify who is responsible for misconduct or dereliction of duties that results in
shortcomings, in order to hold them accountable. In addition, the problem of oil theft is another
salient example. Crude-oil loss is a problem not discussed in the early NEITI reports.
In the 2012 NEITI Report, the crude-oil losses were attributed mainly to oil theft estimated at
US$20 billion yearly. Oil theft is defined as:
any activity relating to the theft or sabotage of crude oil, facilities or
installations in form of illegal bunkering, pipeline vandalism, fuel scooping,
illegal refining and transport and oil terrorism (2012 NEITI Report, p.305).
The report does not specify who is responsible for these losses. However, using words such as
theft, sabotage, illegal bunkering, vandalism and terrorism deflects the responsibility onto
external parties and uncontrolled events. In addition, bribery and corruption are cited as
potential reasons for the problem, which costs the NNPC US$1,537,522,452, along with a loss
of revenue of US$1,705,479,980 due to production delays (2012 NEITI Report, p.35).
However, even though significant, it did not trigger further investigation, nor were specific
saboteurs identified for the losses or held accountable for corrupt activities. Dealing with oil
theft and oil losses using responsibility-shifting and blame-shifting language is an example of
rhetorical understatement in which an author “deliberately expresses an idea as less important
than it actually is” (Harris 2002, p.8). In addition, in comparing the financial flows between the
2014 and 2013 it was stated that:
2014 oil and gas financial flows fell by 5% from $58.200 billion to
$54.555billion. This was as a result of deferred production and crude losses
due to destruction of production facilities and pipeline breakages and crude
theft (2014 NEITI Report, p.59).
This statement is made in the absence of further corroboration or evidence of destructive
activity. Further, the total revenue to the government in 2015 was US$24,790,797,000 which
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represents a 55% decline in total revenue compared to 2014 and a 63.78% decline compared
to 2011 (2015 NEITI Report). This sharp decline in revenue is once again attributed to the:
fall in global prices of crude oil in 2015, instability in the Niger Delta,
deferred production and Crude losses due to destruction of production
facilities and pipeline breakages, and crude Theft and militancy (2015
NEITI Report, p.32).
This is also repeated in the 2016 NEITI Report:
The drop in production was caused by the vandalization of oil pipelines that
disrupted operations (2016 NEITI Report, p.30).
The decline in the production of the joint ventures was attributed to the:
disruptions in operations experienced by most JV Companies due to
sabotage (2016 NEITI Report, p.36).
Oil theft, vandalisation of oil pipelines, oil sabotage and militancy are terms used to describe a
long-lasting phenomenon that creates significant losses. The language used in the NEITI
reports is an example of responsibility-shifting language. This responsibility-shifting language
is also examined in previous accounting research such as Pupovac (2014) and Pupovac and
Moerman (2017), who demonstrate how Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria used similar language
to shift responsibility for oil spills away from the company. The information disclosed is not
comprehensively detailed. For example, a lack of details about the quantity and type of oil theft
is evident, no specific responsible parties are identified and no recommendations are provided
to deal with this issue. This lack of information hinders decision-making and compromises the
concept of transparency and NEITI’s ability to achieve accountability.

While transparency and accountability and their scopes are not specifically defined, NEITI
started to highlight its ability to pose questions and enquire about anomalies in the audits
beginning with the 2011 NEITI Report. For example:
We noted the reluctance of some listed upstream companies to respond to
audit enquiries on the premise that the NEITI Audit is only concerned with
producing companies (2011 NEITI Report, p.22).
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Further, when investigating the NNPC’s non-remittance of US$3,996,282,000 as dividends
from NLNG to the Nigerian government account, NEITI confirmed that “[p]revious letters
from NEITI to NNPC yielded no response” (2011 NEITI Report, p.92). Although the related
companies and government entities were reluctant to share information in most of the cases,
NEITI continued to highlight its ability to enquire about anomalies in the audits in all
subsequent NEITI reports.
The level of response to NEITI’s enquiries varies across years. For example, in the 2012 NEITI
Report 22/33 enquiries generated no responses, especially from government entities such as
the NNPC, NPDC and NLNG. However, in the 2013 NEITI Report 20/27 enquiries had
responses from the related entities. In the 2016 NEITI Report 15 out of 19 of the enquiries had
no responses, and NEITI could not solve 12 out of 22 issues related to the 2015 NEITI Report
because the related entities, especially the NNPC, either did not respond to the enquiries or did
not apply the recommended solutions. Finally, there were only five enquiries each for the 2017
and 2018 NEITI Reports, with two and no responses respectively.

The scope of transparency and accountability has expanded since the 2012 NEITI Report. For
example, in that report NEITI is required to ensure “that government receives what it is
expected to receive and that companies pay what they are expected to pay to government as at
and when due” (2012 NEITI Report, p.1). However, there is no evidence in the NEITI reports
that NEITI pre-calculates the expected value of payments between the companies and the
government, taking into account non-cash techniques that affect tax payments. In addition,
NEITI ensures its ability to obtain information about beneficiary ownership:
The 2013 NEITI Oil and Gas Audit sought to obtain the Beneficial Owners
of Companies operating in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry as defined
within the scope of the EITI requirement 3 and was able to obtain names of
the natural person(s) who directly or indirectly (through another company)
ultimately controls the corporate entity except for publicly listed companies
and wholly owned subsidiaries (2013 NEITI Report, p.41).
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However, the auditors did not comment on the fact that only “Twenty-Nine (29) of the “forty
one [sic]” (41) Companies covered in the audit, completed the Field legal contract templates”
(2013 NEITI Report, p.42). This means that almost 25% of the companies did not provide this
information, which may affect the quality and the promised transparency of such information.
In terms of achieving transparency and accountability in the allocation of the oil and gas
revenues, NEITI is to:
work very closely with government to ensure that revenues received from
companies are prudently and transparently applied to provide infrastructure,
basic social services like education, health care, security, housing and others
towards improving the general standard of living of Nigerians through
poverty reduction (2012 NEITI Report, p.1).
In addition, NEITI guarantees that information is available from “the point of extraction, to
how the payment and revenue makes its way through to the Government, to how it benefits the
citizens of the country whose natural resources are extracted” (2014 NEITI Report, p.13).
While the information about extraction, payments and revenues to the government is present
in all NEITI reports, the information referring to revenue distribution is missing. There is no
evidence in the reports that NEITI has accomplished this specific target to monitor how the
federal, state or local governments apply revenues to improve the general standard of living in
Nigeria. Information from the distribution side of the oil and gas revenues is limited to ensuring
that revenues are allocated (Figure 9.1)

Figure 9.1: Revenue allocation (2013 NEITI Report, p.37)
This indicates that the promised transparency from the extraction of the crude oil and natural
gas to disbursing revenues for the citizens of Nigeria is incomplete.
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The scope of accountability makes reference to NEITI’s ability to create public debate in order
to hold the government and companies accountable:
The Report is also for wide dissemination to the public through the media
and the civil society as major tools for advocacy, debate, dialogue and
discussions for purposes of holding government and companies to account
(2012 NEITI Report, p.1).
In the 2013 NEITI Report, the notion of transparency is linked to wider economic and
social issues in Nigeria such as fighting poverty. NEITI reports suggest that the potential
economic growth and improvement of the standard of living achieved through the
effective exploitation of the extractive sector may reduce poverty. Unfortunately, the
potential positive impact of the sector has not been realised:
...this potential has not been achieved due partly to the over-dependence
on Crude Oil and Gas revenue and lack of transparency in the Oil and Gas
Sector. The importance of NEITI in the improvement of governance in the
Oil and Gas sector for the overall interest of the vast majority of Nigerians
can therefore not be overemphasised (2013 NEITI Report, p.27).

While the NEITI reports provide comprehensive information about the financial flows and
contextual information about the Nigerian extractive industry, there are several recurrent issues
that suggest that the promised transparency and accountability are compromised. For example:
The method of measuring and recording refined products by PPMC49 and
DPR are not in accordance with best practices. The systems for recording
the movement through the PPMC pipeline and marine transfers are
fragmented, out dated, and paper based, and therefore subjected to error. As
a repeat observation in 2005 audit, NNPC confirmed its intention to upgrade
the system. However no action has been taken (2012 NEITI Report, p.47).
Another issue is an amount of US$8.836 billion that was supposed to have been paid to the
Federal government by the NNPC in 2006; however, as late as March 2015 no payments had
been made or were forthcoming. Other recurrent issues include:

49

The Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC) is a subsidiary of the NNPC that owns and manages
network of pipelines to transport Nigerian “crude oil to the refineries and moving white petroleum products to
the existing and future markets” (PPMC 2020, np).
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▪
▪
▪

Inadequate measurement infrastructure to determine the quantity of Gas
Flared by the Oil and Gas Companies.
Non-compliance with the 2008 Gas flaring penalty rates.
Poor collection of Gas flared penalties and lack of political will to
implement the April 2008 Regulation on the new rate (2013 NEITI Report,
p.143).

In addition, the issue of inconsistency in the pricing method adopted by the NNPC has been a
persistent problem since the first NEITI report. The 2015 NEITI Report confirms that this is
“causing huge revenue loss to the Federal Government of Nigeria” (2015 NEITI Report, p.189).
While the NNPC confirmed that the practice had been discontinued, in the 2016 NEITI Report
the auditors again brought this issue to the attention of the NSWG and NNPC.

Further, other recurring issues relating to the non-remittance of amounts due to the government
by the NNPC and a lack of documentary evidence complicates the reconciliation process. These
were still unsolved in the 2015 and 2016 NEITI Reports. For example, in the 2015 NEITI
Report an amount of US$1,076,011,598 received by the NNPC from the Nigerian Liquefied
Natural Gas Ltd (NLNG) had not been remitted to the Federation and no response had been
made by the NNPC. Further, the 2017 NEITI Report (p.81) confirms that “[t]he cumulative
amount received from NLNG to date (including amounts revealed in previous audit reports
2000 - 2016) is US$17.288 billion. NEITI has consistently maintained that these monies should
be paid into the Federation Account”. Thus, substantial amounts that could be allocated to
improve public services and the living conditions of Nigerians is not remitted to the
government.

A lack of consistent interpretation of the legal texts in relation to PPT computations, tax
holidays and the rate of signature bonus constantly results in unresolved differences and losses
to the Federation. In summary, the updates on past recommendations in the 2016 NEITI Report
indicate that more than 60% of the issues raised in the 2015 NEITI Report are still unresolved
and the recommendations have not been implemented, especially by government agencies.
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Thus, NEITI faces challenges in its quest to achieve accountability in the extractive industry in
Nigeria, due in part to the lack of power to enforce recommendations and use transparency to
achieve accountability.
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9.6 Summary
This chapter presented the mobilisation level of analysis to assess how NEITI mobilises its
strategic outcomes. The 2007 NEITI Act (the Act), and the language and scope of transparency
and accountability in the NEITI reports were analysed. The analysis shows that there are many
positive and negative aspects associated with the Act. The Act is considered the first of its kind
among all EITI-implementing countries, and it legitimises NEITI as a key player in the
Nigerian government’s anti-corruption efforts. Since it codifies NEITI principles into a formal
law, the Act also represents a first step in creating an appropriate legal framework to attract
investors and build trust in this sector.

However, the Act has many loopholes that might be exploited by private and government
companies and government agencies; these limit its effectiveness and its ability to achieve its
stated outcomes. These loopholes include the open-ended objectives specified in s.2 of the Act
to eliminate all forms of corruption in the revenue flows in the extractive industry. Further,
there is a lack of definition of NEITI’s core activities, such as physical and financial audits;
ambiguity is worsened by the fact that the Act does not set a clear timeline and milestones in
regard to the publication of the audit reports. Furthermore, the Act does not set standards for
extractive industry best practice regarding transparency and accountability so that stakeholders
can address their conduct accordingly. Another flaw in the Act is that it does not provide any
guidance about what is needed to achieve transparency and accountability in revenue
expenditure.

Although the Act specifies sanctions against noncompliant parties, the analysis shows that the
Act lacks the ability to initiate any criminal prosecution. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the
Nigerian President possesses the power to appoint the members of the NSWG, which
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consequently owe political accountability to the President. This government dominance over
the NSWG affects NEITI’s independence and its ability to observe, scrutinise and ensure the
transparency and accountability in the extractive industry. Further, CSOs are a minority actor
in the NSWG and lack the technical and financial resources to play their intended role in the
process. This problem is further intensified since most of the local CSOs are funded by the
government, which subsequently compromises independence. Therefore, the Act is still a dull
sword that gives the impression of sharpness, but does not cut where the cuts are needed,
especially with regard to corruption, to achieve the desired outcomes. This means that the Act
rhetorically mobilises NEITI and contributes to the creation of the spectacle of transparency
and accountability but, in fact, does not have a significant impact on poverty reduction,
corruption or fighting the resource curse.
The analysis of the reports’ content in relation to transparency and accountability reveals that
the reports contain vague and blame-shifting language. In addition, the scope of transparency
and accountability is not clearly defined and, in practice, is limited to the preparation and
publication of the reconciliation of cash flows between the companies and the Nigerian
government.

The next chapter will discuss the concepts of transparency, accountability and the Theory of
Spectacle to address the research objectives.
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Chapter 10: NEITI as a Spectacle of Transparency
10.1 introduction
In 2003 NEITI was introduced to promote governance through increased transparency, and
therefore accountability, in Nigeria’s extractive industry. As discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9,
NEITI uses its auditing and reporting functions to visualise and make valuable the concept of
transparency, and the NSWG as the multi-stakeholder mechanism and the Act to mobilise its
accountability function. This thesis examined how the storyline or script of transparency is
constructed, conveyed and legitimised in NEITI reports through the micro-level (visualisation)
text and structure features of language (valuation). Moreover, the thesis challenges the
spectacle of transparency and what NEITI measures to assess the level of transparency. This
leads to the question of accountability. In other words, who or what is controlling the narrative
of transparency and who or what are the spectators (mobilisation)?
The following principles underpin the analysis and subsequent findings of the thesis. First,
organisational discourse creates certain realities, and organisations exist through the script they
construct (Mumby & Clair 1997). In this case, NEITI is a “transparency initiative” and the
story is about revealing financial flows by reducing opacity to an audience of spectators.
Second, transparency is an elusive term that is contextually bound and reinforces the notion
that “the more we see the more we know”. Subsequently, spectators are supposed to be able to
make informed judgements and sanction those that do not live up to expectations. There are
several components that define and limit NEITI’s objectives and mechanisms to achieve
transparency. In this thesis, these include the scope and quality of information in NEITI reports,
including timeliness, relevance, completeness, accuracy and the ability of the stakeholders to
comprehend published information. Third, while accountability takes various forms, there are
three basic components: an actor, a forum and an account (information), which are in a
relationship in which the actor provides an account to the forum (Bovens 2007). Three forms
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of accountability have been considered in this thesis in relation to NEITI: transparency-asaccountability, intelligent accountability and public accountability. Finally, the spectacle has
been defined as “the very heart of this real society’s unreality” (Debord 1967, p.3) and a “social
relationship between people that is mediated by images” (Debord 1967, p.4). This reflects the
ability of the spectacle to claim the status of reality and to play a role in perception management
or perception manipulation through the power to conceal or reveal other specific aspects of
lived experience or existence – the “other realities” (Boje 2001; Patrascu 2013). Since NEITI
operates in an industry that is dominated by the ideological context of neoliberal global capital,
the spectacular production of NEITI secures legitimacy for an audience of willing spectators.
This chapter provides a critique of the spectacle of transparency. The next section presents
examples of partial representation or omission of salient issues regarding the Nigerian
extractive industry. This is followed by a discussion of the findings on transparency and
accountability with insights from the Theory of the Spectacle.

10.2 State of play in Nigeria
After 16 years of NEITI implementation and the publication of 11 reports, Nigeria has achieved
some progress in terms of transparency mainly through increased disclosure (Okeiyi 2017).
NEITI in Nigeria and the global EITI were introduced to mitigate and overcome the negative
consequences of the resource curse, especially those caused by the lack of transparency, an
inadequate accountability system and widespread corruption in the extractive industry (Adams,
Osho & Coleman 2008; Corrigan 2014; Schuler 2012). While fighting the resource curse is
expected to result in better life conditions for Nigerians, the human and economic development
indicators do not show significant improvement. According to the Corruption Perceptions
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Index50 in 2018, Nigeria was ranked 144th out of 198 countries with a score of only 27/100
(Transparency International 2018). The average score across countries is 43/100, which means
that Nigeria performed considerably below average.

Nigeria was ranked 156th out of 189 countries in 2016 using the United Nation Human
Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 2017). The Human
Development Index is “a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent
standard of living” (United Nations Development Programme 2019, p.2). Further, Nigeria was
ranked 158th out of 189 countries in 2018, which means that Nigeria made a step backward in
this area (United Nations Development Programme 2019a). Moreover, the country scored only
0.34 on a scale of 0-1 on the Human Capital Index51 of the World Bank for 2018 (World Bank
2019). This makes Nigeria among the countries with low human development and poor
indicators in terms of their health-care systems, education and life conditions. For example, the
average unemployment rate in Nigeria in 2018 was 23% (World Bank 2019a). Therefore, after
nearly 16 years of implementing NEITI, its ability to fight the resource curse by promoting
governance and reducing corruption through transparency and accountability is questionable.

The following sections provide examples of omitted, partial and misstated issues in the NEITI
reports, particularly regarding the narrow scope of transparency that NEITI provides and how
it marginalises important issues such as the impact of the lack of government spending on the
life conditions of Nigerians

The index ranks “countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to
experts and businesspeople” and scores each country on a scale of 0-100 points where 0 means “highly corrupt”
and 100 means “very clean” (Transparency International 2018, np).
51
The Human Capital Index (HCI) of the World Bank “quantifies the contribution of health and education to the
productivity of the next generation of workers” (World Bank 2020, np).
50
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10.3 NEITI – what is not in the script of transparency
Many have criticised NEITI for not revealing and for misstating important aspects of the
industry that fall within its scope of governance, transparency and accountability; for example,
issues related to tax breaks, corruption of the NNPC, other cases of corruption in the industry
and the understatement of oil theft. In addition, the adoption of NEITI underplays several issues
regarding Nigeria and the ability to deliver on its objectives.

Tax breaks
The analysis of the NEITI reports conducted for this thesis shows that the issue of tax breaks
is not addressed directly in any of the reports. While tax breaks or tax “holidays” are a common
practice used by governments to attract foreign investment in its oil and gas sector, the usual
practice is to only allow five years of tax breaks (van Dorp 2016). Nigeria NLNG Limited
(NLNG) is a liquefied natural gas-producing joint venture between the NNPC (49%) and a
coalition of MNCs including Royal Dutch Shell, Total and Eni (51%). Tax holidays for NLNG
are permitted under a special law, NLNG (Fiscal Insurances and Assurances) Act 1990. The
exemption includes corporate tax payments and a range of other taxes, such as an education
tax, and extends the normal five years of tax exemptions in the gas sector by a further five
years. In addition, the period to use deferred tax assets extends the effective period to 12 years
(van Dorp 2016). The total tax losses to the government from NLNG amounts to more than
US$6.5 billion, including US$3.3 billion for the MNCs (ActionAid 2016). This is in a country
where 11 million children are out of school and the total budget for education is far less than
the tax holiday given to these MNCs (ActionAid 2016). In addition, the MNC tax holiday is
three times the Federal budget for health in a country where 15% of its children die before they
reach five years old due to a lack of health care, and 60% of its population live on less than one
US dollar per day (ActionAid 2016; van Dorp 2016).
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Corruption of the NNPC
The non-transparent practices of the NNPC have also resulted in huge financial losses of
revenue for the Nigerian government. For example, in 2014 the Governor of CBN asserted that
US$20 billion in NNPC oil sale revenues was missing, amounting to a third of the oil revenues
between January 2012 and July 2013 in a period of a very high average crude oil price of
US$110 per barrel (Nnaa, Kia & Nwibor 2015; Sayne, Gillies & Katsouris 2015). This was a
direct accusation of misappropriation and corruption by top officials of the NNPC. The NNPC
usually cites oil theft as the primary cause, however, there are other possible reasons. For
example, the government allocates an average of 445,000 barrels of domestic crude oil per day
to the NNPC to distribute to the four domestic refineries in Nigeria (2016 NEITI Report).
However, only a quarter of this amount reaches the refineries, with the remaining 75%
exported. No clear explanation or indication of the revenues from these exports is given (2016
NEITI Report). The average loss amounted to US$6 billion a year between 2010 and 2013
(Sayne, Gillies & Katsouris 2015). In addition to the missing revenue, the Nigerian government
became a net importer of refined oil to cover the needs of the domestic market. In addition, the
NNPC did not remit revenues to the Nigerian government “from the sale of 110 million barrels
of oil over ten years from one block controlled by its subsidiary NPDC52, worth an estimated
$12.3 billion” (Sayne, Gillies & Katsouris 2015, p.6).
These recurring issues relating to non-remitting amounts payable to the government and the
lack of revenue disclosure complicates the reconciliation process, as evidenced by the 2015
and 2016 NEITI Reports. In addition, there is the challenge of an inconsistency in the pricing
methodology adopted by the NNPC. These persistent issues are evident from the first NEITI
report. For example, the 2015 NEITI Report (p.189) confirms that unaccounted revenues cause

52

The Nigerian Petroleum Development Company Limited (NPDC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the NNPC
and is in charge of “petroleum exploration and production activities” (NPDC 2019, np).
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a “huge revenue loss to the Federal Government of Nigeria”. Other criticisms of the NNPC
refer to systemic governance issues, including “no published annual reports, weak audit
functions and a board chaired by the petroleum minister” (Sayne, Gillies & Katsouris 2015,
p.9). Taking into consideration the entangled network of public entities and private companies,
especially the position of the NNPC as the national representative in all oil and gas joint
ventures in Nigeria, there is considerable conflict between the aims of NEITI and the interests
of these actors.

Oil theft
According to Ralby (2017, p.14) “no country on earth is more frequently associated with oil
theft than Nigeria”. The amount of oil theft varies from year to year and there are different
estimates of its costs. For example, while it was estimated in the 2012 NEITI Report that oil
theft costs US$20 billion yearly, the daily estimated oil theft from the pipeline in 2013 was
300,000 barrels (Nnaa, Kia & Nwibor 2015). In 2015 it was estimated that the total cost of oil
theft in Nigeria was between US$3 and US$8 billion annually, in addition to other economic,
environmental and social costs including the loss of thousands of lives (Ralby 2017). The
number for 2019 is estimated to be over 100,000 barrels daily, and the federal government loses
“as much as $25 million (N7.7 billion) daily and $9 billion (N2.8 trillion) annually to oil theft”
(Kolawole 2019, np). In addition to the crude oil theft, Nigeria is still losing “roughly 30
percent of its refined products to smuggling into neighboring states” (Ralby 2017, p. 4). The
oil theft in its various forms is facilitated by the collusion between MNCs, government agencies
and parastatals53 operating in the oil and gas sector (Ralby 2017).

While the NEITI reports prior to 2012 did not address, or even mention, the problem of oil
theft, the 2012 NEITI Report defines it as “any activity relating to the theft or sabotage of crude

53

Parastatals are hybrid entities with public and private shareholding, such as the NNPC.
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oil, facilities or installations in form of illegal bunkering, pipeline vandalism, fuel scooping,
illegal refining and transport and oil terrorism” (2012 NEITI Report, p.305). The 2012, 2013
and partially 2015 NEITI Reports are the only reports to provide a comprehensive account of
oil theft, including details about the amounts of oil theft, its causes, and its economic, social,
environmental and health impacts. In addition, the decline in the 2012 revenues from the oil
sector was attributed to “crude theft, deferred production due to destruction of production
facilities and crude losses resulting from sabotage and pipeline breakages” (2012 NEITI
Report, p.15). Similar to other findings, the NEITI reports use terms such as sabotage, illegal
bunkering, vandalism and terrorism when describing oil theft to deflect responsibility
(Nwagbara & Belal 2019; Pupovac & Moerman 2017). However, after the 2013 NEITI Report,
oil theft was only mentioned in the NEITI reports, with no further details, as the main
contributor to the decline of revenues from the oil sector. For example, between 2012 and 2013
the decline was almost US$10 billion (2013 NEITI Report). However, despite the significance
of these revenue losses, there is no disclosure in subsequent reports of further investigation.
For example, the losses caused by oil theft and sabotage is estimated to be more than US$4.3
billion in 2016 and US$3.837 billion in 2018 (2017 NEITI Report; 2018 NEITI Report).
However, a Wikileaks document from the American Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, confirms that
the loss is a result of corruption amongst officials, especially those of the NNPC, neglecting to
register the amount of oil received and on-selling the unaccounted oil to anonymous
beneficiaries (Ejiogu, Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019).

Other issues of corruption
Various social activist groups have identified corruption related to the extractive industry, such
as the Malabu business scandal revealed in 2015 by Global Witness. According to Global
Witness (2015), Dan Etete, the former Nigerian Oil minister, allocated a huge oil field to the
company Malabu Oil and Gas – a company of which he failed to disclose his co-ownership. In
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2011, Etete sold the right of investment to Royal Dutch Shell Nigeria and Eni for US$1.1
billion. While the share remitted to the owners was US$800 million (Global Witness 2015),
the Nigerian government received only US$207 million as a signature bonus. The amount
received by the government was reported as a discrepancy in the 2011 NEITI Report. The total
amount of US$1.1 billion was equal to 80% of Nigeria’s 2015 health budget and would have
been enough to fund 1.7 million of the out-of-school girls in Nigeria to go to school for five
years (Global Witness 2015).

NEITI is a control mechanism that creates pseudo-realities as a substitute for the cause of
undesirable life conditions (Kersten & Abbott 2012). While NEITI focuses on the positive or
objectively verifiable aspects of revenue flows within the extractive industry, the reports
conceal that which is unpleasant and corrupt. The more information is revealed, the less
informed we are (Tsoukas 1997). The following section demonstrates how the direction of
transparency is a production within in a broader ideological performance of neoliberalism and
global capital. The ability to conceal and reveal, and to produce a script of transparency that
serves the needs of powerful players within a system of neoliberal economics are the
fundamental characteristics of a spectacle.

10.4 The script of transparency
While it is not a favoured policy for both governments and companies operating in developing
countries (Haufler 2010), transparency minimises political instability through attenuating any
debate or questioning of corruption and any discussion of the need for structural reforms in the
regime (Eigen 2007). As a spectacle, NEITI links transparency in the extractive industry to its
ideological context:
[T]he basic claim underlying Debord’s theory of the spectacle is the
assertion that what we see in the world – essentially, how the world is
architected – is a reflection of triumphant ideologies (Gilman-Opalsky 2011,
p.98).
224

The Nigerian extractive industry is a part of a wider neoliberal ideology in which the power of
capital and financial actors has dominated social, political and economic life (Lehman,
Hammond & Agyemang 2018; Sikka 2015). Neoliberalism is the idea of commodification and
self-regulating markets based on the premise of market competition with minimum government
intervention to efficiently allocate goods and services worldwide (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009;
Goldstein 2007). Therefore, transparency is a necessity to ensure market competition and
market efficiency (Meyer et al. 1997; Sovacool et al. 2016; Teurlings & Stauff 2014). This is
evidenced in the trend in which state regulatory and governance functions are delegated to nongovernment structures, such as companies and international institutions, without clear
transparency and accountability frameworks (Breslow 2015; McCarthy & Prudham 2004).
EITI and NEITI are examples of this trend of non-government initiatives for global governance
that represent a power shift between the government and non-government structures supported
by MNCs. For example, the legal director of Royal Dutch Shell, argues that EITI:
offers the best and only effective global common alternative to a patchwork
of variable and ad hoc national rules to legislate for so-called ‘financial
transparency reporting’ in the USA and Europe (cited in Rees 2014, p.20).
The previous section demonstrated the nature of NEITI as a spectacle of transparency that
conceals and underplays issues of corruption, operational issues in relation to tax revenues in
the Nigerian extractive industry and negative effects in relation to economic and human
development in Nigeria.

10.4.1 The scope of transparency
NEITI promised transparency in the revenue-collection cycle in the extractive industry to
ensure that companies remit, and the government receives, what was expected. In addition,
since the 2013 NEITI Report, NEITI has been tasked with revenue distribution, linking
transparency to the broader economic and social ideal of fighting poverty. However, the
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analysis attests that the only form of transparency provided by the NEITI reports is the
disclosure of information about the collection of cash revenues from the extractive industry.
Therefore, the scope of transparency is narrow and ignores the most common types of
corruption (for example, patronage54) in resource-rich countries (Kolstad & Soreide 2009).

For example, NEITI disclosures of cash revenues only are made at the expense of non-cash
tax-management technologies such as depreciation, provisions and transfer pricing. In addition,
the government’s revenue collection is made visible at the expense of its revenue expenditure
or revenue distribution. This reflects the feature of spectacle productions that makes some
aspects of an organisation visible at the expense of others (Flyverbom & Reinecke 2017). This
echoes Debord’s (1967) arguments about appearance and visibility as promoting a “brand or
image” of transparency or the rhetoric of transparency that enhances reputation to serve the
interests of a network of power.
While the scope of the NEITI reports provides narrow and partial transparency, the qualitative
characteristics of the information in these reports provides the second component through
which transparency is assessed.

10.4.2 The qualitative characteristics of the information in NEITI reports
The quality of the information about disclosures is more important than its quantity (Ejiogu,
Ejiogu & Ambituuni 2019). Assessing the qualitative characteristics of the information
disclosed in NEITI reports (Chapter 7) demonstrated that the information is questionable in
terms of its timeliness and in the materiality of discrepancies, verifiability, completeness and
accuracy. The quality of information in the NEITI reports, especially the reports’ timeliness,
may signify an attempt by government, companies and other NEITI stakeholders to control
54

Patronage is the lack of transparency regarding revenue expenditures (Kolstad & Soreide 2009).
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information in order to shape public knowledge, and thus public opinion, about matters of
concern (Tsoukas 1997). Thus, the spectacle of transparency is produced for international
stakeholders or spectators, such as the domicile countries of MNCs operating in Nigeria’s
extractive industry and international funding institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.
In addition, this spectacle is used for local spectators to shift citizens’ attention from their poor
life conditions and concerns about corruption to spectacular events (Kersten & Abbott 2012).
10.4.3 NEITI as a spectacle of transparency
NEITI compensates for the questionable quality of its data and its narrow scope of transparency
by highlighting its own positive contribution and shifting responsibility for incomplete work.
To achieve this outcome, NEITI uses several discourse strategies. The use of intertextuality,
specific pronouns, recommending terms, professional jargon, passive voice, active voice and
other rhetorical devices are just few of the strategies (Chapter 7). In addition, it includes the
rhetoric of an audited report with authoritative, formal, professional and neutral diction, and
statistical methods and devices (Chapter 8) (Brick 2011). The specific choice of text structure
and the rhetorical use of statistical methods and devices create an intended response from
readers and legitimises the text, its ideas and its producers (Gephart 2006; Young 2003). The
extensive use of calculative practices and statistical graphs in NEITI reports resonates with the
business model in Western society that takes for granted information produced by “apparently
scientific means” (Winiecki 2008, p.186).
However, NEITI reports’ size and extensive use of technical language raise a question about
the understandability of the information they provide and their ability to make the extractive
industry transparent to Nigerian spectators. Further, Hoinathy and Jánszky (2017) propose that
to promote transparency, accountability and better governance it is insufficient to have a robust
civil society; rather, this civil society should be empowered by educated, informed and active
citizens. Therefore, the level of education and the technical, financial and legal abilities that
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allow recipients to comprehend, process and use this information represent key components of
transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson 2016). However, out of Nigeria’s 40 million
children, 10.5 million are out of school, the highest proportion in the world (UNICEF 2017).
In addition, only 59.6% of the total population in 2017 were able to read and write, only 40%
of primary-school teachers are qualified and severe deficiencies in educational resources
persist. Thus, the ability of the reports to empower Nigerians as stakeholders to hold the
government and extractive companies accountable is questionable. This finding also aligns
with Remadji and Janszky’s (2017) study of EITI in Chad, in which the technical and complex
language of EITI reports and the high centralisation of the EITI process restricted involvement
in EITI to a group of educated elites. This raises the question of who the intended audience or
spectators of the NEITI spectacle of transparency really are.
In the case of NEITI, a network of power consisting of those “who have architected society for
their own interest” is represented by the relationship between the government and MNCs
(Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.73). Internally, governments usually aim to confirm that their
operations are “sufficiently open to public view and simple enough in its essentials that citizens
can readily understand how and what it is doing” (Dahl 1998, p.126). Thus, the Nigerian society
as a whole is one of NEITI’s intended audience of spectators. Externally, the Nigerian
government aims to be perceived as transparent and to gain international legitimacy and foreign
aid and attract foreign investments (Al Faruque 2006). This is similar to Boje’s (2001, np)
Consumption Spectacle, in which “[a]ccountants construct accounts that are consumed, not just
by clients, but by politicians, examiners, partners, and investors”. NEITI, therefore, is a
legitimacy mechanism used by MNCs to enhance their public image internationally (Egbon
2015), particularly with shareholders and other spectators in the MNCs’ countries of domicile.
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At the local level, NEITI communicates its activities to the Nigerian public through CSOs that
perform activities such as roadshows and workshops that are also spectacular, rather than
informative, events (Uzoigwe 2011). This, in addition to the other concerns discussed above,
confirms that the primary audience of spectators for NEITI is Western stakeholders and CSOs,
with the Nigerian public a secondary audience. NEITI acts as a gatekeeper and controller of
the narrative of transparency. In other words, NEITI is a spectacle in which phenomena, such
as transparency, are filtered, domesticated and integrated with the dominant models in society.
This is in line with Debord‘s (1967) argument that the spectacle filters ideas to give the old
social, economic and political models a false impression of innovation and originality. In
addition, this spectacle serves the MNCs and free capital flow interests externally, and
rhetorically addresses the calls for public transparency and accountability internally. NEITI
“redirect[s] citizens’ attention from structural inequalities to spectacular events designed to
subdue social criticism” (Kersten & Abbott 2012, p.324). As Merrifield (2004) argues, public
opinion is silenced with spectacular events such as the production of NEITI reports. This, in
turn, mitigates any attempt to challenge the constructed ideology or current system, and defends
the status quo (Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba 2011). These findings confirm similar studies in the
accounting literature that examined rhetoric as a silencing power in the context of studying the
power exercised by various organisations to silence their negative impacts and maintain
dominance. For example Chwastiak and Young (2003, p.533) studied how corporations
“silence the negative impact of their activities upon the earth, the hell of war and the beauty of
peace, the spiritual, human and social impoverishment arising from excessive consumption,
and the dehumanization of workers”. Further, Semeen and Islam (2020, np) examined how
“social impact disclosures, silence and rhetorical strategies are used as a mechanism of
symbolic power through which fair trade organizations maintain dominance over their
stakeholders in the fair trade field”. This highlights how NEITI reduces the concept of
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transparency to a mere image or spectacle that mediates relations with spectators. NEITI as a
spectacle becomes a need in itself because it signifies the transparency of the extractive industry
and becomes a pseudo-need for consumption. This demonstrates the ability of NEITI reports
to be a perception-management technology that creates a pseudo-reality of transparency, and
therefore accountability: this is the power of spectacle.

10.5 Spectacular accountability
The analysis in Chapter 9 suggests that NEITI is mobilised through networks, including the
provisions of the Act and the work of the NSWG. Accountability relationships manifest as an
actor providing an account to a forum (Roberts 2009). While seemingly uncomplicated, this
relationship can be complex and ambiguous. In the accounting literature it has been
demonstrated that accounts come in many and varied forms from audited financial statements,
images in sustainability reports, banners, posters and shareholder letters (Murphy & Moerman
2018). Because the accountability relationship relies on account, information that the actor
provides to the forum – in this case the ideal of transparency in the revenue flows in the
extractive industry – is a key enabler.
Currently, EITI, NEITI and other multi-stakeholder reporting mechanisms such as Publish
What You Pay, Revenue Watch and Transparency International are alternatives to government
initiatives to promote governance (Magno & Gatmaytan 2017; Schuler 2012). The increasing
participation of CSOs in this domain reflects the decreasing role of government. In this
neoliberal era, there is a perceived lack of confidence in the role of governments to represent
the public interest; instead, there is growing trust in CSOs and citizens as forums in a nonbinding or de facto accountability relationship (Bovens 2007; McCarthy & Prudham 2004).
Thus, in the case of NEITI the actor is a network of extractive-industry companies (both local
and MNCs) and the Nigerian government through its ownership of the NNPC, its share in other
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parastatals such as NLNG and its legislative authority. The forum or spectators are the NSWG
on behalf of citizens, government and companies, and the account is the NEITI reports. Boal
(1993) refers to this entanglement of actors and spectators that is often a characteristic of
spectacles as “spect-actors”: a process by which spectators are brought onto the stage in
spectacular productions as a form of rhetorical stakeholder engagement with those to whom
“we owe an account”. Accountability is a complex concept that manifests in several forms. The
three examined in this thesis are transparency-as-accountability, intelligent accountability and
public accountability. NEITI is a spectacle that mediates relations between the government,
the extractive companies and the Nigerians as an example of the regulatory shift evident in
neoliberal systems:
from binding to increasingly voluntarist, neo-corporatist regulatory
frameworks involving non-binding standards and rules, public-private cooperation, self-regulation, and greater participation from citizen coalitions,
all with varying degrees of capacity and accountability (McCarthy &
Prudham 2004, p.276).
Together, this complex image of accountability from the spectacle of transparency is a form of
spectacular accountability.
Public accountability
Since the impacts of the extractive industry affect Nigerian citizens, the EITI principles and the
Act specify the public as the intended audience for NEITI reports. Therefore, the promised
accountability embedded in NEITI is aligned with the principle of public accountability. In this
scenario, Nigerian citizens and CSOs are the spectators that hold the government and the
companies to account for financial flows. However, several factors lead to dysfunction in this
relationship: the modest level of transparency provided; the Nigerian public’s low level of
technical, financial and legal abilities; the weakness of CSOs in Nigeria, their lack of technical
and financial resources their reliance on the government for funding; and the government and
industry actors that dominate the NSWG mechanism. These factors indicate a considerable
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conflict between the modest levels of transparency, the aims of NEITI and the interests of
partisan actors.
In addition, the analysis in Chapter 9 demonstrated that, in practice, the Act does not have the
legislative power to enforce compliance with EITI principles, especially since NEITI cannot
initiate criminal prosecution or sanction defaulters. Therefore, NEITI is inadequate to
transform “transparency” into an obligatory accountability mechanism. Further, there is no
evidence to support the assertion that the Act achieves public accountability.
Intelligent accountability
Second, transparency can enable intelligent accountability by allowing quality information to
generate informed public debate. If NEITI disclosures are reliable, there is an expectation that
the spectators have access to the technical and financial resources to ask questions and
investigate the information supplied. The analysis in Chapter 9 confirmed that NEITI
investigates audit concerns by asking questions of the extractive companies, government
entities such as the NNPC and government agencies. Therefore, there are indications of a form
of intelligent accountability arising from transparency. However, the scope of this transparency
is limited, and the quality of the information is questionable (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). Since most
of the entities operating in the Nigerian extractive industry do not adequately respond to
NEITI’s inquiries (Chapter 9); important aspects such as the issue of tax breaks, corruption
within the NNPC, oil theft and other corrupt practices by MNCs and Nigerian officials are not
addressed in NEITI reports. These conditions hinder intelligent accountability or make it, at
best, a partial intelligent accountability.
Transparency-as-accountability
Third, transparency-as-accountability assumes that all one needs to make an informed
judgment is an increased quantity of data or information (Roberts 2009). In this scenario,
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accountability is reduced to merely making more things visible (Hood 2010). As NEITI is a
transparency initiative, it provides more information about revenue flows than was previously
available. Therefore, it demonstrates characteristics of transparency-as-accountability.
However, a lack of, or partial, transparency harms accountability by disclosing inappropriate
and inadequate information and hinders efforts to hold actors, in this case the government and
extractive companies, to account (Hood 2010).
NEITI manifests a network of power between actors including the NEITI auditors, government
agencies responsible for receiving extractive payments, government entities operating in the
extractive industry, the extractive companies and CSOs (Öge 2016a). In this network, the
responsibility of the NSWG is to monitor the process of NEITI, which makes the auditors,
government agencies, government entities and extractive companies accountable to NEITI.
While NEITI states that the NSWG, on behalf of citizens, is the spectator in the process of
revenue collection, there is no indication of how accountability for this audience is enacted in
the government revenue expenditure cycle.
Therefore, the NSWG is a primary spectator in its relationship with the extractive companies
and the government agencies and entities, and an actor in its relationship to the President and
National Assembly. Therefore, NEITI provides the spectacle of transparency-asaccountability as evident in the slogan “Promoting Transparency, Enabling Prosperity”. This
could be more accurately stated as “Promoting Partial Transparency, Concealing Poverty”.
This confirms Tsoukas’s (1997, p.827) opinion that “[m]ore information may lead to less
understanding; more information may undermine trust; and more information may make
society less rationally governable”.
In summary, there is a spectacle of transparency-as-accountability and minimal evidence of
public accountability or intelligent accountability.
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10.6 The NEITI spectacle
According to Debord (1967), spectacles are a mechanism of control in the guise of development
and evolution to conceal the dominant role of capital in society. NEITI was introduced in
Nigeria to ameliorate the resource curse that is the direct consequence of foreign investment
in the extractive industry. In other words, it is one of a long list of initiatives designed to
improve governance and community outcomes in resource-rich countries consistent with
development economics and a neoliberal agenda.
Debord (1967, p.3 & 4) defined the spectacle as a “social relationship between people that is
mediated by images” and described it as the “the very heart of this real society’s unreality”. In
the case of NEITI, this refers to the accountability relationships that are mediated by the image
of transparency. NEITI uses the narrative or story of transparency to imply that accountability
is in fact attained through the function of information disclosures: transparency-asaccountability. Therefore, NEITI uses the spectacle of transparency to convince spectators, at
a global level, that governments and MNCs are accountable to local actors, such as CSOs and
the public. Similar to other spectacles, NEITI reports invoke a superficial perception of their
significance rather than intellectual output (Crary 1989). This is further explained by Tsoukas
(1997, p.833):
Information becomes a surrogate for the world – what is actually going on
tends to be equated with what the relevant indicators (or images) say is going
on.
Based on the above, the NEITI reports make the concept of transparency visible at the expense
of accountability; make the appearance of the report visible at the expense of its content; make
the transparency of cash flows in the revenue collection visible at the expense of other noncash tax management strategies and the transparency of revenue expenditure; make the
reconciliation of cash flow visible at the expense of more important issues related to oil theft,
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corruption of government entities and tax breaks; and make the seemingly transparent and
accountable extractive industry visible at the expense of the reality of the resource curse. The
spectacle of transparency leads to forms of spectacular accountability.
The network of power, which includes the government and MNCs, is creating this image of
transparency that is a taken-for-granted belief about the best way to guarantee market
efficiency. This spectacle maintains the status quo to favour MNCs and neoliberal governments
by promoting the new norm in which voluntary initiatives such as NEITI replace the
government in governing the global economy and vital industries such as the extractive
industry. In return, the MNCs and governments receive monetary benefits. At this level of the
spectacle, the neoliberal system prevails through an alliance between governments and MNCs
that circulates the capital between the powerful players and maintains the status quo. Thus,
taking into account the types and extents of NEITI’s transparency and accountability, and
NEITI’s ideological underpinnings, NEITI is a neoliberal spectacle of transparency-asaccountability that provides partial transparency and harms accountability.

235

Chapter 11: Conclusion
This chapter discusses the findings of data analysis and contributions of the thesis. First, a
summary of the critical analysis of NEITI and its ability to provide transparency and
accountability to promote open and accountable management of the Nigerian extractive
industry is presented. Next, contribution to the accounting literature is discussed, followed by
theoretical and methodological contributions. The chapter concludes with the limitations and
further research opportunities.

11.1 Summary of findings
This thesis analysed the discourse of transparency and accountability of NEITI in Nigeria using
Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the Theory
of Spectacle. Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and heavily relies on the extractive industry,
especially its oil and gas sector (CIA World Factbook 2018; UNICEF 2017). However, despite
the abundance of natural resources, Nigeria is considered as one of the resource curse countries
due to its poor economic, social and development outcomes. The lack of economic and political
transparency and inadequate accountability mechanism contribute to the political, social and
economic issues in Nigeria (Akinrele 2014; Amnesty International 2017). To mitigate the
negative effects of the resource curse, Nigeria joined EITI in 2003. EITI was established as
“a global standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral
resources” (EITI 2017, np). However, after 17 years of implementation, the issue of how the
storyline or script of transparency is constructed conveyed and legitimised in NEITI reports for
an audience of spectators is salient. Instead, NEITI has sustained a spectacle of transparency
and an image of accountability for nearly two decades. This thesis addressed the issues of
transparency and accountability by:
1. Exploring how the meaning of transparency is constructed, conveyed and
legitimised in NEITI reports.
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2. Examining how NEITI discourse maintains the objective of promoting open and
accountable management of the extractive industry.
3. Critically evaluating the network of power and ideology that maintains EITI in
Nigeria.
Combining Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach to CDA with insights from the Theory of
Spectacle reveals how NEITI’s reporting made transparency visible and valuable while
mobilising accountability in the public domain. In addition, the analysis of the network of
power among members of NEITI’s National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) sheds light
on a network of interwoven interests between the government, companies, and CSOs, in the
age of global capital and economic dominance of neoliberalism.
Several studies in the literature have examined the operations of NEITI, especially its legal
framework. However, most of this literature lacks the contextual and ideological dimensions
in addressing NEITI’s work and structure. For example, a number of studies examined how
NEITI provides transparency through its ability to conduct reconciliations that reveal
discrepancies in the financial flows between the extractive companies and the government
(Aigbovo & Atsegbua 2013; Luqman & Lawal 2011). Other studies have focused on NEITI’s
legal framework, the NEITI Act 2007 (the Act), and its ability to enforce NEITI’s objectives
(Ako & Ekhator 2016; Ekhator 2014; Haufler 2010; Ihugba 2014; Okeiyi 2017; Okeke &
Aniche 2013; Löwenheim 2008). Ejiogu, Ejiogu and Ambituuni (2019) further studied NEITI’s
ability to provide transparency through examining the quality of information disclosed.
However, these studies detach NEITI from the network of power and ideologies that underpin
its outcomes. Finally, Egbon (2015) studied how MNCs operating in Nigeria dominate the
discourse of transparency through CSR reporting. This thesis analysed how NEITI shapes the
concepts of transparency and accountability through the production and language in its reports
within a network of powerful actors. As Debord (1967) argues, the spectacle is an image of
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reality that underpins a society’s unreality. Therefore, CDA and insights from the Theory of
Spectacle reveal that NEITI serves as a spectacle of transparency.
The visualisation level of analysis (Chapter 7) shows that NEITI reports (2004-2018) adopt a
formal, neutral and technical language, similar to an accounting audit report. In the reports,
there is evidence of different types of textual and rhetorical techniques, including the use of the
pronoun “we”, a soft versus strong voice, passive and active voice, and intertextuality. These
techniques achieve a particular agenda, including highlighting the significant contribution of
auditors to NEITI reports and emphasises the credibility of the information. However, a shift
in responsibility for incomplete work, such as investigating the cause of discrepancies in the
reconciliation of revenues is also evident. The analysis further revealed the narrow scope of
transparency in the NEITI reports. In particular, there are significant concerns about the quality
of data and NEITI’s ability to achieve transparency in terms of timeliness, completeness and
accuracy. Thus, the ability of NEITI reports to make this spectacle of transparency visible while
hiding other aspects is a defining characteristic of Debord’s (1967) spectacular productions.

At the valuation level of analysis (Chapter 8), the content of NEITI reports become valuable
through the production process and particular genre. The reports include structural features of
a formal audit report such as cover page, preface, table of contents, list of appendices, executive
summary, the audit methodology and the extensive use of calculative practices, and statistical
and numerical modelling. A formal report represents an image of credibility and reliability that
legitimises its content, ideas and its producers (Gephart 2006; Wegner & Bartlett 2009; Young
2003). As Crary (1989) argues, one of the characteristics of the spectacle is the dominance of
image over intellectual output. NEITI reports are designed for consumption by an audience of
spectators and the image of “audited report” dominates its content.
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The mobilisation level of analysis (Chapter 9) investigated how NEITI reports address
transparency and accountability. The chapter also examined the network of power between
different social actors involved in the process of the production, legitimation and dissemination
of the reports, including the composition of the NSWG and the Act. The analysis demonstrates
that NEITI reports do not directly address the concepts of transparency and accountability.
Instead, the reports use vague and blame-shifting language when the two concepts are
discussed, such as in the case of the loosely defined scope of transparency and accountability.
In addition, while the Act is considered the first of its kind in EITI-implementing countries and
legitimises NEITI as the key player in the government anti-corruption strategic plan, the
analysis shows a number of its limitations such as the inability of the Act to initiate criminal
prosecution or enforce sanctions against non-compliance.
Further, it was also revealed that the Nigerian President holds power to appoint the members
of the oversight body, NSWG, which makes the members accountable to the President and the
government. This imbalance in power challenges NEITI’s claims of independence and its
ability to observe, scrutinise and ensure transparency in the extractive industry. This also
compromises the role of CSOs members in NSWG as the “watchdog” of the NEITI process.
The power imbalance in the NSWG means that the Act only rhetorically reinforces NEITI to
achieve its intended objectives. And has little impact on ameliorating corruption, as
demonstrated in the many examples of concealment or misstatements regarding the state of
play in Nigeria, such as the issue of tax breaks and oil theft.
According to the Theory of the Spectacle, social relations are mediated through spectacles
(Debord, 1967). In the case of NEITI, the spectacle of transparency mediates a form of
spectacular accountability in the relationship between responsible extractive industry and an
independent government or state as accountable actors for revenue flows to the NSWG and
Nigerian citizens. Therefore, the three levels of analysis contribute to the conclusion that NEITI
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is a mere spectacle in which spectacular accountability is mediated through reports as a
neoliberal spectacle of transparency-as-accountability. In addition, NEITI reports as a
spectacle silence issues such as oil theft, tax breaks and other forms of corruption; and reinforce
to a distant audience of spectators such as stakeholders, that there is a change. The promotion
of transparency through voluntary initiatives such as NEITI is typical of neoliberal best
practices that guarantee open and transparent markets and replace the role of governments by
NGOs and MNCs both locally and in the global economy.

11.2 Contribution to the literature
In the current literature, several studies address both EITI and NEITI (Andrews 2016; Ihugba
2014; Okeke & Aniche 2013; Sturesson & Zobel 2015). However, except for a recent study by
Ejiogu, Ejiogu and Ambituuni (2019) that address the qualitative characteristics of the
information of NEITI reports, the majority of studies of the NEITI and EITI reports have used
quantitative methods such as panel data and regression analysis. These quantitative approaches
have examined EITI’s ability to fight corruption, improve foreign investments, provide
transparency and achieve economic growth (Corrigan 2014; David-Barrett & Okamura 2016;
Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr 2016; Malden 2017; Öge 2016; Papyrakis, Rieger & Gilberthorpe
2017; Sovacool et al. 2016; Villar & Papyraki 2016; Williams 2011). Further, studies such as
Egbon (2015); Ekhator (2014); Furstenberg (2015); Haufler (2010); Short (2014); Sovacool
and Andrews (2015) have commented on issues relating to EITI and NEITI but lacked
empirical specificity. This thesis contributes to the literature from an accounting perspective
by using a qualitative approach to gain insights about the spectacle of transparency that creates
an illusion of accountability in the Nigerian extractive industry. EITI, as a globally accepted
initiative with a unique structure, is a hybrid organisation that includes governments, MNCs,
domestic companies, and CSOs. Analysis of discourse in NEITI’s reports offers important
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insights into the role of organisational disclosures in creating and communicating a spectacle
of transparency.
In addition, the thesis contributes to the broader critical accounting literature by exploring
neoliberal power relations that exists in new hybrid forms of capital that use the market ideal
of transparency as a form of accountability to alleviate social issues such as the impacts of the
resource curse.

11.3 Contribution to the Theory of Spectacle
This thesis used a critical theory, Theory of Spectacle, to study NEITI and its network of power
within the Nigerian social, economic and political context. Critical studies have a dual purpose
by revealing unjust circumstances and structural inequality and identifying potential for
emancipatory change (Habermas 1996). Therefore, critical studies should explain the causes
of current structural inequalities and identify potential goals for social transformation. While
inequality is manifested mainly in the unequal wealth distribution, it “is rooted in social
structures that give some social groups more access to socially valued goods, practices and
positions than others”, that is unequal power distribution (Rehbein 2018, p.57). The Theory of
Spectacle is a well-established theoretical approach in marketing, economy, and the social and
political domains. However, its use and application in accounting literature is limited to only a
handful of studies as discussed in chapter 5 (Boiral 2013; Boje 2001; Boje 2001a; Chatterjee
et al. 2020; Gumb 2007; Pupovac & Moerman 2017; Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba 2011). Except
for the theoretical-based studies by the management scholar, Boje (2001, 2001a), accounting
researchers have examined management disclosures and corporate CSR reports.
In this thesis The Theory of Spectacle was used to explore how NEITI creates the spectacle of
transparency-as-accountability to distant and local spectators. As such, the thesis extends the
Theory of Spectacle to the disclosure of financial information to external spectators and
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supports the theory by providing empirical evidence. Thus, the spectacle of transparency-asaccountability is an example of how accounting is an important domain where the rhetoric of
publicly available information for decision-making is a spectacle.
At an organisational level, the spectacle of transparency-as-accountability through accounting
information and calculative practices promotes NEITI’s economic and social outcomes. It
justifies NEITI’s credibility and the practices and policies of dominant players, especially the
Nigerian government and the MNCs. This exemplifies the spectacular role of accounting in
rationalising social and economic reforms that support governments and MNCs to merit the
public trust and discharge accountability (Hines 1988; Catchpowle & Cooper 1999; Uddin,
Gumb & Kasumba 2011).
Further, the spectacular production and publication of NEITI reports give the spectacle of
transparency-as-accountability a megaspectacle dimension. In particular, the power to
mobilise public opinion and dominant economic and political models in society through
spectacle of transparency with poor and questionable data quality is more harmful to the
concept of accountability (Hood 2010). As such, the transparency-as-accountability
megaspectacle in the Nigerian extractive industry fixates the attention on the sustainable
spectacular production of professional looking audit reports. This has the power to silence the
public opinion and distract Nigerian citizens from the social inequality and inefficient and
corrupt system that maintains inadequate social, economic and living conditions. Further, the
transparency-as-accountability megaspectacle targets international spectators to ensure
foreign investment in the extractive industry, foreign aid to the Nigerian government and gain
legitimacy in the international community; while concealing corruption locally. Thus, this
spectacle transforms NEITI into a living example of social, political and economic control
technology to “redirect citizens’ attention from structural inequalities to spectacular events
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designed to subdue social criticism” (Kersten & Abbott 2012, p.324). Further, it also conceals
part of the corrupt practices in the Nigerian extractive industry, such as oil theft and extended
tax breaks that deprive Nigerian citizens of socio-economic benefits from extractive resources.
Therefore, it contributes to maintaining corruption and unequal wealth distribution between
MNCs, government officials and Nigerian citizens; resulting in low human development
indicators.
While the previous studies in accounting using the Theory of Spectacle examined the discourse
of MNCs, this thesis focussed on a hybrid form of organisation. The findings demonstrate how
NEITI has replaced the government in the promotion of better governance outcomes through
transparency and accountability. Thus, the spectacle of transparency-as-accountability
converts NEITI into an integrated spectacle that reflects the triumph of capitalism in its latest
version, neoliberalism. The dominance of this spectacle is evident through the coalition
between MNCs and the Nigerian government in an arena where the struggle of multiple
discourses exists. One example is the sections of the Act that grant the MNCs and government
exemptions from sharing information with NEITI. In this sense, the spectacle of transparencyas-accountability is the dominant social order that reflects “the ideological position of those
who have architected society for their own interest” (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, p.73). This is
consistent with the logic of neoliberalism since it shapes (through the global extractive
industry) the social, political and economic aspects of life in Nigeria. NEITI as integrated
spectacle also reflects the emergence of soft regulation that delegates the role of the states to
corporations, NGOs and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, but without
clear transparency and accountability frameworks.
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11.4 Methodological contributions
This thesis makes several methodological contributions. The use of Clegg and Kornberger’s
(2015) three-level analytical approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) represents its first
application in accounting literature. Clegg and Kornberger’s (2015) approach untangles the
complexities of discourse and combined with the Theory of Spectacle, exemplifies how NEITI
can maintain the spectacle of transparency to a range of spectators.
The analysis of the structural features of NEITI reports (Chapter 8) is similar to the second
level of Fairclough’s model of analysis and shows how text is legitimised in a broader social
setting; in other words, how “talk” becomes “fact”. The process of valuation is reminiscent of
van Dijk’s (1993, p.252) concept of social cognition that creates “social representations in the
minds of social actors” leading them to accept and embrace the content of texts.
The last level of analysis (chapter 9) examined how the networks and social actors such as the
government, MNCs and CSOs shape, control, dominate and mobilise public opinion towards a
specific topic or event. In NEITI, social actors use standards and rules, such as the Act, to
manage access and relationships within and between networks. Thus, the spectacle of
transparency-as-accountability promotes an accountable and transparent extractive industry,
but at the same time conceals that in 17 years of implementing NEITI, there is very little change
in terms of corruption and distribution of revenues from extractive industry.

11.5 Other contributions
This thesis highlighted deficiencies in delivering the accountability in NEITI’s mechanism.
While NEITI’s narrow scoped transparency delivered questionable information in terms of its
timeliness, materiality, completeness and accuracy, the thesis also revealed that NEITI failed
to achieve its promised accountability in the Nigerian extractive industry. For example,
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NEITI’s mechanism did not reduce corruption or the unequal wealth distribution between
MNCs, government officials and Nigerian citizens.
The analysis demonstrated several corrupt practices in the Nigerian extractive industry, such
as the oil theft and extended tax breaks that deprive a large proportion of the Nigerian
community from the benefits of extractive resources. For example, the results remain low in
terms of low human development indicators. Further, this thesis revealed an unequal power
distribution between the Nigerian government, MNCs and CSOs and how this is maintained
through the Act and NSWG. The thesis has demonstrated that, due to the reliance on domestic
regulatory, political, economic and social frameworks, the aims of EITI may not be delivered.
Therefore, in terms of practice and policy implications, the results demonstrate the need for
changes to the operationalisation of EITI in the Nigerian context to address the current
deficiencies in NEITI’s structure and processes.

11.6 Limitations
First, the unavailability of or restricted access to NNPC, extractive industry companies and
other entities’ reports is one of the limitations. The current NNPC’s reports are short and nonaudited “Annual Statistics Bulletin”, much different to an audited annual report. This has meant
that reconciliation of revenue streams revealed by NEITI and the actual revenues in the NNPC
Annual Statistics Bulletin was not possible. Second, this thesis focussed on the disclosure of
financial calculative practices, and the analysis was confined to the financial audit to the
exclusion of the process and physical audit. Including the process and physical audit sections
to the analysis would complement the empirical findings from other disciplinary perspectives
on disclosure and transparency. Finally, the data of the thesis was limited to publicly available
documents: the NEITI reports and the Act. For example, interviews with NEITI officials and
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management of CSOs could contribute to a spectator perspective and how various spectators
receive NEITI reports.

11.7 Future research
The thesis revealed that transparency is an elusive concept that is shaped by its context, scope,
the network of power that directs it, the quality of data produced, such as its timeliness,
completeness and accuracy, and the ability of this data to achieve transparency. All these
factors play a significant role in defining transparency and its ability to generate accountability.
The unequal power distribution between the Nigerian government, MNCs and CSOs is evident
and maintained through the Act and NSWG. From this further research, opportunities are
possible to contribute to emancipatory change and address the current deficiencies in NEITI’s
structure and practices. For example, including the process and physical audits, media
publications and interviews with members of NSWG can shed further light on NEITI’s role
and its ability to achieve transparency in the Nigerian extractive industry. Second, interviewing
CSO representatives that are not part of the NEITI structure provides an opportunity for a
counter account of NEITI reports. Counter accounts55 are used to foster change by highlighting
contradictions and inconsistencies in disclosures (Thomson, Russell & Dey 2015); and can
reveal views of NEITI spectators.

In addition, the emerging literature in ethnostatistics could be used as a methodological
framework to understand the presentation of graphical and statistical information in NEITI
reports. This methodological framework can assist in revealing the social context in which the
production of NEITI reports takes place. Ethnostatistics can also contribute to explaining how

Counter reports are “alternative representations of organizations, industries or governance regimes, produced
by civic society groups in order to rectify a state of affairs that is considered harmful or otherwise undesirable”
(Vinnari& Laine 2017, p.1).
55
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quantitative methods and the process of numerical and statistical modelling have a
performative aspect of making “things” and getting “things done” (Winiecki 2008, p.204).

Finally, there are opportunities to conduct comparative studies between NEITI and EITI in
other developing countries similar to the Nigerian context, for example, Iraq. But also
comparative studies between NEITI and EITI in developed countries, such as Norway which
joined EITI in 2007. This can contribute to comparing countries with different social, political
and economic contexts and explore the effects on the spectacle of transparency for a local
audience in a developed country context.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: EITI Principles
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative
economic and social impacts.
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s
citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of
their national development.
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over
many years and can be highly price dependent.
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure
over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic
options for sustainable development.
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the
extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and
accountability.
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of
respect for contracts and laws.
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment
that financial transparency may bring.
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability
in public life, government operations and in business.
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive
industry companies operating in that country.
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant
contributions to make - including governments and their agencies, extractive industry
companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations,
investors and non-governmental organisations. (EITI 2019c, p.6).
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Appendix 2: Identified rhetorical devices
Rhetorical device

Description

Ambiguity

A word, phrase or sentence that carries more than a single meaning.

Background image

Visual tools to support authors’ messages and meaning.

cliché

Refers to a sentence that is overemployed until it has exhausted its novelty.

Deductive reasoning

Moving from general established ideas to a specific conclusion.

Denotation

The dictionary meaning of a word.

Euphemism

A less direct word replaces an offensive one

Formal diction

The use of utilises objective, dignified and unpretentious terms and phrases to communicate the writer’s intended message.

Imagery

The use of a colour to conjure a feeling that supports the intended approach of the author

Intertextuality

A literature style that accommodates, juxtaposes, and transforms other texts, statements and voices to create a new text that serve the author’s
purposes.

Logo

A designed symbol identifies and distinguishes an organisation and its products.

Rebuttal

Discussing an argument in an attempt to disapprove by using reasoning and evidence.

Tautology

The repetition of the same meaning by using different words to emphasis and enforce the intended message.

Thesis

An idea statement upon which the main argument of that piece of literature is based.

Thriller

A rhetorical device that evokes excitement and suspense to the structure and emotions that are carried by a sentence

Understatement

When deliberately expresses an idea as less important than it actually is.

(El Hamad 2017, p.38)
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Appendix 3: NEITI NATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKING GROUP (NSWG) – 2008 TO 2012
SN
1

Name

Position

Representative

Background

Prof. Humphrey Assisi Asobie

Chairman

Civil Society

2

Mrs. Zainab Ahmed56

NEITI

3

Mr. Andrew Fawthrop

Secretary to
NSWG &
Executive
Secretary
Member

Rights activist (President of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People, MOSOP)
Accountant/ public sector executive

4
5

Shehu Sani
Comrade Peter Esele

Member
Member

6

Mr. Austin Olusegun Oniwon

Member

7

Alhaji Jafaru Aliyu Paki

Member

Expert-extractive
industry
Expert-Civil Society
Expert-Labour Unions in
the Extractive Sector
Expert- Government
company
North-West Zone

8
9
10
11
12

Dr. Muhammed Imam Yahaya
Alhaji Aliko Mohammed
Mr. Leke Alder
Mr. T. K. Ogoriba
Mazi Sam Ohuabunwa

Member
Member
Member
Member
Member

North-Central Zone
North-East Zone
South-West Zone
South-South Zone
South-East Zone

13

Ms. Ifueko Omogui

Member

Expert

14
15

Mallam Mahmud Jega
Alhaji Ibrahim Dankwambo

Member
Member

Expert- Media
Expert

Chairman and Managing Director Chevron
Companies in Nigeria
Human Rights Activist
President of Trade Union Congress (TUC)
Group Managing Director, NNPC.
Former Adviser to the President on Petroleum
Matters
No available information
No available information
Lawyer/Brand Strategist
President, Ijaw World Congress
President, The Nigerian Economic Summit
Group (NESG)
Chairperson, Federal Inland Revenue Service
(FIRS)
Editor, Daily Trust Newspapers
Accountant-General of the Federation

(NEITI 2016a).

56

Government- Minister of State for Budget and National Planning in 2015, and Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning in 2019
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Appendix 4: NEITI NATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKING GROUP (NSWG) – 2012 TO 2016
SN
1

Name

Position

Representative

Background

Mr. Ledum Mitee

Chairman

Civil Society

2

Mrs. Zainab Ahmed

NEITI

3
4

Mr. Dom Nwachukwu
Ms. Faith Nwadishi

Executive
Secretary
Member
Member

Rights activist (President of the Movement for the
Survival of the Ogoni People, MOSOP)
Accountant/ public sector executive

5
6

Mr. Bassey Ekefre
Ms. Abiola Ige

Member
Member

Expert
Expert- extractive companies

7
8

Mr. Toba Akinmoladun
Mr. Babatunde Ogun

Member
Member

9

Mrs. Kate Okparaeke

Member

Expert-Industry
Expert-Extractive Industry and
labor union
Expert

10
11
12
13
14
15

Mr. Andrew Yakubu57
Mr. Isaac Boyi
Mr. Musa Nashumi
Mrs. Maryam Ladi Ibrahim
Mr. Patrick Udonfang
Barr. Abubakar B.
Mahmoud (SAN)

Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member

Expert-Government company
Expert
Expert-extractive companies
Expert
Expert
Expert- extractive companies

Expert-Trade union
Expert-Civil Society

Geologist
National Coordinator of Publish What You Pay
and other international anti-corruption groups
MD, Ground Water Resources Ltd
Accountant, consultant to several government
agencies and international financial organisations
Executive director- Royal Dutch Shell Nigeria
President of (PENGASSAN), a labour union for
professionals in the Oil and Gas industry
Former President of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Nigeria
Group Managing Director-NNPC
Academic- Geologist
Mining Engineer
Banking and Finance
Lawyer
Commissioner for Justice, Kano State

(NEITI 2016b).

57

In 2018 Andrew Yakubu was accused in a money laundering case to the sum of US $9,772,800 and £74,000 (seventy-four thousand pounds sterling) (Adesomoju 2019).
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Appendix 5: NEITI NATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKING GROUP (NSWG) – 2016 TO 2020
SN
1
2

Name

Position

Representative

Background

Dr. Kayode Fayemi
Mr. Waziri Adio

Government
Media

Minister of Solid Minerals Development
Journalist

3
4

Mr. Lawan Gana Lantewa
Dr. Bernard Verr

Chairman
Executive
Secretary
Member
Member

Consultant
Accountant

5
6
7
8
9
10

Mr. Ndubuisi Emmanuel Chiejina
Barr. Hannatu Musa Musawa
Mrs. Anne Adaeze Onyekwena
Otunba Gbenga Onayiga
Dr. Maikanti Kacalla Baru
Dr. Mahmmoud Isa - Dutse

Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member

11

Prof. Olugbenga Akindeji Okunlola

Member

12

Mr. Clay Neff

Member

North-East Geo-Political Zone
North-Central Geo-Political
Zone
South-South Geo-Political Zone
North-West Geo-Political zone
South-East Geo-Political Zone
South-West Geo-Political Zone
Expert-Government company
Expert-Government (became the
Chairman since 2018)
Expert-Acadimea (Nigeria
Mining and Geosciences
Society)
Expert-Industry

13

Mr Kolawole Banwo

Member

Expert-Civil society

14
15

Mr. Sani Shehu
Comrade Igwe Achese

Member
Member

Expert
Expert-Union

(NEITI 2016c).
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Lawyer
Journalist
No available information
Journalist
General Managing Director NNPC
Permanent secretary of the Ministry of
Finance
Academic (Economic Geology)

Chairman & Managing Director of
Chevron Nigeria Limited
The Board of Trustees of the Civil Society
Legislative Advocacy Centre
Civil Rights Activist/ politician
Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural
Gas

Appendix 6: EITI Board Members 2019-2022
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(EITI 2019e).
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